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Introduction: Spenser’s Narrative
Figuration of Women

T

he focus of this book is the figuration of women within
Spenser’s narratives in The Faerie Queene. Its introduction addresses
my reason for using “figuration” in the title and begins to show why “narrative” is also featured—begins, because the proof of this pudding is in
the showing, the demonstrable effect of the moving, temporal dimension
of narrative on meaning as each chapter explores it. My use of “women”
in the title is lexical, the designation of an initial, recognizable grouping.
Within Elizabethan society and culture, including poetry and drama,
women was a functioning term, however much diversity it masked, enabled, or suppressed. I use the term in this historical, yet still open, still
moving, sense.1 In Rethinking Feminism in Early Modern Studies, Ania
Loomba and Melissa E. Sanchez observe that a key issue in early feminist
criticism and theory—and one currently “far from settled”—was “how to
define ‘woman,’” to which I would add, “and especially how to respect and
account for a multitude of differences between women.”2 Each chapter that
follows contributes to the significance of these terms in Spenser’s culturally encyclopedic text, refining and modifying what they encompass. In
this way, each illuminates women’s plights and possibilities in the age of
Elizabeth.
In emphasizing an unsettled use of language in its plural form,
however—women, not woman—I am implicitly privileging history, analytics, and difference over universalization, psychosociology, and theory,
although I am not excluding the latter trio, and in fact will bring it into
discussion when productive, clarifying, or in some other way helpful for
my purpose to do so.3 Simply, if not too simply, put, my allegiance is more
Aristotelian than Platonic in this study. One entailment of such prioritizing is my commitment to textual detail and specifics, and this means close
reading.
***

2   Introduction: Spenser’s Narrative Figuration of Women

Spenser’s figuration of women in The Faerie Queene is widely various, with
figures ranging from static to mobile, from mono- to multidimensional,
from monstrous to idealized, from purely fictive to strongly historicized,
with many a variant in between. Like the figures of men, they develop with
respect to the thematic focus of each book, some crossing from book to
book. Metaphorically and analogously, that is rhetorically, they also relate
to one another in interwoven, textual ways that resemble a network or web
and resonate with social and cultural structures, past and present. Political
and religious connections of this sort, together with gendered ones, have
been in evidence for decades, as have legal ones more recently. Spenser’s
richly figured text is a cross section of all these, and all further resonate with
my own longstanding interests in rhetoric and figuration, which, accompanied by a heightened attention to narrative, this book engages. The ancient
roots of rhetoric and law, for example, are thoroughly intertwined, as a
number of studies have emphasized with respect to intention, probability,
inference, equity, and character.4 To these, I would add the suggestive relation to the Spenserian text of the accumulative, comparative role of precedents in English common law and of the case-based reasoning of casuistry
in ethics and religion.5 My central concern, however, is with the interwoven, resonating, paralleling, developing Spenserian text itself—a text that
is variously parodic, analogous, allegorical, and intertextual. This concern
accords with other broad structural phenomena, even as it connects the
figures of women in Spenser’s more epic narratives in The Faerie Queene
with those in his more romantic ones—Una with Florimell, for instance.
Renewed interest in character in the past two decades and the controversies it has spawned and continues to spawn, especially in Shakespeare
criticism, have also generated additional angles from which to view
Spenserian figuration, and vice versa, and I have incorporated them.
Perhaps above all, these developments, together with others mentioned,
have further highlighted the critical function played by the lenses we choose
through which to examine early modern writings. This critical function will
be salient throughout my argument, as will the multiple lenses I openly
use—a different lens, sometimes more than a single lens, in each chapter.
Relevant terminology, itself a basic lens, has been prominent in
recent studies of Shakespearean character, involving word-concepts
such as personification, person or persona, figure, and character itself.
Personification and character in their modern senses, it turns out, are not
properly Renaissance terms, although this fact in itself does not disqualify
their informed use with respect to Renaissance texts. 6 André G. Bourassa
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offers a thorough discussion of the history in French of the word-concepts
personnage and caractère from ancient Greece to the Renaissance, which is
virtually the same as that of the cognate terms in English (83–85). Person
goes back to Latin persona, or “mask,” and George Puttenham’s term in
his English rhetoric for the counterfactual in “personation,” namely prosopopoeia, similarly goes back to Greek prosôpon, “something covering the
face.”7 Both terms involve fiction and identity, or questions of identity,
and both imply rhetoric, poetry, and, still more broadly, culture, society,
and civilization itself. Once freed from Proteus’s cave in Spenser’s fourth
book, for example, Florimell “mask[s]” her affection “with modestie” as
she prepares to return to society.8
The term I prefer with reference to The Faerie Queene is nonetheless figure, with an occasional exception, notably in chapter 3, which treats
Britomart, the figure of a woman in Spenser for whom the term character
also makes considerable sense, as it does in the criticism of Shakespeare’s
plays. For the same reason, notably in chapter 3, I also bring the modern
theories of figuration of Paul Ricoeur and Jean-François Lyotard into the
discussion, as well as theories of psychoanalysis and important discussions
of gender. These theoretical excursions, and several others, are relatively
brief, not focal, however. Their purpose is specific, meaningful connection, rather than overarching explanation for the entirety of the present
book. The Faerie Queene packs the sort of variety found in the panoply
of Shakespeare’s plays into the 35,000 lines (rounded) of an evolving narrative written over many years. The word-concept figure is particularly
useful with respect to Spenser’s massive poem and greatly various figures
of women because it encompasses a continuum from an emblem such
as Speranza, to an emotive image such as Acrasia, to a character such as
Britomart in dialogue with her motherly nurse about love-sickness. It further encompasses the vital connection between rhetoric and personation.
Characters in Shakespeare’s plays can also be, and variously have been,
called figures too.
Like persona and prosopopoeia, the English word-concept figure has
an ancient and expansive, revealing genealogy. 9 It derives via Latin figura
from fingere, “to form or fashion by art,” and, like its Latin parent, was the
customary rendering for Greek schema, “perceived shape.” The range of
historical significations the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) affords for
figure, notably cross-referenced with the verb feign, which is also derived
from Latin fingere, serves my present purpose well. These significations
start most generally with “form, shape,” then proceed to “the proper shape
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or distinctive shape or appearance (of a person or thing ),” specifically
including “an embodied (human) form”; a “represented form” or “ image,
likeness,” including an imaginary one; “a phantasm”; a “statue, image, or
effigy,” or even a part enacted; “an emblem, type”; “a written character,”
whether alphabetical, musical, or mathematical; or “any of various forms
of expression, deviating from the normal arrangement or use of words
. . . a figure of speech.”10 The list might be said to suggest a movement from
top to bottom, from finished creation to basic materials, from objective,
embodied person or thing to signs and their uses—notational or poetic,
purely referential or creative. The developing process of figuration within
the narrative, specifically as it affects Spenser’s major figures of women, the
ones about whom lesser figures constellate, is at the heart of this book. My
term for it is narrative figuration.
The role of the narrator in The Faerie Queene also bears on terminology and, as I inescapably found in writing this book, it recurrently bears
on the interpretation of Spenser’s figures of women. It does so all the more
because the function of Spenser’s narrative in the portrayal of these figures
is crucial—more than perhaps we have thought. Long since, writing a book
on Spenser and the medieval poet William Langland, I encountered the
importance of the narrator’s role and at first attempted to keep the term
“poet,” that is, the poet’s voice in the poem, apart from the term “narrator,”
but I found this distinction increasingly difficult to maintain as Spenser’s
poem developed. I finally abandoned it, explaining this fact in my discussion of the 1596 installment.11 These Spenserian voices recurrently interact
with and blend into each other, as do voices in Chaucer’s General Prologue,
another of Spenser’s models. More recently, in a chapter on “Chaucer’s
and Spenser’s Reflexive Narrators,” I compared the narrative personae of
Chaucer and Spenser, making use of poststructural theory; in another
chapter, “What Comes after Spenser’s But in The Faerie Queene,” I considered both these narrators from the perspective of linguistic minutiae, in
Spenser’s instance the diction, rhetoric, and grammar of his sixth proem.12
In the present book, I have referred in specific contexts of The Faerie
Queene to the “perceptual unreliability of the narrator” or to the “sometimes unreliable narrator,” to the narrator as “a persona, himself a mask,
now to be trusted, now not, now within the fiction, now apart from it,” and
to a Spenserian narrator who is inconsistent “even in his masking.” Like the
other figures of Spenser’s poem, “its narrator also evolves and shifts. His
own figure is contextualized.” These views reflect those in my earlier publications, but I have found them newly pertinent in considering Spenser’s fig-
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ures of women, as will be evident in the chapters to follow. In these, I have
used the terms “poet,” or “Spenserian poet,” and “narrator,” or “Spenserian
narrator,” as the context has invited them. In passing, I’ll mention that I
encountered similar issues regarding poetic and narrative voices in discussing Milton’s Paradise Lost, whose poet considered Spenser his “Original.”13
Another issue this project raises is that of separating out Spenser’s
figures of women for discussion. This separation risks decontextualization,
as to varying extents do any other kinds of selection, for that matter. I hope
to have lessened this danger by being keenly aware of it and by having considerable familiarity with the poem, enough (I hope) to recognize when
more context is needed. Spenser’s massive poem is verbally intricate, and
its interwoven plots and multiple characters are challenging to remember,
not unlike those in Shakespeare’s King Lear or his earliest Henry plays.
Overlooking Spenserian specifics blurs or distorts Spenser’s poem, which
responds most fully to careful, reflective reading. The relation of reading
to rereading is another issue bearing on interpretation as well as on teaching, which analysis should consider, and I do.
A compensating advantage of choosing to focus on Spenser’s narrative figuration of women has been the surprising perceptions and connections that have not been seen before or have not been seen the same
way, something that I found happening both with new chapters and with
those that incorporate revised segments of earlier publications. Despite
my interest in the narratives of The Faerie Queene over the years, focusing
on its figured women has highlighted the importance of these narratives
still further. Taken together, their stories themselves have a distinct tale to
tell about the function of narrative in The Faerie Queene. Storytelling is a
basic, perhaps the most basic, age-old way of organizing and understanding experience, and the multiple, multiplying narratives of Spenser’s poem
are not an exception. That the stories of the figures I treat in detail are
moving narratives—at points or in instances sadly stilled ones—is vitally
important in itself. As the figure that Spenser names Mutability realizes,
only what moves lives and, while living, changes. In addition to illuminating the work of Spenser’s storytelling, his narrative figurations of women
also differ to such an extent that they resist easy generalizing, or indeed,
isomorphic theorizing, in this respect reflecting his still moving, metamorphic poem as a whole. The Faerie Queene is fundamentally committed
to process and exploration, and a reading of it should be as well.
***

6   Introduction: Spenser’s Narrative Figuration of Women

In the first three of the chapters that follow, I have concentrated on
the three major figures of women in The Faerie Queene, namely, Una,
Belphoebe, and Britomart, including the interlinked relations of their
stories with those of Florimell, Amoret, or both. Other women-figures
enter the discussion as well, certainly Duessa, Una’s wicked double.14 Each
of these chapters, as their titles signal, makes the figure of a woman the
focal subject. The fourth chapter groups other figures of women on the
basis of stillness and movement, constancy and change—figures found in
a single location or situation and those that move into different places and
contexts. It then concentrates on several figures in the mobile grouping,
namely, Aemylia, Serena, Mirabella, and Pastorella—particularly Serena.
Although these figures lack the prominence of the titular figures of my
first three chapters, they are much more than features of an allegorical
landscape and prove particularly challenging with respect to reading it.
Some years ago, I passed up an invitation to write an article on
“Spenser’s Women” for The Spenser Encyclopedia because I did not see
how to treat them together compactly for that format without producing
something that looked like essential femininity or “Woman.” As already
noted, they are much too various. Accordingly, each of the following chapters takes an approach that fits the narrative figures in it, using a different
lens and sometimes more than a single lens. Chapter 1 approaches Una
through the history of parody and specifically through Spenserian parody.
In the early cantos of every book of The Faerie Queene, parody plays a significant role, which includes parodic self-citation. It also includes both
parodic content and parodic expression and both criticism and sympathy.
Its subject is often sacred, as in the instance of Una and as it frequently is
in the Middle Ages and, much later, in the poetry of John Donne. Broadly
conceived as “comic quotation, imitation, or transformation,” parody enables a shift of perspective that makes Una at once less simple and more
accessible.15 Parody is committed to play, not simply in its ludic sense but
also in its open, or loosening, complicating, moving, one.
A telling instance of Spenserian parody that I examine in chapter
1 links the sexual assaults on Una, Florimell, and Duessa (faked in her
case). The memorably onomatopoeic word “blubbered,” which applies in
the 1590 poem only to these three figures, occurs in all three assaults. The
contextualized precedent of Una’s blubbering, defined by similarity to
and difference from that of the other two figures and vice versa, opens up
larger issues that pertain to her figuration more generally and to the widely
contrasting critical responses that it has evoked in recent publications. A
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number of these responses make Una either wicked or otherworldly, mere
flesh or mere spirit. They miss the integrity of her figural being.
Other salient instances of parody in the first chapter that pertain to
Una include the opening cantos of Book I and the satyrs’ forest, a place of
Ovidian myth and kindness in every punning sense of this word and one
that only Una in Book I and Hellenore in Book III get to visit. A major
portion of this chapter concerns the culminating return of Una to Eden,
together with Redcrosse, her chosen dragon-slayer. This is a return that
extensively parodies both the biblical garden that is lost forever and its
restoration. Many readers of The Faerie Queene, including me, have again
and again used the words “parodic” or “parody” with reference to specific
parts of it. My argument in this chapter is that a shift of perspective to
recognize parody more fully and openly enables the recovery of Una’s
figural being, which is distinctly that of a woman. That it should do so
with respect to Una, a human figure of Truth, affords a particularly stringent test and meaningful confirmation. That this shift should occur in the
opening book of the poem, moreover, makes it especially notable in what
follows, as appropriate—that is, not as a totalizing template but as a single,
recurrent possibility.
Taking a different approach, chapter two focuses on Belphoebe,
who enters the poem in Book II. Belphoebe is named after a classical
moon goddess, a mythologized aspect of nature, and not, like Una, named
after a metaphysical conception. Further unlike Una, who is betrothed
to her human lover at the end of her story, Belphoebe is relentlessly virginal and never reconciled with her twin sister, Amoret—“Love.” In further contrast to Una, Belphoebe appears in three successive books, each
a different thematic context. Increasingly, these books seek some form
of balanced relationship that progressively involves others. Depiction
of Belphoebe begins with a long, all-inclusive, idealizing portrait of her
early in Book II, a momentary pause narratively framed by the parodic,
low-life figure of Braggadocchio, her lustful contrary. Nothing comes
of this meeting of opposites, which abruptly ends with Braggodocchio’s
lecherous lunge and Belphoebe’s raised javelin, then her flight.The opening portrait of Belphoebe is full of suspended tensions between mythic
and mortal realities that the narratives of Books III and IV must further
confront, and as early as the third proem, these tensions involve Queen
Elizabeth’s sometime-favorite, Sir Walter Ralegh. At the same time, they
conspicuously affect the poet-narrator’s role as recurrently he turns to lyric
and myth. In Book III, a narrative impasse in the eroticized relation of
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Timias and Belphoebe issues in the strange glorification of Belphoebe’s
rose, which is a virtual apotheosis, and then, in Book IV, in the entanglement of Amoret in the relation of Timias and Belphoebe. Amoret’s
plight becomes a thinly disguised reference to the secret marriage of
Ralegh to Elizabeth Throckmorton and the disgrace of them both in the
eyes of the queen. The poem becomes openly subject to history, as does
my approach to it and as the subtitle of chapter 2, “History’s Interlude,”
signals.
Although Timias and Belphoebe are reconciled, Amoret, first captured by Lust and later abandoned in the forest by Belphoebe and Timias,
is subsequently found by Prince Arthur. Seeking shelter, Arthur unwittingly takes Amoret and her female companion to the House of Slander,
an old hag whose figure is a hideous cartoon alluding unmistakably to the
queen. Although parody is not my focus throughout the present book,
here I would nonetheless stress that allusion itself is ludic (< ludere, “play,”
alludere, “play with”). Serio ludere is a Renaissance commonplace that
embraces parody, from its more benign expressions to the more biting
expressions into which it can blend. Again, parody persists as a possibility
in The Faerie Queene, although it never encompasses the whole as it does
in contemporary works by Rabelais and Cervantes. All or nothing is not
the Faerie way.
Belphoebe never leaves the woods in the course of the poem, and
her portrayal gives us no sense of her developing interiorly or consistently
from one of her appearances to another. Her virginity is the only other
consistency about her, and it begins to look like fixation. Whereas Una,
another allegorical figure, learns from experience, Belphoebe evidently
does not. In another figural contrast to Belphoebe, her twin, Amoret, is
nearly always found in Houses or more broadly in cultural topoi in the
poem—in situations set apart from the moving narrative of quest, if also
in some sense part of it as a sort of way station. But even as The Faerie
Queene invites categories and distinctions, it seems always to breach the
one and trouble the other when read closely. The woods—in extreme
intertextualized form the Wandering Wood—can be considered a topos as
well, yet, in its wilder forms, the woods can still be distinguished from the
more cultivated places. If, unlike her twin sister, Amoret herself ever really
changes, she does so in the company of the questing Britomart, a subject
treated in the third chapter, which focuses on this cross-dressed knight.
Both Amoret and Florimell are part of Britomart’s story. As earlier noted,
I make Florimell a comparative part of Una’s as well.
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Britomart is the most complex of Spenser’s figures of women.
Instead of looking at her through a single lens, I use several sequentially in
chapter 3, which not surprisingly is the longest in this book. The first lens
derives from recent discussions of Shakespearean character, particularly
Alan Sinfield’s, and then shifts to a primarily rhetorical focus, as does Book
III itself in its culminating episode of the House of Busirane. 16 My focus
next becomes primarily mythic, iconological, and thereby gendered, tracing Britomart’s arming and her armor itself from early episodes in Book
III, through Book IV, to her final battle in Book V. Although the lenses
I use are, like those of others, still selective, together they seem relatively
more adequate to the nuances and development of her figuration than a
single lens could ever be. Even so, they do not exhaust the possibilities.
From the opening episode of Spenser’s Book III, Britomart’s
agency, her mind, and her inside, which differs from her armored outside,
are emphasized. She has a father rather than a myth of origin, a kindly
old nurse, and both a history and a projected future set firmly on earth.
From the outset, moreover, she and her adventures are defined by their
relationships to and differences from those of numerous others. She has
a social existence more pronounced and complex than that of other figures of women in the poem. A number of additional “character effects”
Sinfield finds in Shakespeare’s women are also found in Britomart, for
example self-reference and self-questioning , which include soliloquy
and lying (58–59). Also included are indecision, decision-making, and
informative conversations overheard by the audience (or readers), which
raise questions about intentionality (59). Although I do not want to make
Britomart into a cross-dressed Shakespearean heroine, I am not alone in
having seen similarities between her and Shakespeare’s Rosalind, Viola, or
his other, ostensibly female cross-dressers.
Britomart’s experiences prior to the House of Busirane lead into
it and, like this place, they specifically increase her awareness—Sinfield’s
“developing interiority” or “consciousness” (62, 65). For Britomart, this
perverted rhetorical House of Ovidian myths and Petrarchan conceits
that spread over two cantos is a further education and initiation into the
erotic culture in which she, too, has functioned to this point. The abusive Busirane, a poet-magician, has captured Amoret, transfiguring her
from what she was in the Garden of Adonis to the Ovidian-Petrarchan
love object, and Britomart’s task is to free her from Busirane’s spell and
thus to enable arrested love. Busirane represents a fantasy and a culture
of rape, but his ultimate wish remains only that. Britomart frees Amoret,
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and Busirane’s artworks vanish, in 1590 leaving behind only a trace, an
ambivalent hermaphroditic image.
When a continuation of the 1590 installment comes in 1596, this
image and the actual reunion of Amoret with her knightly lover, which
was imaged in the hermaphrodite, are gone. Instead, the action of Book
IV opens with Amoret and armed Britomart on a single horse, thus in
silhouette another hermaphroditic image. Britomart masks her identity
as a woman from the apprehensive Amoret, who thinks that her fully
armed rescuer is a man. Thus abusing Amoret by playing with and on her
responses, Britomart performs and thereby explores her own manhood,
as contemporary readers of myth could have imagined it. Thus feigning,
abusing, and likely faining, she inherits something of Busirane’s role,
along with Amoret, whose role as victim Britomart had earlier entered
empathetically while rescuing her. Psychologically oriented readers might
recognize here a doubled traversal of fantasies.
The combined silhouette of Britomart and Amoret on the horse
further anticipates the hermaphroditic statue of Venus within her eponymous Temple later in Book IV. Britomart by herself is an armed Venus—
traditionally, a Venus armata—however, and for my purpose she is most
significantly a combination of Venus and Mars, not simply a VenusVirgo or even a Minerva/Athena. The principle of erotic coupling in The
Faerie Queene, embodied in its principal couple, Britomart and her lover
Artegall, requires four terms, not just two opposites. Each member of the
couple variously includes the male or female other, and this is why the
grotesque, immobile, hermaphroditic image of binary opposites at the end
of Book III in 1590 proves inadequate. This is also why the true Britomart
is not simply within the armor and why she is crucially wearing her armor
when she finally fights Artegall in hand-to-hand combat and is reconciled
to him. Her armor and her agency have become effectually the same in the
course and process of Books III and IV. In Britomart’s close combat with
Artegall (disguised as the Salvage Knight), he is wounded, but she is not,
although her horse is, and her ventail, or mask, is sheared off to show her
face, framed by wisps of hair. As in the House of Busirane, she remains in
control, and Artegall yields to her before she accepts him.
Britomart is an evolving figure in Books III to V, and, in their
course, her armor figures the development of her integrity and its loss.
Though armed in Book V, she is no longer armed distinctively in her own
armor. Recurrently, her identity is mistaken or misinterpreted—first by
Dolon, ironically named for a Trojan who betrayed his own side, and then
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by the ascetic priest of Isis, who ignores the personal and suppresses the
passionate in Britomart’s experience, overwriting them with dynastic concerns. What makes a crucial difference, however, is the extent to which
the poem goes out of the way to expose the fact that Britomart herself does
not realize what is happening in this process of transference and substitution—misappropriation, in another lexicon, still rhetorical but now also
economic, or structural. It is openly done to, not by, her figure, bearing in
this respect some similarity to Busirane’s transfiguration of Amoret, with
the significant difference that Britomart has not spent her whole preceding life in the sheltered Garden of Adonis (then in the similarly enclosed,
protective Temple of Venus, if we factor in the 1596 installment).
Accordingly, the description of Britomart’s final battle with Radigund,
Artegall’s jailor, is specifically wasteful in sexual and generative terms. It
witnesses the abuse of Britomart’s figural integrity. Britomart pays a high
cost for rescuing Artegall. Killing Radigund, she loses too much of herself,
and, with this loss, the many inconsistent, problematical figures of women
in Shakespeare that Sinfield and others address—characters with a “continuous consciousness” until it fails or falls silent—also come back into
view, returning to memory like so many cultural ghosts.
As the main title of my fourth and final chapter, “Phantasies, Pains,
and Punishments,” signals, in it I shift from the single focal subject of the
earlier chapters to take stock of the rest of Spenser’s narrative figures of
women. I have subtitled it “A Still-Moving Coda” for the relative brevity
and generality of its first third, while signaling that this coda escapes its
own generalizing soon after.17 As earlier indicated, my approach to the rest
of these fictive women has a basis in the paradoxical combination of stillness and movement—still moving. This basis derives from discussions in
chapters 1 to 3, with respect to which it is a recurrent drumbeat. They lay
the groundwork for it, as also happens in the developing context, book by
book, of the poem itself. Both terms, stillness and movement, have positive
and negative extensions: for example, stillness suggests stability, constancy,
conceptualization, and lyric sublation or, conversely, fixation and death;
movement suggests life, time, change, and narrative or, conversely, instability and inconstancy. On this inclusive thematic basis, one grouping of
Spenser’s fictive women consists of those found in a single location and
condition—thus situated or placed. As presiding genius, any of these good
or evil figures might move within her site, as do Lucifera and Alma, but
not beyond it. The chapter offers Acrasia as a contained example of this
group, insofar as her figure is central to questions about sex and gender in
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the poem. Explicitly mythological figures and statues of them I mention
but do not pursue, because my concern is primarily with figures more distinctly human. Many of the former I have also discussed extensively elsewhere (and endnote as appropriate).18
My chief concern in the fourth chapter is with the relatively lesser
figures of women who move into different places and contexts. While
Duessa and Hellenore get attention, as Duessa already did in chapter 1, the
mobile figures mainly treated in chapter 4—Aemylia, Serena, Mirabella,
and Pastorella—are all in the 1596 installment, Aemylia in Book IV, and
the other three in Book VI. With their inclusion in this project, all six
books of the 1596 Faerie Queene are represented. Although relatively
minor compared with Una, Belphoebe, and Britomart, each of the main
figures of chapter 4 has narrative life—a story. Aemylia’s is a story of transgression, suffering, and reform whose conclusion stands in marked contrast to that of Amoret. The interlinked stories of Serena and Mirabella
are profoundly psychological studies of female misery, and they further
extend and transfigure Amoret’s and Belphoebe’s twinned stories as well.
The story of Serena in particular is simultaneously and significantly the
story of her figuration. There is less to the story of Pastorella, but she is
the last fictive woman of note in The Faerie Queene of 1596, and her story
brings my discussion back to that of Una and Redcrosse at the end of
chapter 1.19 Like their story, Pastorella’s ends with restoration. This ending
is at once fit and parodic, the same yet also quite different—still moving.

Chapter 1

Parody and Perfection: Spenser’s Una

T

his chapter begins with background that enables and
introduces my focus on Una’s figuration, while deferring her thematic
dominance for a time. It moves from the general to the more specific, from
a discussion of parody as a historical form to parody in the 1590 Faerie
Queene, especially with respect to Una, Duessa, and Florimell, all three of
whom resonantly “blubber” in the charged context of near-rape. Building
on their parodic relation, the chapter then examines the problematizing of
Una in stark terms of good or evil in recent criticism, which I interweave
with my own readings of her experiences throughout Book I. It concludes
with a substantial treatment of parody in Eden, where Una’s story achieves
a divinely comic ending.
***

My opening question is whether we have fully appreciated the extent
and degree to which The Faerie Queene, like contemporary masterpieces
by Rabelais, Shakespeare, and Cervantes, makes a defining use of parody,
albeit not an exclusive or overwhelming use. Without denying the serious
moral and religious force of the poem, might we do so? Would a greater, more specific recognition of the presence and function of parody in
Spenser’s epic, as apart from irony, satire, or simple contrast, shift our
sense of it? In asking such questions, I am deliberately seeking a shift in
perspective that will make Una both more accessible and less simple as a
figure.
Each book of the epic uses comic parody early enough for it to be
a formative influence and thereby signals a fundamental commitment to
play in both the ludic and open senses of the word. This is also a commitment to process and exploration, which a reading of each book should
reflect as well: just for example, in Book I, Archimago’s parodic impersonation of Redcrosse initiates and intermittently propels a comic subplot;
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in Book II, the figure of Braggadocchio reflects back parodically on both
Guyon and his Palmer; the parodic Malecasta in Book III, together with
Florimell, frames its first canto, and Florimell quickly accords with the
thematic “mirrours more then one,” her figure later to be parodied specifically by her double, the False Florimell.1 Additional examples abound in
the 1596 installment: in the opening cantos of Book IV, the outrageous
parody of friendship by the false foursome; the parody that relentlessly
dogs the execution of Artegall’s justice in the early cantos of Book V; the
parody in Calidore’s quest throughout Book VI, evident in the ironic juxtaposition of pastoral and violence from the earliest cantos to Melibee’s
idyll. In the first of the Mutabilitie Cantos, Mutability’s rebellion, itself
already parodic, is then further parodied by Faunus. Such familiar examples are only a start, but, coming early in each book, they are, like other
first impressions, important and lasting. Of course, as each narrative
progresses, it is subject to modification and, in the instances of each book,
to significant, even radical modification. The paired protagonists of Book
I, Redcrosse and Una—perhaps Una most of all—afford an especially telling test of the parodic potential of Spenser’s epic romance, and they will
appear recurrently in subsequent discussion.
Whatever early preview of The Faerie Queene Spenser’s friend
Gabriel Harvey saw, parody aligns suggestively with his familiar response
to it as “Hobgoblin runne away with the Garland from Apollo.” Harvey’s
critical jest contrasts with the enthusiastic praise of Spenser’s lost comedies that it follows. 2 In context, Harvey further compares what he has
seen of The Faerie Queene unfavorably with Ariosto’s model romance and
instead recommends that Spenser return to the generic model of ancient
and contemporary writers of dramatic comedy, including Aristophanes.
Perhaps the academic Harvey was more of a generic purist than Spenser
or, perhaps, less of a one. Anciently, Aristophanes also affords a familiar
model—perhaps the model—of parody.
Parody might well be the major term from ancient Greece that
describes “comic quotation, imitation, or transformation,” although parody is also a practice that readily overlaps, merges with, or even blends
into satire and irony, two other ancient terms. 3 Additional terms of relevance, such as burlesque, travesty, pastiche, double-coding, and meta-fiction
are all more recent. Although these terms have variously been identified
with parody, by themselves they are generally narrower or even other with
respect to it. Both great parodies—the usual historical examples being by
Aristophanes, Rabelais, Cervantes, and Sterne—and the ancient roots of
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parody are more complex and inclusive; they are capable of criticism, sympathy, or both at once—that is, of balance, ambivalence, or simple ambiguity. They include both parodic content and parodic expression, either
of which can also constitute parody by itself. These, too—complexity and
ambivalence, criticism and sympathy, and content, expression, or both—
are further points of emphasis.4
John Florio’s Italian–English dictionary of 1598 refers to parody,
as does Henri Estienne’s Greek dictionary in 1572. The widely read J. C.
Scaliger discusses parody in his Poetices libri septem of 1561 (Rose 9–10).
Strictly English sources, namely the clergyman Thomas Walkington (The
Optick Glasse of Humors, 1607) and Ben Jonson in Every Man in His
Humor (performed 1598, published 1616), employ the term. Anciently,
the term parody occurs in Aristotle’s Poetics, referring to the comic writings
of Hegemon and Nicochares, parodists of epic style and matter.5 Ancient
commentators on the writings of Aristophanes extend the term to “all
sorts of comic literary quotation and allusion” (Rose, 15). Quintilian also
refers to parody as imitation and as an abuse of language, a sort of extended
catachresis.6 (Catachrestic form is a thought to ponder: in miniature, consider, analogously, the paradoxical phrases “coy submission” and “modest
pride” to describe Milton’s Eve, for whom either word alone is insufficient
and a single, proper word is lacking.)7 In the Middle Ages, comic wit and
structural doubleness are notable in biblical parody, in musical and visual
parody, in such an elaborate comic subplot as that of The Second Shepherd’s
Play, and in Chaucer’s self-reflective Tale of Sir Thopas and Tale of Melibee,
both tales important to Spenser. In medieval England and Germany, parodies of the Mass were endemic in “the underworld of clerical writing,”
as well as in the margins of religious and legal books; according to Miri
Rubin, readers, hearers, and viewers were continually reconstructing the
“eucharistic symbolic,” using “old materials to signify new perceptions and
to express altered points of view.”8 By the later Renaissance, Petrarchan
parody is so widespread as to have become a subject in itself. Under Queen
Elizabeth and King James, John Donne parodies sacred subjects in erotic
poems and erotic poetry in holy sonnets. The historical, complementary
co-existence of such parody signals its play, its double-sidedness, its loosening of boundaries, its potential for inclusion and connection.
Etymologically, parody derives from the greek word for song or ode,
oidē, and para, a prefix indicating “beside” or “against”—that is, either
nearness or opposition—and by extension implying either sympathy, on
the one hand, or contention, on the other. Use of the same prefix, para, in
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words such as paradox and parallel are analogously suggestive, particularly
since they also convey notions of doubleness—with paradox, doubleness
of thought; with parallel, doubleness of representation. Margaret A. Rose,
to whose work I owe much, allows that humor was not always or necessarily present in ancient parody, but her own definition, sensitive to sourer
and narrower modern theories, requires it: “the comic refunctioning of preformed linguistic or artistic material” (52). By refunctioning, she wants to
signal creativity and, by preformed material, to get beyond the misleading reduction of parody only to style. Again, she stresses the comic nature
of parody, while nonetheless acknowledging exceptions. The word comic
itself, I would add, also has a range of meaning, applicable both broadly to
humor and to a tale with a happy ending, for example.
For my present Spenserian purposes, parody has a specific connection with imitation and citation, including self-citation and self-reflection,
and, in short, with mirroring, including refraction, or bending. It also
involves incongruity and revisionary recreation, typically comic in some
sense. Irony, probably the term most often used for a number of relevant
passages in Spenser’s epic, is at once broader and less specific. Although
irony can describe a recurrent or continuing attitude, such as that of
an eiron like Socrates or Chaucer, irony is traditionally classed as a figure—Puttenham’s “Drie mock.”9 Although parody, like irony, can apply
to a single sentence, it typically has more formal substance; we might
announce an intention to write—to compose—a parody, less likely one
to compose an irony. If extensively applicable, irony becomes an adjective;
parodic becomes a noun—parody. Granted this last distinction, I note that
it appeals to our experience of literature, which evokes responses. Again,
however, I would stress both the tenuousness of provisional distinctions
such as that between irony and parody and their usefulness for thinking.
Parody, as my description of it has indicated, is a flexible term.
Maddening to anyone rigorously logical as this lack might be, parody has
fuzzy edges, as do most other literary terms, such as those of rhetoric.
Ideally, these terms outgrow the taxonomic fixation useful for beginning
students, and the same applies to the distinctions of genre, whose most
striking characteristic is that its forms are ever developing and changing.10
Parody overlaps with other techniques, forms, and categories, and vice
versa. Among these, in addition to irony, are allusion, comparison, and,
in their loose senses, analogy and intertextuality, all of which are broader
and less specifically—that is, neither exclusively nor absolutely—committed to the comic, in all the breadth of this happy term itself, than parody is.
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Literary terminology is most valuable as a platform for the exploration of
thoughtful, affective, exploratory response, not as a means of pigeonholing. Platforms are important, but they are only a start.

Parody and the 1590 Faerie Queene
Before returning to Archimago’s impersonation of Redcrosse early in the
second canto of Book I, which I briefly mentioned in the section above, I
want to go back to the beginning of the first canto of this same book. In
its initial stanzas, St. George’s armor on a knight seeking a dragon, accompanied by a lady with a lamb on a leash, lends parodic potential to this
overdetermined figure of the popular, as well as of the more elevated, imagination.11 The knight and the lady, both nameless and set against a blank
landscape at the outset, also trigger memories, further parodic, of many
an iconic illustration in a book of hours or other devotional volume.12 Of
course, this is not all the initial descriptions suggest, but only what is to
the immediate point: at the outset, these figures, which take shape progressively, remain silhouettes and outlines, still to be filled in—and filled
out. The many verbal ambiguities inhering in them, especially in the figure
of Redcrosse, only increase their potential. The narrator speculates that
the figure of Una, whose whiteness is obscured by her black stole, “inly”
mourns, a heavy care in her heart.
Skimming, for the present, over multivalent parodies in the first
book, such as the Wandering Wood, its abiogenetic reptilian resident,
the helpful heavenly maiden’s advising Redcrosse to spend the night with
Archimago, this tempter’s mumbo-jumbo, his sprite’s comic katabasis to
the Cave of Morpheus, and more, I now return to Archimago’s impersonation of Redcrosse. It is of particular interest because it involves the
narrator’s parodic self-citation. It begins when Archimago, having separated Una from Redcrosse and set her “wandring” once again through
the woods, decides to disguise himself, trying out his extensive repertoire
of “formes and shapes” (I.ii.9–10). These, especially his dragon number,
unsettle him, “That of himselfe he ofte for feare would quake, / And oft
would flie away.” His fright anticipates the target of this proleptic parody,
namely Redcrosse, who, fourteen lines later, is said to be fearfully running
away from himself (“still flying from his thoughts and gealous feare”: 12).
Properly, the prolepsis belongs to the narrator, who sets up the parodic
echo. Between prolepsis and subsequent echo, Archimago dons armor and
accoutrements matching those of Redcrosse, and the narrator lingers over
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a detailed description of this impersonation, as if to savor its ourageous
wickedness: “the mighty armes,” the “siluer shield,” a “bloudy crosse,”
a “bounch of heares” upon the helmet (11). Then comes the narrator’s
parodic self-citation of the opening stanza of the poem, in which we got
our earliest glimpse of Redcrosse:
Full iolly knight he seemde, and wel addrest,
And when he sate vppon his courser free,
Saint George himselfe ye would haue deemed him to be.
(I.ii.11)

For the first time in the poem, the saint is named, if only as a seeming falsehood. As we know, the words, syntax, and stanzaic location of these breezy
lines parody the first stanza of canto i: “Full iolly knight he seemd, and
faire did sit, / As one for knightly giusts and fierce encounters fitt.” Doing
so, they simultaneously unsettle the identity of the figure within the armor
we first met and the perceptual reliability of the narrator. Uncertain reliability becomes a heightened possibility upon which the poem will play—
and play variously—thereafter. No figure, including the narrator, will be
wholly exempt from it. Whether considered locally as parody or under an
overarching umbrella of parody, such play takes on a role that need not
be abrasive, corrosive, or, indeed, destructive, although in theory it could
be. In striking examples from later books, the parody even of Artegall
or Calidore in their first cantos does not cancel the fact that they are, as
we say, more on the side of the angels than their vicious opponents
are. Their virtues may be modified and redefined, critically scrutinized
and profoundly questioned, but not wholly undermined or simply
invalidated.
At the outset of Book II, there is again parody aplenty even before
Braggadocchio’s debut. Guyon’s response to Redcrosse, then to Duessa, is
itself parodic, and the Castle of Medina is surely a parody of true temperance. But my favorite instance is Duessa’s so overplaying the part of violated
virgin that the disguised Archimago has to tell her to dial it down (i.16).
By parodic contrast, details of Duessa’s botched audition recall Una’s earlier response to the actual assault of Sans Loy in Book I. Duessa’s “fowly
blubbered” face and “garments rent,” for example, disfigure Una’s “ruffled
rayments, and fayre blubbred face.”13 In response to this parody, what is
called for, finally, is judgment—sensitive, critical judgment, which by its
very nature is subject to demonstration, dispute, and, when justified, revision. Embracing the possibility of revision, such judgment is provisional,
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working within an ongoing process that includes play rather than excluding or shutting it down. Tonally, the difference between torn garments
and ruffled raiments is both subtle and considerable, not to mention that
between fair and fowl. Raiments, a word deriving from an Old French verb
meaning to array, suggests finery, and “ruffled rayments” suggests merely
disordered ones, whereas Duessa’s ripped clothes and disheveled hair suggest something more brutally physical—cruder and rawer.
The memorably onomatopoeic word “ blubbered” applies in
the 1590 Faerie Queene only to Una, Duessa, and Florimell, linking
their assaults, while further description radically differentiates them.14
“Blubbered,” is a word that originates in connection with bodies of water.
It could well have been used to initiate an Ovidian metamorphosis into
a brook or a spring, part of the landscape on the order of the nigh-raped
nymph’s “bubling fountaine” in Book II.15 Applied to a human being, it
is, at least potentially, an undignifying, even ugly and degrading, word,
in all the weight of the notion of dignity, or human worth, in this period.
This weight is religious, not simply social, insofar as it enters discussions of
merit, justification, and punishment.16 In short, “blubbered” is a carefully
chosen word that befits a context of rape, whether actual or feigned.
I’ll turn next to the events that open Book III and begin to define
its context. They start with Britomart’s unseating Guyon, proceed to the
vision of the fleeing Florimell, and finally turn to the episode of Malecasta,
an obvious parody of chastity. Recalling the figure of Verdant in the Bower
of Bliss, at the outset of Book III the “fiery feete” of Guyon’s horse “burne /
The verdant gras” and doing so, parodically reinforce the comic justice, not
to say the condignity, of this knight’s come-down at the end of Britomart’s
spear (i.5). Biblically, “all flesh is grass,” and, with Florimell on the narrator’s horizon—proleptic but also close by—“all the goodliness thereof is
as the flower of the field”: Isaiah 40:6.17 The castle of Malecasta displays a
tapestry that is further mindful of the mythic potency of Acrasia’s Bower,
now transposed to a social landscape—a court, not an isolated islandcoupling. This tapestry features eros and death in the story of Venus and
Adonis, ending with a fictive woman bending over a dying man, another
parodic recollection of the Bower.
Near the outset of Book III, Florimell bursts onto the scene as a sudden, striking impression that is gone almost as soon as it comes, although
it also lingers memorably.18 The forest setting is deeply shaded, and her
appearance “out of the thickest brush” is white, gold, and sparkling
against it:
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Vpon a milkwhite Palfrey all alone,
A goodly Lady did foreby them rush,
Whose face did seeme as cleare as Christall stone,
And eke through feare as white as whales bone:
Her garments all were wrought of beaten gold,
And all her steed with tinsell trappings shone,
Which fledd so fast, that nothing mote him hold,
And scarse them leasure gaue, her passing to behold.
Still as she fledd, her eye she backward threw,
As fearing euill, that poursewd her fast;
And her faire yellow locks behind her flew,
Loosely disperst with puff of euery blast:
All as a blazing starre doth farre outcast
His hearie beames, and flaming lockes dispredd,
At sight whereof the people stand aghast:
But the sage wizard tells, as he has redd,
That it importunes death and doefull dreryhedd.
(III.i.15–16)

The impression Florimell’s figure creates is beautiful, fearful, ethereal,
portentous, ominous, and, paradoxically, both fleeting and lasting. At
first, the view of the lady is frontal, starting with her face. In the second
stanza, the view is from behind her as she passes from sight. The phrase
“Still as she fledd” suggests movement and its opposite, stillness; she is at
once fleeing and frozen in fear—like the nymph of the fountain in Book
II. Comparison of her hair to the tail of a comet with “flaming lockes dispredd” enlarges her significance, associating her with anticipated sorrow
and death, of which there is much in Book III. Notably, she is not named
in the text until canto v, where her dwarf finally recounts the cause of her
leaving the court to find Marinell, her wounded love. The fact that this
cause is withheld until then resists identification of her in canto i too simply with “flower honey,” a translation of the name Florimell. As ever in
Spenser, we read the image as we go, not rushing to the typically reductive
label that the narrator deliberately (parodically?) withholds until later.
In years past, this image of Florimell was identified primarily with
Neoplatonic beauty. More recently, it has been read as desire or, specifically, male desire. In all instances, eros would be a better, broader, historically more accurate term. The fleeing beauty, after all, is followed by
an image specifically of male lust in the figure of the forester with his
punny, phallic “bore speare.” The two male knights who join the chase are
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motivated by eros to pursue a beautiful and wondrous object of desire,
rather than by lust in itself. Comic as may be the sight of two knights on
a single horse in pursuit of their fleeing vision, Guyon, however given to
outbursts of wrath, is still the patron of temperance, if now without the
exclusion or denial of eros.19 Bestial lust flees in another direction, and
Timias, who, Harry Berger observes, is here first named in the text, goes
after the would-be violator. Timias’s proper name, deriving from “honor”
in Greek, deflects readings of his motivation as merely its opposite.20 By
the same reading, honor may not be motivating the eros of Guyon and
Arthur, but neither is animal lust.
The cross-dressed Britomart, now also named for the first time in
the text, is constant to her own quest, indeed, explicitly to her own “mind,”
declining pursuit of either forester or Florimell. She cares not to “follow beauties chace” or “Ladies Loue” (i.19). Although these phrases are
ambiguous (the chase of beauties, beauties’ or beauty’s chasing; the love of
ladies, ladies’ or lady’s loving), Britomart’s rejection of them simply comes
down to the facts that she is not interested in chasing a fleeing woman or
in flight as a means of escape. Florimell’s fear of the slobbering boor who
chases her is entirely justified, as later is her continued flight from a helmeted knight with unfamiliar insignia, not to mention the reader’s awareness that the sight of her has erotically motivated this knight. Projection of
Florimell’s fear onto Britomart, however, is textually unjustified.21 On the
one hand, a flightly female is just not Britomart’s type, and, on the other,
Britomart, far from rejecting eros, actively and aggressively seeks Artegall.
In the Castle of Malecasta, she also feels misplaced empathy for its impassioned seductress. Although Book III makes the theme of “mirrours more
then one” focal, every figure is not interchangeable with every other one.
Spenser’s figures of women all have some relevance to one another, but
they are not simple projections or doubles of Britomart. Their differences
and contrasts are as defining as are their similarities and likenesses. Parody
is well suited to enable the complexity of this mirroring.
Since I have made an issue of the word blubbered, I propose to follow it to its reappearance in Florimell’s would-be rape by the fisherman,
and then back to Una’s by Sans Loy. The parodic relationship between
these scenes is further defining. Ultimately, it will introduce consideration
of what might be termed “the problem of Una.” Recurrently analogized
by the narrator to small, frightened, fleeing animals—a “light-foot hare,”
“a fearefull Doue”—and later to Ovidian figures fleeing in fear—“fearfull
Daphne” and, more puzzlingly, “wicked Myrrha”—Florimell progresses
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from the natural fear of a predator to a fear that is culturally and mythically defined. This defining fails to distinguish Daphne’s choice of virginity from Myrrha’s incestuous guilt.22 In short, Florimell’s travel takes her
from the erotic context on the near side of the Garden of Adonis into
the seamier context on the far side, a context that at moments infects the
narrator’s perspective, too, as in the conspicuous instance of Myrrha. A
similar development will bear on the depiction of Serena in Book VI, who
might be seen to have stepped carelessly into the allegorical landscape that
the Blatant Beast inhabits (iii.23–24).23
On the far side of the Garden, an impressive assortment of parodic
perversions of eros emerges: the witch, her son, and her other misbegettings, namely the hyena-like beast and False Florimell; Argante and
Ollyphant, twins in lust, incest, and predation; the Squire of Dames, a
promiscuous figure who belongs in a fabliau; the dirty old fisherman and
shape-shifting Proteus, exemplar of instability; Malbecco, Hellenore,
and Paridell, who parodically figure the destructive force of eros in history; and finally Busirane and his aestheticized house of erotic horrors.
Florimell’s continual flight through the woods to the sea seems to descend
through a scale of being : her flight into and through the woods, then
the monstrous destruction of her signature white horse and the loss of
her identifying girdle, the mixing of her garments with fish scales,
and her abduction by the flux of the ocean. She suffers a near-metamorphosis into what her blubbered face portends—the foam or airy bubbles
of the sea: faced by Proteus, she is “Ruffled and fowly raid with filthy
soyle, / And blubbred face with teares of her faire eyes” (III.viii.32).
The words “Ruffled” and “raid” (arrayed) echo the description of Una’s
raiments when the satyrs frighten Sans Loy away; “fowly” and “faire,”
respectively, recall Duessa’s faking and Una’s distress in comparable
situations, as well. “Soyle” could indicate genital fluid, presumably
spilled by the fisherman.24 More obviously here, the victim is soiled by the
victimizer.
I can’t say that I find anything funny about Florimell’s shame and
fear when Proteus claims her. Now she is compared to “a fearful partridge,
that is fledd / From the sharpe hauke,”
And fals to ground, to seeke for succor theare,
Whereas the hungry Spaniells she does spye
With greedy iawes her ready for to teare.
(III.viii.33)
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Florimell comes closer to the physical brutality of rape than any other
figure of a woman in the poem, with the partial, elusive exception of
Serena and, still more symbolically and psychologically, of Amoret. Yet
the run-up to Florimell’s terror is a shameless parody of double entendres,
such as her prayer to the old lecher “to guide the cock-bote well,” since
“the great waters gin apace to swell” (24). Whether this doubleness is
perversely shameless or innocently so, as well as for whom it is either, are
open questions, although at least we know that the old lecher—hardly
offered as a role model—responds to Florimell’s hapless words by “fondly
grin[ning]” (24).
Nevertheless, Florimell’s rescue from the fisherman parodies Una’s
from Sans Loy in Book I. Like Florimell’s, the extremity of Una’s fear, evident in her “fayre blubbred face,” also finds expression in an image of natural instinct:
She more amazd, in double dread doth dwell;
And euery tender part for feare does shake:
As when a greedy Wolfe through honger fell
A seely Lamb far from the flock does take,
Of whom he meanes his bloody feast to make,
A Lyon spyes fast running towards him,
The innocent pray in hast he does forsake,
Which quitt from death yet quakes in euery lim
With chaunge of feare, to see the Lyon looke so grim.
(I.vi.10)

Although wolf, lamb, and lion carry biblical associations not found in
Florimell’s hawk, partridge, and spaniels, the affective content is similar.
Florimell’s rescue, again like Una’s, is preceded by an evocation of
providential care that attests to her chastity and innocence, making the
narrator’s earlier comparison of her to Myrrha even more dubious, indeed,
hasty and foolish:
See how the heauens of voluntary grace,
And soueraine fauor towards chastity,
Doe succor send to her distressed cace:
So much high God doth innocence embrace.
(III.viii.29)

Proteus, hearing the shrieks of Florimell, hastens to her aid, much as do
the satyrs to Una’s. Less benign than the “wyld woodgods,” as the satyrs are
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called in Book I (vi.9), however, the shape-shifting Proteus and the restless
sea in which he lives realize Florimell’s movement in some sense, even as
he imprisons her because of her constancy—once again her stillness (“Still
as she fledd”: III.i.16)—in the rocky cave from which she then can fly no
more. Movement and stillness, like eros and death, continue to inform her
figure and parodically to recall the nymph of the fountain in Book II.
The evocation, or rather the invocation, of providence in anticipation of Una’s rescue is more elaborate and emotional than in Florimell’s,
although the extremity of their peril is similar. Yet the “heauenly virgin”
Una, who teaches truth among the satyrs, is a different figure in the narrative context of a different book, and her plight asks for discrimination. 25
Having snatched Una’s veil from her face, Sans Loy tries flattery first, then
force. At this point, the narrator exclaims, “Ah heauens, that doe this hideous act behold, / And heauenly virgin thus outraged see, / How can ye
vengeance iust so long withhold” (vi.5)? The “shiekes” and “cryes” of the
“pitteous mayden” follow, together with her “plaintes” to the heavens,
That molten starres doe drop like weeping eyes;
And Phoebus flying so most shamefull sight,
His blushing face in foggy cloud implyes,
And hydes for shame.
(I.vi.6)

Whereas Florimell, like Serena later on, feels shame before her rescuer and
hides her face in fear, here it is Phoebus who both flies from the shameful sight of violent assault and, hiding his own face, exhibits, as if by
contagion, its shaming effect on him. The extravagant figure of stars that
melt into tear drops could be considered either hyperbole or catachresis
by Renaissance standards, in either case a figure associated with an excess
befitting the situation.26
What happens next in stanza 6, however, is more controversial, and
my own relationship to it has wavered over the years. Ending this stanza,
the Spenserian narrator asks a question that might first be taken at face
value: “What witt of mortall wight / Can now deuise to quitt a thrall
from such a plight” as Una’s? The answer comes instantly, at the outset of
the next stanza, “Eternall prouidence exceeding thought, / Where none
appeares can make her selfe a way: / A wondrous way it for this Lady
wrought” (7). In retrospect, the question that ends stanza 6 might be considered rhetorical, but only if we overlook the difference between the wit
of a human being and eternal providence, obviously God here. Yet Berger’s
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observation that the sequence is comic, comparable to “operatic parody”
and calculated to remind us that “in spite of all the fuss, everything is well
under control,” has traction. When Berger adds that the question and its
answer “serve mainly to alert the reader to Spenser’s own inventiveness,”
however, his reading offers to replace parodic multivalence with deflating skepticism and to exclude “Eternall prouidence” from the Spenserian
equation.27 The special virtue of parody is to enable a balance of empathy
and comedy, seriousness and play. Una’s plight engages, not only operatic
excess, but also the violence of rape and the doctrine of grace—God’s concern for truth and for human beings. If “the heauenly virgin” Una is never
as physically imperiled as Florimell, her figural being modulates all these
possibilities, and, in the immediate instance, it does so through the inclusive, nuanced potential of parody.

Parody and the Problem of Una
Una’s blubbering, even more than that of the other figures of women, has
opened up larger issues pertaining to her figuration, to critical response,
and to parody. Una is conspicuous in the first book of the epic, and this
book, as opening, is ground and backdrop for the working of the books
that follow. Since the subject of Book I is religious—by its nature bearing on the most serious, ultimate of concerns—it also offers a particularly stringent test of the extent to which the poem might be considered
parodic and its very allusiveness ludic (cf. allusive, < ludere, “play”). Serio
ludere is a Renaissance commonplace that embraces parody. The conception of allusive parody, including the self-citational sort, begins to grasp
the complex tonality of Book I, as the preceding section has suggested.
To judge from recent criticism, Una’s figural being, the kind of figure
she presents, has become more problematical than it was in days gone by.
Without the extremities of recent criticism, in fact, Una might not be a
problem or have one. We live in extreme times. Truth being the daughter
of time, to cite the old adage, recent enlightenment might well be progress,
although it is difficult to see how the extreme diversity of current views can
all be equally enlightened. A number of readings find that Una is deficient,
overbearing, emasculating, or simply evil, especially in the early cantos of
Book I, whereas others have continued to find her benign or heavenly in
updated or reinvigorated ways. My point is that the current problem of
Una inheres in the reception of her in recent criticism and is made accessible by it. Accordingly, my plan is to interweave diverse, recent, broadly
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representative views of her figure—historicist, comparative, psychoanalytical, and theological—with my own readings and especially with the
parodic potential of her figuration, thereby to recognize and include, if
not to reconcile, them. Already in this chapter, I have found her figure
touched by allusive parody, at once in retrospective rereading and immediately. In the end, discussion of parody in the twelfth canto, which treats
Spenser’s Eden, will offer a possible resolution of issues that bear on Una’s
figural being there and elsewhere.
One driver of the negative readings of Una is the fact that we never
get inside her in the way or to the extent we do with Redcrosse. Her lamblike innocence—is it instead her simplicity, her oneness?—is hard to
bear. Briefly, at least, Una, seeming to mourn “inly” from our first sight
of her, comes to experience emotions such as grief, fear, anger, compassion, doubt, and joy, which connect her to the realm of human passion
and indeed to humanity as we mortals know it, but she remains upright,
despite her brief, despairing swoon when she encounters the dwarf with
the armor that Redcrosse abandoned before Orgoglio seized him. If she
falls, she does so ritualistically “Thrise” (I.vii.24), and we know she will
get up: not operatic parody this time but an experience—yes, ritualized
experience—that touches her and does so without causing a sustained and
damaging descent.28 Notably, she gets up before Arthur comes to the rescue, her renewed resolve and strenuous effort seeming to coincide with
his arrival in the narrative (vii.27–29). Experience is not by definition
corrupting (except in the mouth of Milton’s Satan). Moreover, Una is a
figure who, from start to finish in Book I, occupies substantial portions of
text and even whole episodes, making her a major player in this book. Her
experience, not only Redcrosse’s, plays a defining role.
Claire McEachern calls Spenser’s epic “This least inward of poems,”
and Una might well be the major figure to whom McEachern’s remark
most nearly applies.29 More recently, Kathryn Walls has described Una as
primarily an emblematic character, to an extent a designation comparable to McEachern’s, although for Walls Una figures the Invisible Church,
whereas for McEachern she figures the contemporary, national church of
the Tudors: if there is similarity in these two views, there is more substantial difference.30 Yet Una is not only an autonomous figure in the narrative
of the poem, but sometimes crucially she also represents an aspect—an
interior dimension, if you will—of Redcrosse, as, for example, when she
intervenes both physically and psychically to stop his suicide. After she
and Redcrosse are divided into “double parts” early in canto ii, neither
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is complete without the other, and both are potentially—not necessarily
or always already—inside and outside one another. 31 Their relationship
thereafter depends on demonstrable context; often, it is ironic, parodic, or
both and therefore a sign of difference and distance—of divisive doubleness. Their reunion signifies wholeness, first incipient and in the end, if
not perfected, at least assured.
From the beginning, when Una and Redcrosse wander through the
Wood and stumble upon Error, Una is clearly characterized in the narrative as contingent truth, or truth in this fallen, human world. She does not
possess infallibility or even the intuition of an angel. Complaints about
her evil, deceptions, or failures arise from a reductive conception of her
either as only a woman or else from too simple an assumption of her ideality, one so exaggerated as to replace the unfolding narrative by an a priori
idea of her as purely an abstraction or a mystical sign. This is a false division of concept and signifying figure from narrative. Either extreme, Una
merely as woman or merely as ideal, effectually replaces the working of
narrativized figuration in Book I and bifurcates or denies her integrity as
a figure.
When Una is abandoned by Redcrosse, she or, rather, her unfolding experiences organize the evolving forces of nature, history, and grace
that will rescue Redcrosse—the lion, the satyrs, Satyrane, and eventually
Arthur, in sum an ascending scale, as well as one that implies a historical progression. As Coelia puts it in canto x, Una “Hast wandred through
the world,” leading her “weary soles” (an obvious pun) and guided by
grace, while the benighted Redcrosse has sunk into the darkness of himself (I.x.9). When Una mistakes the disguised Archimago for Redcrosse
in canto iii and later, in canto vi, for a pilgrim, her error, which parodies,
by similarity and difference, the initial response of Redcrosse to Duessa,
again bears witness to the inescapable human fallibility of her figure.
In a relevant, religious commonplace of the period, only God sees into
the mind and heart and alone unerringly penetrates hypocrisy, which is
Archimago’s moral aspect (I.i.arg.). Not to be divinely unerring is not simply, in a sinful sense, to err; it might instead be an honest mistake and, if
culpable at all, not willfully so: to err, the saying goes, is human, and, in
Una’s characterization, it is at once inevitable and further humanizing.
When Una’s “pet lion” (as Richard Halpern comically dubs him)
also fails to respond to Archimago’s evil in canto iii, it is first and foremost because he is a lion, not because Archimago has morphed into Judas,
as Walls suggests, nor because the lion has become Una’s projection, as
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Halpern indicates.32 At the same time, Judas, as hypocrite, like any other
egregious, historical expression of hypocrisy, could be considered a specific aspect of what Archimago conceptually represents, if this reading is
invited by the context. Satan himself, the guileful father of lies, is surely
another candidate, should we want one, since Archimago is said to hate
Una “as the hissing snake” in the Garden of Eden, that is, as the shapeshifting Satan (I.ii.9).33 In short, in the episodes involving Una, the figure
of Archimago, when present, is a larger term for hypocritical guile even
than the historical Satan, although Archimago’s figure alludes more than
once to Satan and will do so again in Spenser’s Eden.34
In the developing narrative of The Faerie Queene, figures often represent many historical singularities, whether once or recurrently, rather than
just a single one. Una’s lion does not recognize Archimago because this
guiler does not use force, as do Sans Loy and earlier Kirkrapine. In this
failing, the lion is analogous—again, analogous, not an identical projection—as variously elsewhere, to Redcrosse, who can recognize and deal
with the direct, martial threat of Sans Foy but fails to recognize anything
wrong with the disguised, deceitful Duessa. The lion, after all, whatever
else he might be, is an animal. He is evidently also truth-loving by nature,
or kind, as are all God’s human creatures and instinctively his nonhuman
ones, too, especially when contextually animated—anima, or ensouled to
an extent, as the word animal signals.35
McEachern’s argument about Una concerns history, politics, and
ideological representation—more exactly, the coding of ideological distinctions onto the female body. McEachern recognizes that Una is associated with the invisible Church but focuses instead on the challenges of
representing this church, or Christian truth, in the world by the figure of a
woman whose binary opposite, Duessa, is another such figure. McEachern
observes that the very clothing of Una renders her vulnerable to imitation,
and as supporting evidence she offers contemporary, overlapping illustrations of Queen Elizabeth and the Romish whore of Babylon (53–58).
She suggests that Una’s visibility as a clothed, attractive figure of a woman
necessarily compromises her absolute purity by embodiment and her selfsameness, or identity, by susceptibility to duplication (45–46). Notably,
however, Una only appears unveiled in her “self-resemblance” when
restored to Eden, as distinct from her unveiled distortion by “blubbred”
terror before Sans Loy (I.xii.8, vi.4, 9–10).36 Although McEachern’s generalization about the absence of inwardness in Spenser’s epic is mistaken
in my view, her problematizing of Truth’s gendered expression in clothing

Parody and Perfection   29

and as beauty is valuable.37 Berger seems to agree when he finds that, “Una
is no less visible than Duessa and no less an idol,” but then he explains
this overlap as the product of androgenesis, because Una, no less than
Archimago’s specter of her, Duessa, is under male instruction—simply the
same from this perspective.38 Such views as McEachern’s and Berger’s seem
extreme. Put most simply, Una and Duessa, one and two, are not equal—
period; yet, as numbers or numerical concepts, in addition to whatever
else they are, they are both comparable and differential.
In contrast to McEachern’s historicism, Syrithe Pugh’s emphases
are primarily comparative and generic. Her perceptive discussions of Una
include the Ovidian features of the Wandering Wood, Ovid’s literary
compassion for his heroines, and the Ovidian forest of Spenser’s satyrs.39
Deserted by Redcrosse, Una, in Pugh’s reading, resembles Vergil’s Dido
and Ovid’s Ariadne in the Heroides, the opening of whose epistle Una’s
meeting with the lion and subsequent complaint recall (66). Ariadne is
also rescued by Bacchus and his satyrs in “one of Ovid’s favourite myths”
(67), and Pugh notes that Redcrosse and Una’s retreat from a rainstorm
into the Wood of canto i alludes to that of Aeneas and Dido from a rainstorm into a cave. All these episodes qualify as sympathetically comic parody. Pugh further observes that the “innocent wandering” in the Wood
by Spenser’s couple turns into confusion, however—an implicit criticism
of the Vergilian antecedent—as, unwittingly, they draw closer to Error’s
cave (50). A sharp difference exists between Pugh’s allusive reading of
Redcrosse and of what she terms Una’s “innocent wandering” and that of
Walls, who speaks of “complicity” in the couple’s mutual desire to enter
the Wood and of their guilty fear before God, from whom they “run away”
into it (26, 29). But the rain-making deity of canto i is significantly Jove,
not simply the Christian God, and his violent emission into his leman’s—
that is, his mistress’s—lap is more suggestive of an Olympian rape than of
the biblical flood found in Walls’s reading (28). Redcrosse and Una don’t
run into the Wood; they just enter it, being “Enforst” by nature (rain) to
do so (I.i.7). They seek shelter in the Wood because, in a relevant pun, they
have enough sense to get out of the rain. The pagan culture of the ancient
world and nature, especially human nature, which includes common sense
and the fleshly senses, are thematic throughout Book I. The pagan is also
the (merely) natural until nearly the end of this book. Yet nature has been
divinely created and, if in time fallen, in time also redeemed, as it will be
decisively first in the eighth canto by Arthur and then progressively by
Una and Redcrosse in the rest of Book I.
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Pugh’s description of the forest in canto vi—another woody, or natural, and mythological place (topos)—to which the satyrs take Una after
her narrow escape from “the paradigmatic Ovidian danger, that of rape,” is
especially attractive:
[This forest] is the world of Ovidian myth, metamorphosis, and
natural magic as a benign and sheltering place, characterized by pity
for the unprotected female and by a natural instinct of religious
awe, though ill-expressed as idolatry. By making Sylvanus’s crew
the agents of divine providence, Spenser begins to suggest a certain
compatibility between Ovid and Christianity, especially in his pity
for the weak and vulnerable, and in his interest in the miraculous
[67].

The satyrs’ forest, benign if idolatrous, fits well the parodic ambivalence,
or doubleness, that repeatedly touches the figures of Book I and affects our
response to them. At its sharpest point, it includes the notoriously benighted but comic efforts of the satyrs to worship Una’s “Asse” when she discourages their idolatrous worship of her own person (vi.19). Naturally, in
a resonant word, the satyrs do not quite desist.
For Halpern, Una represents “the invisible Church or Christian
Truth,” a distinction that has always seemed a bit fuzzy to me, too (1). He
carefully asserts that Una’s “lion becomes to some degree a psychic projection of Una” and therefore intuits Una’s wishes in clawing open the door
to Corceca’s cottage (2). But soon, Halpern’s Corceca likewise signifies
Una’s “blindness of heart” for two reasons: first, Una does not interrupt
“her lion’s murderous rage,” and second, “When a Spenserian hero arrives
at a particular locale, we generally understand the place to embody his or
her spiritual condition at that moment” (2). This generalization, although
plausible, is an oversimplification. The simultaneous presence of two (or
more) visitors in the Houses of Book I, not to mention evidence from the
Houses of subsequent books, instead suggests that every House has some
special pertinence to each visitor, not an identity with each: Redcrosse is
not Coelia, and Britomart is not Amoret, the latter a distinction that I
pursue in chapter 3. If, in some ways and to some extent, Una represents
the Church, in addition to Truth, she has a distinctly social, cultural, and
historical dimension, to which the role of an abbess (Abessa) and Corceca’s
incessant use of prayer beads perversely pertain. Details, particulars, and
distinctions, not only similarities and generalizations, are ever important to the working of Spenserian allegory. Those who are deficient, or
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lacking, and blind of heart—Abessa and Corceca—pertinently contrast
with Una’s presence and needs as an abandoned woman, as Truth, or as
Church, rather than simply exposing her interiorized hang-ups. The other
problem, Una’s not restraining the lion, vanishes if we do not just assume
that he is her projection. Lions respond instinctively to violence, as does
Una’s lion to the violent intrusion of Kirkrapine.
Insofar as Una figures Truth, she certainly has some degree of intuition, as philosophers assert we all do, and she also has some knowledge
of the ur-dragon, that dragon of dragons, that is besieging Eden. To ask
why Una, who eventually recognizes the Wandering Wood as the site of
Error’s den, should be “familiar at all” with such a place overlooks this
background (Halpern, 2). No more than experience need knowledge be
corrupting : “Evil into the mind of God or Man / May come and go, so
unapprov’d, and leave / No spot or blame behind,” to recall Paradise Lost,
for whose poet Spenser was the “Original.” 40 Una is noticeably quicker
than Redcrosse to read the signs of danger in the Wood and then to recognize Error. She cannot do so sooner precisely because, as this episode
signals, she is contingent truth here. She is no longer in Eden or even in
the court of Gloriana, having entered the world of quest in order to end
the siege of Eden by evil. Now she participates in a quest narrative that
is committed to experience, to encountering its perils and learning from
them. That she does learn from them is one reason she can see through
Archimago’s disguise in canto xii, as she cannot earlier, in cantos iii and vi.
Of course, in canto xii, she is also back in Eden, and the dragon is dead, at
least for now.
Halpern takes Una to task for advising Redcrosse to stay the night
with Archimago, and his doing so invites a closer look at her advice,
which, on the face of it, does seem odd. There is something parodic about
it, since her role recalls the damsels who people romances and either help
the hero or, alternatively, entrap him. The stated reasons for Una’s advice
are that night is approaching and the battle-weary Redcrosse needs some
sleep. True: these reasons respond sensibly to natural needs, of which
Una evidently and appropriately has knowledge, and, as elsewhere until
canto xii, she is unable to penetrate the hypocritical Archimago’s disguise.
Again, the truth she embodies is contingent, not divinely omniscient, and
she is about to learn a hard lesson concerning the natural condition of her
chosen knight.
Halpern’s reading merges Una and Archimago at this moment,
however, and tellingly, he cites as evidence a sequence of two stanzas in
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which, he suggests, we might suppose at the outset of the second, that
Archimago, not Una, is speaking (3). In the first of these stanzas, Una
addresses Redcrosse:
Now (saide the Ladie) [it] draweth toward night,
And well I wote, that of your later fight
Ye all forwearied be: for what so strong,
But wanting rest will also want of might?
The Sunne that measures heauen all day long,
At night doth baite his steeds the Ocean waues emong.

The next stanza continues,
Then with the Sunne take Sir, your timely rest,
And with new day new worke at once begin:
Vntroubled night they say giues counsell best.
Right well Sir knight ye haue aduised bin,
Quoth then that aged man [Archimago].
(I.i.32–33)

In the middle of the second stanza, Archimago reinforces, indeed cleverly
exploits, Una’s advice, but the reasonable and grammatical supposition at
its start is that Una is still speaking. If the identity of the speaker wobbles
for a line in the middle, unless we already suspect Una of evil, there is no
more reason to pin the wobble on her than to give the guileful Archimago
due credit for it. Without a reason to blame Una here, Halpern’s already
having identified her with Corceca and the murderous lion in canto iii,
thereby having violated the narrative sequence of the poem in order to
imply a reason in canto iii to suspect Una’s motive here in canto i, is suspect but strategic. Simultaneously, this strategy welcomes, even provokes,
reexamination of the text, as well as of the method of reading it, which is
hardly separable from Halpern’s critical argument. Ironically, it is useful to
my purposes in highlighting the importance of narrative sequence to the
development, the unfolding process, of the poem. From the Wandering
Wood to the battle with Error, to Archimago, Redcrosse and Una travel
through an increasingly perilous landscape that requires greater discrimination from all who encounter it, not only from the immediate travelers
in the poem. The challenge to reading, whether figures and landscape or
verbal text, is tricky.
Another of Halpern’s arguments is provocative, since it aligns
with his shift from a defining lack in Una to Freud’s notion that castration defines the psychological condition of woman and doing so aligns
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with other engagements of psychoanalytical readings in this chapter and
the third one. Halpern reads Una (woman) as a lack that becomes a “promiscuous unity . . . drift[ing] into” Archimago or other unsavory figures,
because her very basis is an absence of substantive being. This argument is
comically seductive, and, indeed, there is a certain tongue-in-cheek quality throughout Halpern’s essay, initially delivered as a luncheon address—
more serio ludere, perhaps? The argument starts by claiming that the Latin
word una is exclusively a modifier, an adjective or adverb, and not a grammatical entity, or noun (5).41 According to Latin or English lexicons, this
claim is mistaken. English one or Latin unus/-a/-um as a noun variously
signifies a numeral equally represented by the figure 1 or the word one; it
can also signify the concept of singleness, or unity, and someone, a singularity. The relation of the noun to the adjective is often ambiguous—a
dynamic, portentous pun that simultaneously looks two ways, to heaven
and earth, for example, and in short, to a unity. In an unfolding temporal
narrative, such unity becomes at most continuity in this world, which is,
to my mind, what Una comes actually to embody.42
A maxim in Spenser’s Book V comes to mind: “truth is one in all”—
that is, one always and everywhere one, an inspiring thought that the
immediate context challenges in the later, more secular book (xi.56).43 But
how does this familiar maxim apply to Una in Book I? The argument to
its second canto specifically refers to Una as “Truth,” which is the only singular, specific name besides Una she gets. Truth, understood as medieval
trouthe, which is an understanding readily available in the sixteenth century, has ontological, epistemological, and personal dimensions—as the
godhead, objective reality, and subjective, affective loyalty (cf. modern,
plighted troth)—all of which pertain to Una. If I had to choose between
Una as invisible Church or as Truth, the options Halpern specifies, I
would choose Truth hands down as the broader, more conceptual term
and regard the invisible Church as one important expression of it—more
exactly, as one expression of the poetic figure of Una when justified by the
text, and never as an exclusive expression.
Aside from the awkward fact that Una is quite visible, the presence in Augustine of the Protestant doctrine of the invisible Church is
itself debatable. This doctrine, which, for Walls, Una represents, is certainly present in Calvin, who probably thought he found it in Augustine,
and it is earlier present in Luther. The Protestant reformers had somehow to account for what the Spirit was doing during all those centuries
of blindered Catholicism, whereas, in quite a different historical context,
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Augustine had had to fend off the Donatists by defending the institutional
church, something he did vigorously. Many are the versions of Augustine’s
ecclesiology to be found, whether in the Renaissance or the present. Such
a learned bishop in the English Protestant Church as Lancelot Andrewes,
a contemporary of Spenser, speaks not of the invisible Church, but more
traditionally of the “mystical body of Christ,” referring this to Saints Paul
and Augustine.44 But I am not choosing between Una’s conceptual identities, merely prioritizing one, namely Truth.
Between 1998 and 2004, Berger published three related articles, all
of which treat the figure of Una to some extent.45 In them, his approach is
theorized and frankly psychoanalytical, for example, including the castration principle, narcissism, scapegoating displacements, redistributed complicities, and what he calls the discourses of victims and sinners, both of
which are forms of false consciousness. He interprets Spenser’s Book I in
modern terms of gender and sexuality, thereby to show that Christianity
scapegoats woman (1998:177–80). He also intends to demonstrate that
Spenser exposes this scapegoating and its associated expressions of bad or
diseased conscience, rather than participating in them (1998:180).
The proof of the critical pudding is how well it works with Spenser’s
text. Berger reads by the light of a laser beam, and his localized insight is
always illuminating, but I am not so sure that his larger argument holds
up. His discussion of the end of Despair’s canto in Book I affords a striking
example, as well as an opportunity to consider the relevant text: here, Una,
who has entered the cave of Despair with Redcrosse (ix.35), intervenes
suddenly to snatch the dagger from her knight’s suicidal hand, sharply to
reproach him (52), and urgently to remind him of divine mercy and of
his own election (53). At the very end of the canto, Redcrosse does what
Una advises, “Arise . . . and leave this cursed place,” namely, the landscape
of Despair (I.ix.53). His doing so recalls his cooperation with Una early in
the book to defeat Error, however temporarily, and it is a small, imperfect
sign of their reunion as they leave Despair for the House of Holiness. In
Berger’s reading of this episode, however, Una’s intervention effectually
infantilizes, emasculates, and castrates Redcrosse.46 Yet Una has just interrupted a suicide, the temptation to which Despair’s coup de grâce—oops,
forget grâce—has been to excite the deranged knight’s imagination of
damnation. Suicide is imminent, the dagger poised in the knight’s uplifted
hand, and immediate intervention is needed. The terror of damnation is
what the knight flinches from—not from divine forgiveness, as Berger
suggests, but from its erasure by the insidious working of Despair, now
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at its critical moment (1998:176). Nothing is heard from Una of “heauenly mercies” until the critical moment requiring her immediate action
has passed (I.ix.53).47 Insofar as Una’s figure points to heavenly intervention in this episode, she is grace—saving grace—but she is also love, and
she is truth, trouthe. Her acting directly to save her knight also expresses
an assurance and a strength of conviction not evident in her figure before.
These will be evident again before the book is finished.
In another of the articles, Berger treats the “transmigration” of meaning from one character in Book I to another in ways that intersect with my
own and others’ arguments about Una in the present essay. The term “transmigration” is evidently more than a translation of the term “metaphor,” or
continued metaphor (“allegory”), however.48 “Transmigration” substitutes
here for psychoanalytical displacement, and it displaces metaphor’s maintenance of difference, or, indeed, of narrative distance. Thus the meanings
of the names Abessa and Corceca “transmigrate to Redcross,” as instanced
in “his blindheartedness” and in his fleeing from Una, thereby absenting
himself (Berger, 2004:225). Yes, but also no. What’s in a name when each
of these two figures of women is disembodied and returned to the status of
a common word? Transmigratory reading subsequently turns Abessa and
Corceca into additional displacements of the failings of Redcrosse, as cultural representative and protagonist, onto woman. But other kinds of relationship between Abessa/Corceca and the fleeing knight are surely possible, a leading candidate being parody or, more blandly and locally, ironic
commentary. Rather than being sucked into the vortex of Redcrosse’s
psyche, through ironized parody this episode distances it, comments on it
critically, and puts it into a much broader historical perspective.
We witness Redcrosse’s blindness to Una’s loyalty and his flight both
from her (and figuratively from himself ) considerably before Abessa and
Corceca appear in the narrative, and so Abessa/Corceca’s commenting
on Redcrosse’s failures can only be retrospective—simultaneously a backwards connection of their meaning to his and an outward migration of
his meaning to theirs. Yet transmigrating, or simply blending, their meaning (and subsequently Kirkrapine’s) backwards into Redcrosse’s without
their ever laying eyes on him reprioritizes and compromises their own
figuration and function in the narrative, as it does Una’s. Abessa’s name,
for example, has many meanings—notably, absence of being, abbess, and
a meaning that usually gets forgotten, absenteeism, which applies both
to former Catholic and current Protestant abusers of benefices. 49 If the
spelling and etymology of Abessa’s name also relate her to Duessa and
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thence to the larger plot of Book I, the connection appears to be more
strongly thetic and historical than psychic and internal in this instance
(cf. Berger, 2004:225). Allegory, as a continued form of metaphor, is, once
again, about differences, as well as similarities: Abessa is a withdrawal
from being, Duessa a doubling and, implicitly, a fragmentation of it and
therefore a more positive threat. Relatively simple, relatively outward, and
relatively emblematic as are figures such as Abessa and Corceca, their figuration in the narrative resists reduction to Redcrosse’s psyche, as, indeed,
does Una’s. Again, yes, but also no: relationship is not identity: metaphor,
including allegory, always combines similarity with difference.
Allegorical projections and momentary or partial identifications
occur in Spenser’s Book I, as well as in other Renaissance writers, but they
also respect figural differences and narrative distances and ask for specific,
immediate textual support. These expectations apply even to the personified, hence tropic, figure of Despair, who looks like Redcrosse emerging
from Orgoglio’s dungeon and knows all about the knight’s betrayals, but
fails of full identity with Redcrosse, with whom he dialogues, interacts,
and in speaking momentarily even merges, and whom he desperately
wants simply to become. Yet Despair cannot become Redcrosse without
the knight’s actual, bodily death as the fulfillment and finality of his desperation. Precisely labeled, this haunting tropic figure is the temptation to
despair. Another representative instance of the textual support expected
occurs in Archimago’s retrospective-proleptic parody of Redcrosse already
discussed, by which this magician frightens himself with his own disguises
and then dons the armor of the fleeing knight, thus impersonating him.50
Whereas Halpern and Berger prioritize Freud and Lacan, Walls’s
book on Una reprioritizes Saint Augustine, the Bible, and religion more
generally. It too features perceptive, localized readings,51 but I part fundamentally with her central thesis that Una, from the time that she is abandoned by Redcrosse, is consistently and primarily the invisible Church,
also understood as Augustine’s City of God or the human community
joined with Christ and thereby representing him. Consistency and primacy are the major sticking points. In an episode such as Una’s sojourn
with the satyrs, Walls’s thesis is plausible, but not exclusively so, in view of
Pugh’s reading of the same episode, which to me is more compelling. It is
thus not that Walls’s argument is simply wrong, but that it is too absolute.
Her argument requires that, prior to Redcrosse’s abandonment, Una is,
as she puts it, “chronically fallible” (20). Reading Una’s role in entering
the Wandering Wood, in recognizing Error’s den, in her encouragement
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to Redcrosse when he fights Error, and in advising Redcrosse to lodge with
Archimago, Walls outdoes Halpern’s criticism of Una, which she cites for
support. For instance, although neither Redcrosse nor Una enters the cave
of Error, Una is nonetheless “in error” (32). This view denies Spenser’s narrative: both may approach Error, but Una recognizes it, warns Redcrosse,
and stops short of it. Subsequently, the knight peeks boldly into Error’s
cave, his “glistring armor” exhibiting the parodic light of a votive candle—
“a litle glooming light, much like a shade” (I.i.14). Then, once Error has
effectually paralyzed him by coiling her tail, python-like, around him, Una
calls out to him, “Add faith vnto your force, and be not faint” (I.i.19).
Walls criticizes Una at this moment for conceiving of faith as merely “a
supplement to ‘force,’” and Redcrosse for responding, “not because his
faith in God has been awakened but because his pride has been stung”
(21–22). If she is right about Redcrosse’s response, this is his failing,
not Una’s, and, as Walls notes, Una’s encouragement at least works to
strengthen her knight.52 (A parallel but near-farcically parodic incident
comes later, in Lucifera’s House, when Duessa encourages Sans Joy, and
Redcrosse responds instead by mustering his strength.) Even aside from
what Una intends in her cry of encouragement, its result is that Redcrosse
responds “with more then manly force” and beheads the reptilian monster
(i.24: my emphasis). In short, her encouragement works.
But is it fair to conclude that Una conceives of faith as merely a
supplement? First, remember the narrative situation: Redcrosse is in dire
physical straits, the serpent enveloping him; what role should his force
play? And is Una’s outcry to add faith to force—belief to effort—really
compromising in this moment? Consulting the OED, Walls finds that “‘to
add faith to [something]’ was once an idiomatic expression for ‘to give credence to [it], to believe in [it].’” But she adds that, “Faith in the context of
this definition is quite distinct from religious faith, faith (that is) in God”
and bases her assertion on the historically relevant supporting citations
in the OED that are secular—specifically prudential or erotic (23). There
are two problems here: the first hardly counts against Walls’s scholarship,
which precludes the endless rechecking of mutating electronic sources;
nonetheless, the third edition of the OED (2010), contravening her claim,
includes the following religious citation, dated 1560, for the expression
“to add faith to”: “Iudas repented & confessed his sinne, . . but . . because
he added not faith vnto his repentaunce, confession and satisfaction, all
was in vaine.”53 The second problem is larger and more significant insofar
as it bears on the use of negative evidence, that is, on an absence. Although
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Spenser’s use of the phrase was apparently not instanced in the edition of
the OED Walls consulted, negative evidence is weak in the face of textual
use. For good reason, the OED invites readers to furnish any overlooked
example of variant usage, which, in the instance of Redcrosse’s battle with
Error, further shows that the expression in question occurs in the context
of religious faith.
Walls also suggests that “force,” as Una uses it in her outcry, is “probably . . . no more than ‘strength,’” which is “tantamount to believing in
‘himself ’” or in an “intensified egotism” and quite in contrast to Una’s
admonishing him nine cantos later, when he faces Despair, to believe in
God’s mercy (23–24). Yet consider that we are at the beginning of an evolving narrative and that one of the things we initially read about the nature
of Redcrosse’s quest is how much his heart yearns to test his puissance
“Vpon his foe, and his new force to learne” (I.i.3). Untried, overeager, and
overconfident, the young knight has much to learn, but he is nonetheless
on a righteous quest, not only to confront his dragon (or dragons) and by
experience to learn the force of his foe, but also to learn the nature and
source of his own force, which includes his having been chosen to wear the
armor of Ephesians 6:11: the crucial phrase from Spenser’s alexandrine,
“his new force to learne,” reads both these ways. Una’s urging, only sixteen
stanzas later, “Add faith vnto your force,” taken whole as an independent
clause, with its major stress on the immediate predicate “faith” rather than
on “force,” the later object of a preposition, for all these reasons refers
not exclusively to physical strength or to faith as merely a supplement
but functions instead as the salvific intervention that Una’s words intend.
Redcrosse’s true self, the one he is questing to realize, is, if as yet immature,
not just egotistical, as both Una and Gloriana presumably believed when
they chose him and he took upon himself the full armor of God. In short,
Una’s encouragement to Redcrosse is appropriate to the context of his first
battle and to his present condition, rather than simplistically flawed or
disconcertingly secular (Walls, 24).
Aside from the episodes prior to Una’s abandonment, Walls’s opposite, idealizing assertion that Una is somehow transformed, or elected, into
her role as the invisible Church during the night at Archimago’s hermitage
is for me a hard saying. This transformation of Una is, in Walls’s words,
“most important” yet also “secret” and “unspecified” (4; cf. 38, 178). It is
as invisible, or hidden, as the true Church itself—that is, it happens outside our sight and, indeed, beyond Spenser’s text. Thereafter, Una’s adventures mirror those of the Church in Augustine’s City of God: the satyrs,
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for example, represent the Church’s mission to the Gentiles, which is not
invisible, although Una, in reality, is.54
Arthur, like Redcrosse, once he reforms, and like everyone else
who helps Una, barring the lion (read as a Christ figure), is a constituent
part or replica, indeed, an aspect, of Una’s unique singularity for Walls
(178–79). From start to finish, Book I is really about Una, not Arthur or
even Redcrosse, seemingly its equal or more focal protagonist; she, always
already communal, is its only subject. In short, although Walls’s book is
valuable in ways and at moments, not least in seeing something at once
communal and larger than life in the figure of Una, its commitment to an
all-consuming argument challenges credibility, a word some might hear
with irony. Spenser’s epic is a narrative committed to temporal sequence
and development. It resists totalizing, systemic impositions, be they psychoanalytical or religious, modern or late antique.

Parody in Eden
Parody persists in the final third of Book I, for example, in the figure
of Despair as guide and counselor, quoting and skewing classical and
Christian commonplaces, or in the initial behavior of the ungainly,
overweight dragon, “Halfe flying, and halfe footing in his haste” and,
in a pun, shadowing the land “vnder his huge waste” (I.xi.8). Initially,
Una’s figure might seem free of parody at the end, but her homeland,
Eden, and the events occurring there certainly are not, and the more closely we look, her figure is vitally touched by parody as well. It is so because
she is a major player in these events, one finally, if momentarily, again
crucial.
But what in the world might Eden be in the twelfth canto of Book
I? What sort of place (topos)? Many readers, perhaps thinking of Milton’s
“paradise within,” have assumed Eden’s innerness, a reasonable assumption that I share and one that correlates with the inner dimension of other
houses (topoi) in this book. Notably, however, these other houses, even
the minor residences of Archimago or Aesculapius, the one a hermitage,
the other a cave in the pit of hell, are not exclusively inner. 55 The name
Eden openly evokes, indeed insists on reference to, the Edenic garden of
Genesis, gone forever as an unfallen, earthly paradise, and so it evokes
exile, together with return, loss along with triumph. This name further
strengthens the necessity of Eden’s innerness, even while accentuating its
lost outerness and consequent fictitiousness.
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If Spenser’s Eden were only inner, the lengthy, folksy scene-setting
early in the canto would be odd and seem out of place: mirthful children,
women with timbrels, a rabble gaping, gazing, and frightened by the idea
of lingering life in the dragon. Memorably and typically realistic, a mother
warns her child away from the dead dragon’s claws, while others boldly
measure the beast, as if it were a beached whale. In this context, a reader
might well recall the parodic tie of Saint George to the popular imagination when the first canto opened. Now, in canto xii, such domestic scenesetting—also suggestive of genre painting—signals an outer, social dimension, as well. The realm of Eden is the conclusive counterbalance to that
of Lucifera. Both places have inner and outer being in the poem, and their
relationship is effectually parodic.
A. C. Hamilton notes in his edition that the line describing
Redcrosse’s joy at his betrothal to Una—“His heart did seeme to melt in
pleasures manifold”—“recalls the parody of his present state” during his
erotic dream of her at Archimago’s hermitage in the first canto.56 A different parodic reminiscence, also noticed by Hamilton, ties Spenser’s Eden to
Lucifera’s House of Pride. During the betrothal ceremony in Eden,
sweete Musicke did apply
Her curious skill, the warbling notes to play,
To driue away the dull Melancholy;
The whiles one sung a song of loue and iollity.
(I.xii.38)

The OED offers the penultimate line of this inset as an example of melancholy meaning “sadness, dejection . . . gloominess; pensiveness or introspection; an inclination or tendency to this.” 57 The same line recalls the
time that Redcrosse entered Lucifera’s hall to battle Sans Joy and found
there that “many Minstrales maken melody, / To driue away the dull
melancholy” (I.v.3). That dull melancholy needs to be driven away in the
House of Pride, where Sans Joy is about to be battled, is not surprising, but
that this need exists in the palace of Eden’s king is so, unless we remember that an earthly Eden is a memory of failure, exile, and loss, not just a
triumphant return. This is a doubleness with which readers of Milton’s
Eden, envisioned from a fallen world, will be familiar. In this world, the
attainment of a Miltonic paradise within will also co-exist with another
awareness, if only, in such ideal attainment, a memory of what has been
lost. Duessa might be foiled but not eliminated—that is, not killed or destroyed.
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Another revealing instance of parody that occurs when Arthur first
enters the picture in Book I resonates with the present one. The phrase
“exceeding shone” in Arthur’s introductory description recalls that of
Lucifera, in which it occurs twice, and these two figures parodically share
an additional, iconic affinity with a dragon, the one on his helmet, the
other beneath her feet (iv.8–9, vii.34). The description of Arthur has
other verbal memories of unsavory figures who appear earlier, including
Orgoglio and Archimago. The broader bearing of parody on the figure of
Arthur, whose elf queen originates in Chaucer’s comic Tale of Sir Thopas,
which is itself a parody, is one I have told elsewhere. 58 Again and again
in Book I, the idealized figure of Arthur, best of knights and magnanimous epitome of all the virtues, is touched and humanized by parody, as
are all its major figures, Una included. The ambivalence of parody, whose
roots spread over Book I, might be seen to penetrate the entire epic, not
to undermine or destroy its ideals, but at once to recognize and to ensure
their ties to the human conditions of language, of storytelling, and of
life.59 Again, parody can be gentle and forgiving.
It is with this broadly parodic perspective that I want to return to
the problem of Una, insofar as it is also the problem of the whole twelfth
canto, which has fully satisfied few modern readers, perhaps because we
have had other expectations or desires. Noticeably, the twelfth is also a
relatively short canto, in fact the shortest in Book I. Space and time are
not features that Spenser, the poet who puts the Garden of Adonis in the
middle of Book III and its fertile mount “in the middest of that Paradise,”
easily ignores (vi.43).60 A tongue-in-cheek, highly rhetorical, and, frankly,
coy question about Archimago’s arrest near the end of the twelfth canto
openly signals that this arrest will be temporary and brief, as readers discover early in Book II: “Who then would thinke, that by his subtile trains
/ He could escape fowle death or deadly pains?” (I.xii.36). The tone of this
parodic question by the narrator—a question generically reminiscent of
one in a book for children—comes when the threat to the betrothal is over
and right before its consummation proceeds.
For the purpose of discussion, canto xii can be broken into two
halves: first, triumphant return and, second, betrothal, and so, in effect,
past present and future present. At the beginning of the second half comes
the spoiler, the guileful messenger of fragmentation and disunity, that is,
of Duessa: double being, duplicity, dualism. This messenger, Archimago,
destined for near farce recurrently in Book II, is akin to Ate, the messenger with the apple of discord at another, earlier wedding in ancient myth,
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destined to play a part in later books of the poem.61 Duessa’s emissary,
Archimago, the old man of Ephesians 4:22–24, as well as an evil imagemaker and himself the arch (chief ) image, presents her claim to the person of Redcrosse.62 The claim, “that writt,” is not just something written
(xii.25). A writ is more exactly “a written command, order, or authority,”
“a legal document or instrument,” “a written command precept, or formal
order issued by a court in the name of the sovereign, state, or other competent legal authority, directing or enjoining the person or persons to whom
it is addressed to do or refrain from doing some act specified therein.” 63
The legalese would have been familiar to Spenser, himself a litigant and
the deputy clerk of the Council of Munster.64
The writ itself includes Duessa’s claim to Redcrosse “or liuing or else
dead,” phrasing that strangely recalls a memorable, biblical ambiguity in
the initial description of Redcrosse at the opening of Book I, where this
knight is said ever to wear a bloody cross in “remembrance of his dying
Lord . . . And dead as liuing euer him” adore (i.2). Despite a possible echo
of Revelation 1:18, “I am he who liveth that was dead,” exactly what “dead
as liuing” means is ambiguous and elusive at the outset of the opening
canto. The emphasis on death that the phrase “dying Lord” contributes to
this context two lines earlier only heightens its ambiguity. “Dead as liuing” could mean “dead as if living” or “dead as when living” or “dead and
living.” There is more than one touch of ambiguity in Redcrosse’s figure
at the beginning of the first canto, but this particular ambiguity is special, insofar as it concerns the young knight’s faith, the extent and degree
to which he grasps—fully understands or fully embodies—the burden, at
once the weight and the meaning, of the redemptive armor he wears. In
each of the possible readings of the ambiguous phrase, death seems to vie
with or even to preempt life, as it does in the tale Duessa tells Redcrosse
after his defeat of Sans Foy. She portrays herself as the betrothed widow of
a prince slain by foes, who travels far and wide to seek his “blessed body,”
further emphasized and parodically degraded five lines later to a “woefull
corse” (I.ii.24). Since Duessa’s father is the Emperor of the West with a
throne by the Tiber, she is clearly a representative of the Roman Catholic
Church here, and her single-minded search for the body of her slain
prince glances at the enormous emphasis on the Corpus Christi in the late
medieval history of Catholic ceremony and sacrament, which carried
over to the sixteenth century, and it intimates that this emphasis might be
considered a death cult.65 In the writ of canto xii, her claim to Redcrosse
holds a threatening memory of these earlier necrotic passages. Little
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wonder that “dull melancholy” has to be driven away after the intrusion of
Archimago-Duessa and their reassertion of failure and loss at the end of
Book I.
Archimago’s intrusion to deliver Duessa’s legal writ also evokes and
parodies a scene common in both dramatic and nondramatic writing from
the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century, namely the devil’s legalistic assertion of his right to Adam and all his descendants. Together, the charge and
the argument against it were a theological commonplace. Langland’s Piers
Plowman, known to Spenser, affords a representative example of its poetic
treatment.66 When Christ comes to harrow hell and free the pious pagans,
Lucifer explains to his fellow demons that if Christ
“reue [bereave] me my riȝt he robbeth me by
maistrie.
For by right and by reson the renkes [race (“men”)]
that ben here
Body and soule beth myne, bothe goode and ille.
For himself seide, that Sire is of heuene,
If Adam ete the Appul alle sholde deye
And dwelle with vs deueles.”
(XVIII.277–82)

He then adds, “‘I leeue that lawe nul noȝt lete [allow] hym the leeste [the
least of them]’” to escape (285).67 Lucifer’s argument belongs to the Old
Law, which casts further light on the words and images in ArchimagoDuessa’s claim: “the burning Altars,” “bold periury,” and “polluted”
pledges, for example (xii.27).
With further relevance to what happens next in Spenser’s twelfth
canto, Langland’s Satan picks up the thread after Lucifer:
 	
“but I me soore drede,
For thow gete hem with gile and his Gardyn breke,
And in semblaunce of a serpent sete vpon the
Appultree
And eggest hem to ete, Eue by hirselue,
And toldest hire a tale, of treson were the wordes;
And so thou haddest hem out and hider at the laste.”
(XVIII.286–91)

Then Goblin, another devil, chimes in: “‘For [because] god wol noȝt be
bigiled . . . ne byiaped [tricked], / We haue no trewe title to hem, for thoruȝ
treson were thei dampned’” (293–94). In Spenser’s Cave of Mammon in
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Book II, Mammon will receive a common epithet for the devil, “Guyler,”
variously repeated throughout the debate among Langland’s devils and
then in Christ’s answer to them. Its application to Mammon in Book II
will only confirm what Archimago and Duessa share proleptically with
him (vii.64). When, in Piers Plowman, Christ confronts the devils’ legalism, he, too, first answers in terms of the Old Law, observing that beguilers deserve beguilement, that guile had deceived Adam and Eve, and that
his own life has paid on the cross for theirs and redeemed their debt: in
short, an eye for an eye and a fulfillment of the Law (XVIII.330–60).
The further point that pertains to the writ of Archimago-Duessa, however, is that their legalism has been superseded by a new covenant of grace,
redemption, and mercy, which Langland’s Christ next asserts at length.
In all these passages—the exchanges between the devils and then Christ’s
declaration to them—lies the backgrounding gloss on Redcrosse’s response to the charges of Archimago-Duessa and Una’s intervention to
support the truth of his claims. She is “trouthe,” after all, Truth, no longer
veiled, and she is also love, the love of and for Redcrosse. It is fitting at this
point that, as unveiled truth, she should penetrate Archimago’s disguise
for the first time.
Redcrosse responds explicitly to the writ against him, which urges
Duessa’s rights, not Una’s. This distinction should not be misleading,
however: Duessa’s rights cannot exist without the cancelation of Una’s,
nor can Duessa (re)appear without Redcrosse’s separation from Una, as
happened in canto ii. Notably, Duessa does not come herself to Eden’s
court. Likewise, now in reverse, Duessa’s rights must first be disabled
before Una’s are fully restored. Redcrosse’s response blames Duessa
for leading him astray “vnwares” (twice: xii.31–32), and it thus recalls earlier characterizations of him, such as “since no’vntruth he knew” (about
his response to the dream of a false Una: I.i.53) and “too simple and too
trew,” the narrator’s ironic and ambiguous observation when Redcrosse
embraces the guileful deception of Duessa-Fidessa by the tree of Fradubio;
there the narrator’s obser vation referred at once to the swooning
Duessa’s overdone deception and to the naïveté and vulnerability of
the young knight, thus merging them at least syntactically and verbally
(I.ii.45).
In the present canto, Redcrosse’s response to the writ and then
Una’s support of his words now accord with what Langland’s devils fearfully anticipate and what Christ actually says to Satan: “‘For the dede that
thei [Adam and Eve] dide, thi [thy] deceite it made; / With gile thow
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hem gete ageyn alle reson” (XVIII.333–34). Based on deceit and guile,
Duessa’s claim is without legal standing; it lacks truth. Christ’s argument
in Langland next makes redemptive grace and the love of the creator for
his creature still more crucial as its positive culmination. This ending too
will be recalled in the conclusion to Spenser’s first book.
In light of Piers Plowman, Una, together with Redcrosse, is vitally
touched by parody at the end of canto xii—explicitly by sacred parody,
a cultural staple in medieval and Renaissance times. Importantly, it is
together that they act to invalidate the writ, sharing the exposure of its
origin in deceit. But Una’s role goes beyond this exposure. She embodies not only personal loyalty (“trouthe,” or troth) and Truth (“trouthe”)
but also love, at once human love in the narrative and godly love more
broadly and symbolically. It is she who, at the crucial moment, acts to
support Redcrosse and indeed to save him from the guile and dualism
that Archimago and Duessa represent. Britomart will play a similar role
simultaneously as Artegall’s love and the vehicle of redemptive love in
Book V, where the fallen Artegall is imprisoned “Vntill his owne true
loue his freedome gained” (v.57): Artegall’s “true loue” is at once Britomart,
who loves him, and his true love (trouthe, troth) for her. 68 Book V is a
different context, and Britomart’s figure is different from, not simply
related to, Una’s, however, a matter to which my third chapter will in time
return.
After Redcrosse’s acknowledgment of his “mishaps” with Duessa
(31–32), it is Una’s support for his story (33–34) by which her father,
the King, is “greatly moued,” resulting in Archimago’s arrest and the consummation of her betrothal to Redcrosse (35). Una is not Christ, still less
is Britomart much later, but both figures intimate an analogy between
his redeeming love and the love of a woman for a man and a man for a
woman—in canto xii of Book I, especially a woman’s for a man.69 Earlier
in this canto, the narrator has described the “glorious light” of Una’s “sunshiny face,” which Hamilton glosses suggestively with Revelation 12:1, the
woman clothed with the sun (23). In Spenser’s Epithalamion, not to be
published or written until 1594–95, the poet will refer to the beauty of
his own bride’s “sunshiny face,” a memory (at least for his readers) of Una’s
human, as well as of her distinctively heavenly, aspect.70
Hamilton’s notes also gloss the last half dozen stanzas of canto
xii of Book I with references to numerous marital contexts: the marriage supper of the Lamb, the numerological symbolism of marriage in
the Old Testament, pagan Roman rites, and Spenser’s Epithalamion.
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Hamilton specifies the sweating of the walls and posts with sprinkled wine
in Epithalamion, 253–54, with respect to their sprinkling and sweating
in canto xii.38. For me, the most telling parallel between the culminating events in canto xii and Epithalamion comes in the central stanzas of
ceremony in each when time touches eternity. In canto xii, there is heard
the “heauenly noise . . . Like as it had bene many an Angels voice,” a song
at once “heauenly” and “sweet,” otherworldly and sensuous; no creature
knows whence it “Proceeded, yet eachone felt secretly / Himselfe thereby
refte of his sences meet, / And rauished with rare impression in his sprite”
(39). These lines describe the ravishing of sense into spirit, its sublation or
simultaneously its raising, cancelation, and continuation—all three, but
above all here, its elevation. In Epithalamion, the organ notes are louder
(“Open the temple gates unto my love, / Open them wide that she may
enter in”); the choristers praising the Lord are human, the angels “About
the sacred Altare” erotically charged by earthly beauty, and the occasion
more personal than the epic’s narrative, but resonance between the two
occasions persists (stanzas 12–13).71
Subsequently, the liquid imagery at the very end of canto xii—“His
heart did seeme to melt in pleasures manifold . . . Yet swimming in that
sea of blisfull ioy” (40–41)—fulfills that earlier in the book, whether
in Redcrosse’s wet dream in Archimago’s hermitage, his journey “in the
wide deepe wandring,” the enervating stream from which he drinks before
pouring out in looseness with Duessa, or his fall into a “liuing well” in the
final dragon fight.72 An Elizabethan betrothal could extend to the rights
of the marriage bed, although there was confusion regarding this rite,
an issue that Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure explores in the coupled
figures of Claudio/Juliet and Angelo/Mariana. 73 Be that as it may, at the
end of Spenser’s first book, the liquid imagery is simultaneously fleshly
and sacred, erotic and redeemed. The same holds true for the final movement of Epithalamion, whose penultimate stanza looks to a future perfect
of children and lasting, heavenly happiness. The final truncated, imperfected stanza of Spenser’s own marriage hymn then returns time to the
present and its cutting off of completion; at the end of Book I, Redcrosse
returns to his unfinished questing, “and Vna left to mourne”—either left
Una behind to mourn or Una left off mourning, having been reconciled
to Redcrosse’s worldly task (41). Again, a self-citational, parodic comparison with Britomart is evident: when she and Artegall part in Book V, she
“wisely moderated her own smart” and “tempred for the time her present
heauinesse” before seeking new surroundings “her anguish to appease,”

Parody and Perfection   47

again a comparison that will also come with much difference (vii.44–45).
Spenser’s Eden is finally more than temporally double, lost and found.
It is more precisely triple, a present in the poem that encompasses past
and future. In this, it recalls Augustine’s threefold present, time past, time
present, and time to come, and doing so, looks ahead to the similar conjunction of times in Epithalamion.74

“This page intentionally left blank”

Chapter 2

Belphoebe’s “mirrours more then one”:
History’s Interlude

L

ike Una, Belphoebe is an idealized woman-figure in The Faerie
Queene, but she is named for a classical moon goddess, a mythologized
aspect of nature, and not, like Una, christened as a metaphysical conception. She is more relentlessly virginal than Una, however, who is betrothed
at the end of her book and awaits perfected union with her human lover.
In sharp contrast, Belphoebe repeatedly fails to comprehend human love,
even while attesting to her own mortality. Accordingly, she is never reconciled with her twin sister, Amoret, figuratively the side of her that is missing
and part of her story in the poem. In further contrast to Una, Belphoebe
appears in successive books of the poem and therefore in three variant contexts: temperance, chastity, and friendship, respectively, in Books II, III,
and IV. Each of these books, as their titular virtues indicate, seeks some
form of balanced relationship, progressively involving others. Their shifting contexts challenge the initial intimation of Belphoebe’s wholeness and
ultimately suggest that her figure is unbalanced, an extremity of virtue
that is intemperate and, insofar as temperance is rooted in time (< Latin
tempus), untimely. Her virtue finally belongs to some other world.
Belphoebe rushes into the third canto of Book II and promptly
becomes a sustained series of perceptions—less an unfolding series, as in
the instance of troutheful Una, than a shifting one, rather like a successive
series of slides, or stills. Sped up, a successive series begins to look coherent
and animated—moving. This initial series, a portrait that A. C. Hamilton
identifies as the longest in Spenser’s entire epic, foreshadows for the retrospective reader (or rereader) what will become of Belphoebe’s figure in
the course of the books in which she appears.1 In this portrait, she successively takes shape in terms variously Petrarchan, courtly, mythic, biblical,
classical, natural, legendary, and historical. She is both Venus and Virgo
and, like the twin comparisons of her to Diana and to the Amazon Queen
Penthesilea that cap her portrait, she is both mythic and human, ideal and
mortal. Viewed as a portrait, like the many famous, iconic paintings of
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Elizabeth, Spenser’s queen, the figure of Belphoebe has seemingly unlimited potential; viewed historically, in terms of Elizabeth’s actual reign,
Belphoebe’s initial depiction becomes an impossible contradiction, which
the narrative she enters soon enough makes all too real.
Belphoebe’s namesake, the moonlike goddess Phoebe—Diana in
the Roman pantheon—figures in myth as both unapproachable virgin
and mammary mother goddess, the latter of these instanced by Diana of
Ephesus or, indeed, by Spenser’s Charissa, with “A multitude of [nursing] babes” at her breasts (I.x.31). Belphoebe’s genealogy, of course, also
includes Artemis, goddess of the hunt, who is another multiple-breasted
figure, one of whose names is Phoebe.2 Spenser might have chosen the
name Phoebe (Greek phoibē, from the feminine form of phoibos, “shining”)
in order to emphasize the lunar association of the goddess, which suits the
official iconography of Elizabeth I. Phoebe also alludes to the name of the
shining sun god, Phoebus Apollo, and in this way as well to Elizabeth as
a queen.
The double nature of the moon goddess Phoebe is further embedded in the etymological relation of moon to Latin mensis/menses.
Unsurprisingly, Belphoebe’s extensive, all-inclusive initial portrait is full
of suspended, as-yet-unresolved tensions between mythic and mortal realities, and is all the richer, more complex, and potentially more dynamic
for their presence.3 From her first appearance, her mythic, iconographic,
courtly, and explicitly queenly credentials also associate her with the
reigning Queen Elizabeth, most ominously by comparison of Belphoebe
to Penthesilea, “that famous Queene / Of Amazons, whom Pyrrhus did
destroy” (II.iii.31).4 By the end of the proem to Book III, she explicitly
becomes a figure of Elizabeth’s “rare chastitee,” and, in Spenser’s Letter
to Ralegh, which was attached to the 1590 Faerie Queene, she is further
identified with the queen’s person as “a most vertuous and beautifull Lady,”
here a figure distinguished from her person as “a most royall Queene or
Empresse.”5 When she reappears in the third book and the fourth one, she
will also be less credibly mythic and less fully ideal, compromised by her
increasing involvement in the narrative with human and historical realities.6
The first stage of Belphoebe’s portrait makes her appear more angelic
than human and more conventionally rhetorical than real. Although
there is cumulative movement in the poet’s opening , lyrical depiction, Belphoebe herself, entering the narrative in canto iii, is stopped in
her tracks. In narrative terms, her figure is now strikingly static, an
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emblazoned countenance, an object for gazers. At the end of her portrait,
where the comparison of her to Penthesilea appears, she becomes more
natural and active; she is pictured in space and historical time, moving
through landscape and legend. Petrarchan hyperboles characterize the first
five stanzas (cheeks “Like roses in a bed of lillies shed,” fair eyes darting
“fyrie beames,” an “yuorie forhead,” honeyed words, eyelids adorned with
“many Graces”). Then, descriptions of her raiment, weapons, and hair in
stanzas 26, 29, and 30 associate her with the Amazons, but stanzas 29–30
also associate her with Venus disguised as a follower of Diana, and her
buskins and hunting in stanzas 27–28 further associate her with Diana. 7
These last two stanzas are mainly devoted to her legs, thus balancing those
depicting her face at the beginning and following a gaze that proceeds
from top to bottom. “Like two faire marble pillours,” her legs “doe the
temple of the Gods support / Whom all the people decke with girlands
greene, / And honour in their festiuall resort.” Although essentially classical and pagan in reference, and perhaps also suggesting the English folk
festivals of May, this comparison and the succeeding line that virtually
extends it (“Whom . . . resort”) have further evoked associations as radically diverse as 1 Corinthians 6:19, Song of Solomon 5:15, and the climax
of the Romance of the Rose. This Romance, known to Spenser, provides a
sexual referent for Belphoebe’s “marble pillours” supporting a temple that
is more explicit and credible, to my mind, than the much-discussed half
line that stops with the hem of her skirt (reaching to her knee or mid-calf:
26.9).8
The final lines of the penultimate stanza portraying Belphoebe
may even imaginatively suggest such a rendering of myth as Botticelli’s
Primavera (“Spring”), a painting in which Zephyrus, the west wind, touches
the nymph Chloris with the result that “flowers issue from her breath, and
she is transformed into Flora, the resplendent herald of spring.” 9 Early in
the poet’s depiction, Belphoebe has a heavenly, as well as a Petrarchan,
aura (“heauenly birth,” “heauenly,” “Angels hew,” “ambrosiall odours”);
she is even said to be “Hable to heale the sicke, and to reuiue the ded”
(21–22). But now, near the portrait’s end, as she flees through the forest,
and as flowers, leaves, and blossoms are said to enwrap themselves in her
flying hair, her figure is seen instead to suggest a revival that is seasonal and
thus a natural cycle of death and regeneration (30).
Incongruously, in this same canto, the poet’s tour de force in portraiture is framed by the low-life figures of Braggadocchio and Trompart.
A greater contrast between elevated portrait and comic encounter would
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be hard to imagine. A close contemporary analogy might come from the
parodic juxtaposition of comic subplot with main plot in a contemporary play, such as John Lyly’s Endymion or Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor
Faustus.10 Belphoebe and Braggadocchio stage a debate between solitary
purity and social degeneracy, ennobling desire and lustful appetite, honor
and instinct that anticipates the thematic opposition in Shakespeare’s 1
Henry IV of Hotspur’s extravagant idealism and Falstaff ’s earthy pragmatism—between Hotspur’s exclamatory declamation of an “easy leap, / To
pluck bright honor from the pale-fac’d moon” and Falstaff ’s plain, if still
rhetorical, questions: “Can honor set to a leg? . . . Or take away the grief
of a wound?”11 The debate is summarily terminated when Braggadocchio
offers to assault Belphoebe sexually, and, her javelin raised against him,
she flees into the woods and out of Book II, leaving to others the effort to
balance radical extremes in the search for temperance. At this point, she
figures as a strange, sequential mixture of iconographic lyric and comic
narrative, promissory inclusion and active rejection.
***
Before pursuing the figure of Belphoebe into Book III, I want to pause
over the proem to this book, which explicitly addresses the relation of the
living Queen Elizabeth to her two specified Faerie figurations, Gloriana
and Belphoebe. It also introduces the theme of “mirrours more then one”
already met in my previous chapter and that of the relation of art to life,
which is present but suspended in Book II’s long portrait of Belphoebe.
But in this third proem, the poet begins to observe a distinction between
truth and Faerie image that is absent from the proems to Books I and II.
By comparison, these two earlier proems illuminate what is new in the
third. In the first proem, the living queen, “Great Ladie of the greatest
Isle,” is a “Mirrour of grace and Maiestie diuine,” and the poem is a reflection of “that true glorious type” of her. In the proem to Book II, despite
poetic play about the location of Faerie, the queen is the living reflection
of the “antique ymage,” and so the Faerie image is a “fayre mirrhour” of
her face and realms. Overall, the first two proems present one continuous,
unbroken reflection: the queen reflects divinity; like her, the poem reflects
the glorious origins, person, and reign of the living queen. The antique and
Faerie images are also continuous, whereas they will increasingly diverge as
the poem develops. In the first two proems, however, theirs is a continuity
worthy of Una, yet another of the reigning queen’s cultic names.12

Belphoebe’s “mirrours more then one”   53

Referring to the queen’s face, realms, and ancestry, the final stanza
of Proem II offers an apology for the antique Faerie image that is actually
a confident justification of it:
The which O pardon me thus to enfold
In couert vele, and wrap in shadowes light,
That feeble eyes your glory may behold,
Which ells could not endure those beames bright,
But would bee dazled with exceeding light
(II.Pro.5)

The dazzling brightness of the living Queen is enfolded in shadow to
enlighten feeble eyes, enabling them to behold true glory. This veil reveals
a single truth instead of obscuring it, and these shadows, unlike those in
the second three books, which are new in 1596, do not splinter truth or
transform its character. Unlike the proem to Book VI, they do not make
true glory truly fictive.13
In the proem to Book III, the poem continues to be the queen’s mirror, and, although she is invited to view herself “In mirrours more then
one”—specifically either in Gloriana or in Belphoebe—both glasses are
essentially virtuous, and conceivably, at least, they could be received as
an unfolding of the good queen rather than as a dispersion of her unity.
But, in this proem, the present embodiment also begins to vie with the
antique image, living queen with antiquity, and to challenge it. Uneasy
nuances (not quite tensions) cluster around the word “liuing.” In order to
perceive the fairest virtue, chastity in this instance, one “Neede but behold
the pourtraict of her [the queen’s] hart, / If pourtrayd it might bee by any
liuing art.” The poet continues, “But liuing art may not least part expresse,
/ Nor life-resembling pencill it can paynt . . . Ne Poets witt, that passeth
Painter farre.” Then comes a plea for pardon that recalls the one in the
second proem:
       But O dredd Souerayne
Thus far forth pardon, sith that choicest witt
Cannot your glorious pourtraict figure playne
That I in colourd showes may shadow it,
And antique praises vnto present persons fitt.
(III.Pro.3)

These shadows are more opaque—and, as color, significantly more material in contemporary philosophy—than the punning “shadowes light”

54  

Chapter 2

(light shadows, shadow’s or shadows’ light) of Proem II. They testify to
the poet’s “want of words” and wit more than they serve the purpose of
revelation.14 But the modesty topos is here a conventional mask for a more
significant development. The poem is now becoming a somewhat compromised “colourd show” that can merely shadow the queen’s “glorious pourtraict” and tailor antique praises to present persons, a “fitt” that sounds
neither so natural nor so close as the continuity of bright reflections in
Proems I and II. The poem becomes the glass through which the living
sovereign’s true portrait is more obscurely discerned. At this point, it is
difficult not to think again of Elizabeth’s highly symbolic, elaborately costumed, V-waisted portraits and the conspicuous extent to which they are
removed from a realistic, contemporary image of the aging queen. This
sort of “fitt” exceeds any dressmaker’s talents.
The lines that directly follow the poet’s apolog y for “colourd
showes” and “antique praises” refer to the depiction of Queen Elizabeth in
Ralegh’s Cynthia: “But if in liuing colours, and right hew, / Thy selfe thou
couet to see pictured, / Who can it doe more liuely, or more trew . . .?”
than Sir Walter Ralegh (my emphasis). Although the OED offers innocent
and even positive, religious instances of covet, this verb is also associated
strongly with sin—with envy or greed—as it is most memorably in the
Ten Commandments.15 But there is a larger point here: setting the “liuing colours” and “right hew” of the reigning queen against the “colourd
showes” and “antique praises” of The Faerie Queene, the poet introduces a
far-reaching distinction between life and antiquity, historical present and
mythic past, current truth and Faerie image. This distinction does not align
nicely with that between the queen’s imperial and private affairs, which, in
the Letter to Ralegh, are figured, respectively, in Gloriana and Belphoebe.
Instead, it applies to both figures. At the same time, the explicit division
of the living queen into two figures arguably compromises her unity. For a
reader of Book I, the specter of Duessa hovers in the distant background.
Perversely, we might even recall the contradictory, yet overlapping, images
of Elizabeth and the Babylonian whore to which Claire McEachern directs
our attention, as noted in chapter 1.
In stanza 4 of the third proem, when the Spenserian poet refers
a true and lively picture of the queen to Ralegh’s Cynthia, he is unlikely
to have meant a picture that is merely realistic or unembellished by art.
Ralegh’s fragmentary Ocean to Scinthia, much of which relates to his
imprisonment in 1592, a disgrace subsequent to Spenser’s publication of
Book III, is the best indication of Cynthia’s nature we have, and, although
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Ralegh’s voice in it is distinct and passionate, such highly artificial modes
as the Petrarchan (“Such heat in Ize, such fier in frost”) and the pastoral (“Vnfolde thy flockes and leue them to the fields”) are also much in
evidence.16 The bereaved, nostalgic employment of pastoral in Ocean to
Scinthia suggests that the earlier versions of Cynthia by her “shepherd of
the Ocean,” written in less desperate straits, might have been more conventional rather than less so.17 When the poet of The Faerie Queene writes
of the living colors and right hue of Cynthia, he implies a portrayal that
is less hieratic, epic, and allegorical but more contemporary and personal
than his own. Such a portrayal as Ralegh’s might be less universal and
more ephemeral, but it belongs more immediately to time.
Although Spenser’s reference to Ralegh does not discredit the
Faerie image, it does limit its authority unless this image can be expanded
or otherwise modified to embrace life more closely. The third proem provides a particularly apt introduction to a book in which time and eternity or present age and ideal, antique image are not so smoothly continuous as indicated in the proems of Books I and II. Nothing reverberates
through Book III quite like the “heauenly noise / Heard sound through
all the Pallace pleasantly” at the betrothal of Redcrosse and Una—a noise
like the voices of angels “Singing before th’eternall maiesty, / In their trinall triplicities on hye” (I.xii.39)—and no figure quite like the brilliantly
winged angel who succors Guyon appears to rescue its knights and ladies.
In fact, the closest we get to an angel in this book is Timias’s illusion that
Belphoebe is one when he wakens from his swoon to find her bending over
him and ministering to his wounds: “Mercy deare Lord . . . what grace is
this,” he asks resonantly, “To send thine Angell from her bowre of blis,
/ To comfort me in my distressed plight?” (v.35). Then he adds, on second thought, “Angell, or Goddesse do I call thee right?” thereby echoing Vergil’s famous lines from Aeneas’s meeting with Venus in the guise
of Diana’s maiden and avouching the young squire’s perception that this
angelic illusion originates in a more worldly pantheon than Una’s “trinall
triplicities on hye.” Parodically, it also recalls the same allusion to Vergil in
the initial portrait of Belphoebe in Book II and, more openly and perilously, by Belphoebe’s present posture—that of a pietà—the Bower of Bliss
at the same book’s end (II.iii.33, xii).18
A blushing Belphoebe disclaims the angelic or godly status Timias
attributes to her and declares herself simply a maid and “mortall wight”
(36). Unfortunately, her declaration is exactly what Timias might have
longed, but should never have been allowed, to hear her say, for he falls
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irrevocably, irremediably, impossibly in love with her. Belphoebe not only
denies him a reciprocal love but also fails to understand or even to recognize the erotic nature of Timias’s response to her. More than once, the
poet criticizes her failure as a “Madnesse” that saves “a part, and lose[s] the
whole” (43, cf. 42). Oddly, an echo of his criticism will occur two books
later, when another of Queen Elizabeth’s avatars, Queen Mercilla, ambivalently dispenses justice to the figure of a rival queen and where justice is
seen “Oft [to] spill . . . the principall, to saue the part,” while trying “to
preserue inuiolated right” (V.x.2). In both instances, one of the Queen’s
bodies is not reconciled with the other. The tensions between disparate
realities that were suspended in the initial portrait of Belphoebe are
increasingly coming to light.
Back in Book III, while Timias languishes in love’s torments,
Belphoebe spares no pains to ease him, but still not comprehending his
malady, “that sweet Cordiall, which can restore / A loue-sick hart, she did
to him enuy,” or refuse to give (v.50).19 Few readers or rereaders of these
lines are fully prepared for those that follow, in which “that sweet Cordiall
. . . that soueraine salue” is suddenly transformed to “That daintie Rose,
the daughter of her Morne,” whose flower, lapped in “her silken leaues,” she
shelters from midday sun and northern wind: “But soone as calmed was
the christall ayre, / She did it fayre dispred, and let to florish fayre” (v.51).
As Donald Cheney has suggested, precise equivalents for these lines do
not exist. “For her,” he adds, “the rose is a rose, not a euphemism.”20
But surely not just a rose, either. Belphoebe’s dainty blossom soon
opens into a flower strongly redolent of myth: “Eternall God,” we learn,
“In Paradize whylome did plant this flowre” and thence fetched it to
implant in “earthly flesh.” Soon we are asked to recognize the flower as
the ur-rose that flourishes “In gentle Ladies breste, and bounteous race /
Of woman kind” and “beareth fruit of honour and all chast desyre” (52).
A truly marvelous hybrid, this is now the rosa moralis universalis. Not
surprisingly, one of Spenser’s eighteenth-century editors compared it to
Milton’s “Immortal Amarant” in the third book of Paradise Lost, “a flow’r
which once / In Paradise, fast by the Tree of Life, / Began to bloom.” 21
Quite in contrast to this response to such mythologizing of the rose are
medical associations between flowers and menses, specifically menstrual
discharges, which Jessica Murphy has uncovered.22 In short, here are further complications, notably involving opposite extremes—the realms of
flesh and spirit.
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In Belphoebe’s transformation from uncomprehending nurse to vestal
votaress of the rose, to antique origin and a fructifying virtue undifferentiated by time, person, or place, Timias is quite forgotten. Her specific relation
to him will not align with the general moral statement into which it is translated. To echo the third proem, it will not “fitt.” Honor and chaste desire,
the fruit of the flower, are indeed virtuous, but Timias’s love is honorable
in Book III, and his erotic desire, if not virginal, appears to be decent and
pure and, in these senses, to be chaste, not unlike Britomart’s. Thus the general moral statement not merely transcends the particular case but wholly
misses it. Timias is one person these antique praises of the flower do not suit,
and, since Belphoebe’s use of tobacco (v.32) to heal his wounds signals an
obvious allusion to Ralegh, a reader might also think one “present person.”23
Having glorified the rose, the poet appears in no hurry to return
from antique ideal to the person of Belphoebe. Instead, he directly
addresses the “Fayre ympes of beautie” and urges them to emulate their
origin by adorning their garlands with “this fayre flowre . . . Of Chastity
and virtue virginall.” These “ympes” (shoots, scions) of beauty are preeminently the “Ladies in the Court,” to judge both from the poet’s present
address and its resemblance to the final dedicatory sonnet of The Faerie
Queene.24 Timias aside, the poet opts for the general application of the
antique ideal to this present world of readers. But, with the poet’s final
promise that the flower will not only embellish the ladies’ beauty but will
also crown them “with heauenly coronall, / Such as the Angels weare
before Gods tribunall,” the poem travels beyond even Timias’s first flush of
erotic illusion to a simpler, purer, less earthly vision.
The poet’s address to the ladies continues in the next stanza, however, where he now commends to their attention not the beatifying rose,
upon which he has spent the mythmaking of the previous stanzas, but
Belphoebe herself as the true exemplar of its virtue. In effect he returns
the rose, but now in its glorified form, to her person. Of particular note in
this stanza are the initial recurrences of the word “faire” and the phrases
“none liuing” and “ensample dead,” puzzling phrases whether taken alone,
together, or with the “liuing colours, and right hew” of the third Proem:
To your faire selues a faire ensample frame,
Of this faire virgin, this Belphoebe faire,
To whom in perfect loue and spotlesse fame
Of chastitie, none liuing may compayre:
Ne poysnous Enuy iustly can empayre
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The prayse of her fresh flowring Maidenhead;
For thy she standeth on the highest stayre
Of th’honorable stage of womanhead,
That Ladies all may follow her ensample dead.
(III.v.54)

The repetition of “faire” is insistent, even anxiously so, but it also enforces
a link between present persons and Belphoebe. This link, if only a matter
of rhetoric and fair appearance, suggests a series of steps from the court
Ladies’ “faire selues,” surely many of whom in time were bound to marry;
to a generalized “ensample” of purity, to its more exclusive, or higher,
form, virginity; and finally to the individual fulfillment of virginity in fair
Belphoebe herself, who is found on the “highest stayre . . . of womanhead.”
This virginity is clearly not that of Britomart, the protagonist of Book III,
whose quest is for erotic love in marriage. Notably, the stanza preceding
the one just cited has slipped in the line “Of chastity and vertue virginall,”
in which the paired phrases are not identical, as they are not in chaste married love, the objective of Britomart’s quest.
The poet’s conception of a series of steps—that is, a “stayre”—
becomes additionally significant on examination of the other verbal oddities in the stanza cited. 25 The first of these, the phrase “none liuing,” presumably means “none of you ladies” or “no one living,” since the poet here
addresses his present audience, “youre faire selues,” and compares them
with Belphoebe, the exemplar of ideal chastity, to which “none liuing”
has yet attained. Alternatively, if we take the word “liuing” to be applicable to Belphoebe, the phrase could mean “no other living lady” except
Belphoebe herself. This is the meaning of a remarkably similar claim about
chaste Florimell earlier in the same canto where her dwarf declares of her,
“Liues none this day, that may with her compare / In stedfast chastitie”
(v.8). But there are also significant differences between a claim made by
a distraught dwarf within the narrative context of Faerie and one made
by the Spenserian poet himself and addressed to an audience of courtly
women outside the poem. We readily see that the loyal dwarf speaks
loosely or hyperbolically. He really means no other living lady in all the
realm of Faerie is chaster than Florimell or simply that she is the chastest
lady imaginable. The word “liuing,” however, is not so readily defused in
relation to Belphoebe, who mirrors the chastity of the living queen, especially when it occurs in a direct address to the poet’s living audience. If, in
this context, we were to consider Belphoebe “liuing,” then her figure seems
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at variance with the statements in the proem to Book III and downright
embarrassing when we reach “her ensample dead” in the alexandrine of
this same stanza. Such a radical dissolution of the fictional character of
Belphoebe is entirely unexpected and would probably be wasted or, worse,
misunderstood by Spenser’s audience.
The natural reading of the phrase “none liuing” is, then, as suggested,
the obvious one, “no one liuing” or simply “no living lady.” Although this
reading does not refer specifically or directly to the reigning queen, it
increases the distance between Belphoebe as a mythic ideal and any living referent, including the queen, and thus the distance between antiquity
and the present age. The increased distance reflects the strains between
ideal exemplar and human response in the story of Belphoebe and Timias
and helps to bring both their story and canto v to an appropriate conclusion in 1590, namely,
In so great prayse of stedfast chastity,
Nathlesse she was so courteous and kynde,
Tempred with grace, and goodly modesty,
That seemed those two vertues stroue to fynd
The higher place in her Heroick mynd
So striuing each did other more augment,
And both encreast the prayse of woman kynde,
And both encreast her beautie excellent;
So all did make in her a perfect complement.
(III.v.55)

The poet’s depiction of Belphoebe has effectually reverted to his initial
portrait of her by herself in Book II: a succession of opposites in suspended tension, potentiality but no resolution.26 Like Timias’s reference
to a “bowre of blis” earlier in this same canto, the present complement of
virtues that strive (“stroue . . . striuing”) for supremacy glances again at
Acrasia’s domain, whose opposites strive “each th’other to vndermine” (II.
xii.59). The strife of Belphoebe’s virtues may not be that of Acrasia’s, but
neither is it the realized Concord of opposites figured in the emblematic
figure of this name in Book IV’s Temple of Venus, which is that of an
assimilation, however fragile, “above the differences, as in the concept,”
to quote Paul Ricoeur. The assimilation that is Concord achieves a “level
of conceptual peace and rest” and appropriately belongs to a stationary
figure, who can withstand a threat to her equilibrium, precarious as the
latter may be (IV.x.33, 36).27
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To return again to stanza 54, if the obvious reading of “none liuing”
is also the right one in its fourth line, this reading is designed to cause
another, longer pause for thought when we reread the last three lines of
this penultimate stanza and especially its alexandrine, juxtaposed with (or
against) the stanza that concludes the canto: Belphoebe “standeth on the
highest stayre . . . of womanhead, / That Ladies all may follow her ensample dead” (54). If Belphoebe is a mythic ideal who has moved farther away
from a living referent in the penultimate stanza, what has she to do with
death? First she seems to be mythic in stanza 54 and now to belong to
history. The obvious reading of “none liuing” and the alexandrine clearly
do not as yet accord. We might recall that a similar opposition arose in
the initial portrait of Belphoebe in Book II, when heavenly associations
and the attributes of the mythic goddess Diana were juxtaposed with
Penthesilea “that famous Queene / Of Amazons, whom Pyrrhus did
destroy” (II.iii.31).
The phrase “ensample dead,” when glossed at all in the past, was
long taken only to be an ellipsis of the clause “when she is dead,”28 and
this phrase can be referred to the occurrence of a parallel construction in
Merlin’s prophecy to Britomart of the child or “ymage” Artegall will leave
with her when he is dead:
With thee yet shall he leaue for memory
Of his late puissaunce, his ymage dead,
That liuing him in all actiuity
To thee shall represent.
(III.iii.29)

But the phrase “ensample dead” as readily means “her dead, or lifeless,
example.” Before we are startled into reassessment, this is exactly what it
seems to mean, and, if this were in fact all it meant, it would be a chilling
comment on the ideal Belphoebe embodies and, if at a greater remove, on
that of the reigning queen as well. This alternative meaning of “ensample
dead” also finds a relevant parallel in a later alexandrine of Book III. It
occurs when the witch creates False Florimell, that parody of coldly sterile,
lifeless Petrarchism: “and in the stead / Of life, she put a Spright to rule
the carcas dead” (viii.7). Death is this carcass’s present condition (dead
carcass), not its future one (when dead).
The occurrence in a single stanza of two verbal cruxes as immediately
and obviously related as life (“none liuing”) and death (“ensample dead”)
is unlikely to have been adventitious. The meaning “dead example”—the
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more obvious reading of “ensample dead”—accords better with the more
obvious reading of “none liuing,” because it does not require, as does the
alternative “when she is dead,” an abrupt and irrational shift from mythic
to historical reference and, to put it bluntly, from an ageless Belphoebe to
an aging Elizabeth. There is no way to cancel the more obvious reading
of “ensample dead.” But perhaps we don’t have to stop with its dispiriting
message. In the context of Timias’s highly Petrarchan adoration and idealization of Belphoebe, the alternative reading, “ensample [when she is]
dead,” need not refer to death as an exclusively physical event. It can also
be taken in a way that makes sense of the mythic Belphoebe’s connection
with death and offers the positive reflection on her ideal that balances,
although it cannot simply cancel, the negative one.
In its Petrarchan context, the reading “when she is dead” points to
the resolution of the conflict between body and spirit that comes with the
lady’s physical death and spiritual transcendence. The phrase “ensample
dead” therefore implies the ideal, the life-in-death, that the deadly carcass,
the death-in-life, of False Florimell parodies. This reading of the phrase
balances the cold reality of human loss—death, denial, lifeless example—with high praise of Belphoebe and of the queen, whose chastity, if
only dimly, she still mirrors. At the same time, it continues Belphoebe’s
movement away from an earthly reality and suggests that the only possible
solution of Timias’s dilemma—and seemingly the destined conclusion of
Ralegh’s—is the symbolic or actual transfiguration of Belphoebe into pure
spirit.29
Looking back at stanza 54 with the Petrarchan reading in mind, we
might be struck anew by the phrase “perfect loue” and “spotlesse fame.” It
suddenly makes more sense that “none liuing” should be perfect or spotless in Book III, where the possibility of a living Una has receded like a setting sun, and that the “highest stayre . . . of womanhead” should be reached
only with the lady’s transformation through death into spirit. Presumably
this is also the “stayre” on which worthy emulators of the true rose are
crowned “with heauenly coronall . . . before Gods tribunall” (v.53).
It is further tempting to see a relation between the Petrarchan praise
of fair Belphoebe in Book III and the first of Ralegh’s commendatory sonnets to accompany The Faerie Queene:
ME thought I saw the graue, where Laura lay,
Within that Temple, where the vestal flame
Was wont to burne, and passing by that way,
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To see that buried dust of liuing fame,
Whose tumbe faire loue, and fairer vertue kept,
All suddeinly I saw the Faery Queene:
At whose approch the soule of Petrarke wept,
And from thenceforth those graces were not seene.
For they this Queene attended, in whose steed
Obliuion laid him downe on Lauras herse.30

But there is also a significant distance between this vision of Laura’s living
successor and Spenser’s fully idealized Belphoebe, whose rose opens fully
only in death. Perhaps Spenser could see more clearly the temporal, human
cost—to Belphoebe and Timias both—of the fully realized Petrarchan
vision because he was farther removed from it personally, or perhaps just
farther away in epic romance than was Ralegh in lyric. By the writing of
Book III, however, he certainly knew that in time Laura’s tomb could only
be replaced by another’s “ensample dead.”31
The ill-fated encounter of Timias with Belphoebe occurs on the
near side of the Garden of Adonis, in the canto immediately preceding it.
The first stage of the Garden canto itself treats the twin birth of Amoret
and Belphoebe and their adoption by Venus and Diana to be nurtured
apart, Amoret in the Garden and Belphoebe in the woods. No more is
heard of the figure of Belphoebe in Book III beyond the Garden canto.
Yet one figure in the cantos on the far side of the Garden suggests the
lingering, parodic presence of the living queen. This figure is the lascivious giantess Argante, a nightmarish distortion of chastity, born locked
in incest (<incestus, “unchastity”) with her twin brother and now roaming the countryside to capture young men to be sex-slaves in her island
kingdom.32 Besides being, like Amoret and Belphoebe, a twin, Argante’s
incest with her brother embodies a denial of difference in pointed contrast
to the equally distorting exaggeration of difference in the separation of
the twin sisters by Venus and Diana. Argante’s name derives from Greek
homonyms, the one, argos, meaning “idle” (punningly, idyll, < Latin
idyllium, Greek eidullion), and the other, argos (cf. arges and argas), meaning “bright,” “shining,” “white,” or “swift-footed,” meanings that resonate
with the name of the moon-goddess and huntress Belphoebe, insofar as
Phoebe derives from Greek phoibē, or femininized phoibos, “shining.” Still
more to the point, the likeliest origin of the proper name Argante is found
in medieval British folklore and legend, exemplified in Laȝamon’s Brut,
in which King Arthur, after the battle of Camelford, is taken to “Argante
the queen, an elf most fair,” in Avalon. 33 Herein lies the exemplar
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connecting Prince Arthur to his Faerie Queene, now a woody elf, now
great Gloriana.
The figures of Lucifera and Philotime bear witness that such a distorted image—such harsh parody—as that in the figure of Argante is not
alien to the poet’s techniques, even in Spenser’s earliest two books. Yet
Lucifera and Philotime, maiden queens both, are not missing sides of the
living queen but a denial of what she could and should be. In the figure
of Argante, parody occurs with a difference. Where the depiction specifically of Belphoebe in Book III manages in the end to transcend—indeed,
to sublate—the conflict between Belphoebe’s ideal and earthly selves,
the lusty Argante openly crosses the line between the royal concerns of
a queen and the sexual concerns of a woman. Spenser apparently thought
this to have been the case in the queen’s relation to Ralegh even before
1590, when Book III was published.
Before leaving Book III for Book IV, I want briefly to connect
Spenser’s figures of the Queen to the narratological technique of disnarration, a currently popular term coined by Gerald Prince to describe a wide
variety of deflective pauses, omissions, silences, absences, humility topoi
(occupationes), cryptic allusions, lyric sublations (supersessions), allegories
or dark conceits, and more (primarily post-Enlightment).34 Prince’s definitions and multiple descriptions of this technique could be stretched to
encompass most of Spenser’s poem, but his term is more usefully reserved
to distinguish clearly disnarrative, or otherwise nameless, phenomena such
as the half-line that stops with the hem of Belphoebe’s skirt, the uneasy
nuances of Proem III, Belphoebe’s sublated rose, or anxious repetitions
of “faire.” Otherwise, as a general practice, more exact terms, where possible, and specific textual evidence offer fuller, more discriminating results.
Even the unspoken or half-spoken phenomena for which disnarrative is
particularly suggestive are often ambiguously or not exclusively narrative.
Typically, The Faerie Queene eludes categorical restraints, as it does with
respect to parody and epic itself.
***
In Book IV, Belphoebe’s next and last appearance, her estrangement from
Timias intersects with his relation to Amoret, Belphoebe’s missing twin
sister, and Belphoebe’s reconciliation with Timias clashes sharply with
the abandonment and slander of Amoret. With Timias’s reconciliation
and Amoret’s revilement, duality of judgment and truth can no longer be
contained in a single phrase or image, in consecutive stanzas, or even in
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a single character or event. Belphoebe herself—or what her figure was in
Book II and perhaps even in the fifth canto of Book III, an ideal maintaining some relation to worldly reality—is fractured, a mirror now splintered. The alternatives of love and loss, of timeless and temporal truth,
are no longer grasped together, no longer simultaneous and complementary dimensions of awareness, as tenuously they could still be even in the
phrase “ensample dead,” as well as in the juxtaposition of the last two stanzas of Belphoebe’s canto in Book III (v.54–55). They have become still
more sharply distinct and are in danger of becoming mutually exclusive.
The distance between ideal image and present age, antique praises and
living colors, is widening rapidly as history presses on the poem. Whereas
antiquity was earlier continuous with the Faerie realm, it is increasingly
set apart from it. At the same time, more is happening : the distance
between Gloriana and Belphoebe, the imperial and personal figurations of
the reigning queen, is increasingly and more openly a problem. All this is
doubleness compounded.
The story of Belphoebe and Timias in Book IV is now inseparable
from the last stages of Amoret’s story there. Wounded and then tended
by Timias, Amoret becomes the unwitting cause of Belphoebe’s estrangement from him. She has become part of their story and, when she is simply
abandoned by them in the middle of it, she becomes, both narratively and
morally, a loose end waiting to be rewoven into some larger design. Her
ties with the story of Belphoebe and Timias are symbolic and thematic as
well as figural. The ruby that helps to bring Belphoebe back to Timias is
“Shap’d like a heart, yet bleeding of the wound, / And with a little golden
chaine about it bound” (IV.viii.6). A jeweler’s replica of Amoret’s heart
in the Masque of Cupid, this lapidarian heart that Belphoebe once gave
Timias alludes to Amoret’s real one, simultaneously suggesting contrast
and resemblance to it. The heart-shaped jewel also evokes the use of jewels,
lockets, and limned miniatures with intimate significance in courtly culture and notably its use by Queen Elizabeth herself.35
The twin birth of Belphoebe and Amoret, the complementary maids
of Diana and Venus, provides a richly figural backdrop to their aborted
reunion, and, although Amoret arguably is, or rather becomes, a more fully
human figure than merely an abstract conception of Love, or Amor, the
latter is one kind of meaning she carries when she is wounded, then abandoned, and later reviled. Her abandonment resonates with Belphoebe’s
inability to comprehend erotic love in Book III, insofar as the wrathful
Belphoebe, her trust betrayed by Timias, sees no distinction between the
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predations of the fantastically beastly figure of Lust and Timias’s inadvertent wounding of Amoret, thinking to kill all three of them with the
same arrow (IV.vii.36). But the most provocative imitation, or parody,
of Amoret’s thematic congruence with Belphoebe comes when the poet
subsequently interrupts his narrative during Slander’s revilement of the
wounded Amoret to recall an Edenic age when the “glorious flowre” of
beauty flourished, a time when “antique age yet in the infancie / Of time,
did liue then like an innocent, / In simple truth and blamelesse chastity” (IV.viii.30). Antiquity, ideal image, mythic flower, even chastity, all
previously associated with Belphoebe’s rose—the poet associates them
all now with Amoret. Effectually, Amoret is transported from Slander’s
reviling to an antique age of truth and purity, carried back, it would seem,
to an “antique world” of the sort that Eden is found to be at the end of
Book I, the first instance of the antique image, so specified, in the poem
(xii.14). Like Belphoebe and her rose in Book III, she is translated to
another place. This is a mythic place that is very “like an innocent” one (IV.
viii.30). The qualification “like” is notable. Whereas the rose is finally stellified, Amoret’s translation to purity remains in an antique age on earth—
Edenic but also human. The intrusive timing of the poet’s lyric assertion of
his presence, moreover, guarantees that we notice it for itself, as well as for
its content, even more than was the case with Belphoebe’s rose. Little stays
just the same in the still moving Faerie Queene.
In addition to the connections between the stories of Amoret and
of Belphoebe and Timias sketched earlier, there are pointed contrasts.
The reconciliation of Belphoebe and Timias is conspicuously artificial,
effected through the agency of a sympathetic turtle dove and a lapidary’s
heart and totally removed from temporal reality. When Timias is reconciled, his condition actually anticipates Melibee’s self-enclosed vulnerability in Book VI: he is “Fearlesse of fortunes chaunge or enuies dread, / And
eke all mindlesse of his own deare Lord” (IV.viii.18). His Lord is Arthur,
but I have never quite shaken off the intimation of a higher Lord, perhaps
a memory of Arthur’s role as savior in the two earliest books. Timias’s condition is not made whole by his reconciliation with Belphoebe. Its divisive nature is instead reinforced by separation from Arthur and the higher
calling, whatever its precise nature, that this prince represents. Timias is
fixed again, frozen so to speak, in the situation he occupied with respect to
Belphoebe when last seen in the preceding book.36
Still more noticeably, even while the estrangement of Belphoebe
from Timias alludes unmistakably to Ralegh’s fall from queenly favor,
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their reconciliation in Book IV conflicts with the real state of Ralegh’s
affairs in 1596, when Book IV was published.37 After Ralegh’s secret marriage to Elizabeth Throckmorton, one of the Virgin Queen’s maids of
honor, whom he had evidently impregnated and plausibly by marriage
sought to rescue, and the consequent imprisonment of them both in 1592,
he was, although released fairly quickly from prison, not in fact reconciled with the queen until 1597. His wife, left to languish in prison longer
than he, never returned to favor with the queen. In the reconciliation of
Timias and Belphoebe in Book IV, artificial thus means twice unreal—
unreal at once in manner and in historical reference.38 What the subtitle of
this chapter, “History’s Interlude,” suggests now threatens the more comic,
constructive stories of Una in Book I and Britomart in Books III and IV.
History openly compromises the Faerie vision, as it will again in the last
two books.
The plight of the abandoned Amoret contrasts sharply with the
conspicuous artifice of reconciliation. When Arthur finds her in the forest, she is “almost dead and desperate,” ingloriously wounded and unromantically in need (IV.viii.19). In an effort to shelter her (and her less idealized companion, Aemylia), Arthur unwittingly takes her to the House
of Slander, a foul old woman “stuft with rancour and despight / Vp to the
throat” (24), a description that continues the allusions to queenly attire—
this time a starched ruff—begun in the proem to Book III. Once they are
within Slander’s house, the indignant and somewhat bitter voice of the
poet, earlier noted, intrudes at length in the narrative to connect Slander
to the present age (“Sith now of dayes”) and to oppose this age to the
ideal, antique image “in the infancie / Of time” (29–30). Slander’s railings
therefore have a general historicity or timeliness pointedly attributed to
them for which Amoret’s own adventures, apart from the topicality of her
relation to Timias’s estrangement from Belphoebe, would fail to account.
She was captured by Lust while walking “vnwares” in the woods “for pleasure, or for need”—the latter hardly unnecessary—and by her own effort
she has escaped from Lust’s cave without further defilement, at least until
Timias intervenes (vii.4). In short, what befalls Amoret in the two cantos
she shares with Belphoebe and Timias looks very much like the other half
of their story, the half muted in Belphoebe’s withdrawal from Timias and
suppressed in his return to her. What befalls Amoret unfolds the “inburning wrath” of Belphoebe (viii.17) and gives tongue to the revilement and
infamy Ralegh’s secret marriage incurred. This marriage incurred “the
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displeasure of the mighty . . . Then death it selfe more dread and desperate,” to which the eroticized triangle of Belphoebe, Timias, and Amoret
refers with startling directness (viii.1).
Writing presumably in 1592 from imprisonment in the Tower of
London, Ralegh contrasted the queen’s formerly gracious favor to him
with his present state:
Thos streames seeme standing puddells which, before,
Wee saw our bewties in, so weare they cleere.
Bellphebes course is now obserude no more,
That faire resemblance weareth out of date.
Our Ocean seas are but tempestius waves
And all things base that blessed wear of late.
(269–74)

If we remember Spenser’s final vision of Belphoebe in 1590, with its series
of “fayre” steps from living audience to the highest ideal, these words from
Ocean to Scinthia have an added edge. But, even without this refinement,
they afford a commentary on the distance that has opened between living
queen and either of her Faerie images: as the imprisoned Ralegh again
observes of this distance, “A Queen shee was to mee, no more Belphebe,
/ A Lion then, no more a milke white Dove” (327–28). As the distance
widens, as an ideal Belphoebe becomes further detached from living reference, other kinds of reference to the present age build up and push
intrusively into Faerie. Their violence and their ugliness, unparalleled by
the more controlled images of evil in Books I, II, and even III, do not just
threaten the Faerie vision but actually violate it.
The old hag who reviles Amoret, her companion Aemylia, and
Arthur, their would-be rescuer, is nothing short of hideous, as extreme in
her violent ugliness as conciliatory dove and ruby-heart are in their artificiality. The poet seems almost unable to put a stop to his description of
her, his incursion qualifying as another instance of disnarration, refractive
despite its length and violence: “A foule and loathly creature” with “filthy
lockes,” she sits in her house “Gnawing her nayles for felnesse and for yre,
/ And there out sucking venime to her parts entire” (IV.viii.23–24). The
description continues for another two stanzas with a reiterative emphasis and expansiveness that partial quotation hardly conveys. She abuses
all goodness, frames causeless crimes, steals away good names. Nothing
can be done so well “aliue”—that is, in life—without her depriving it of
“due praise” (25). As the poet continues, castigating the verbal poison
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Slander spues out of her hellish inner parts, she becomes an unmistakable
precursor, first of Detraction and then of that poet’s nightmare, the
Blatant Beast, both in Book V: “For like the stings of Aspes, that kill with
smart, / Her spightfull words did pricke and wound the inner part” (26).39
“Such was that Hag,” the poet concludes, “vnmeet to host such
guests, / Whom greatest Princes court would welcome fayne” (viii.27).
Then, just before the poet in his own voice breaks into the narrative for
five stanzas to decry the distance between antique age and present corruption, he praises the patience of Slander’s “guests,” who endure every insult
she can offer, “And vnto rest themselues all onely lent, / Regardlesse of
that queane so base and vilde, / To be vniustly blamd, and bitterly reuilde”
(viii.28: my emphasis). Quean, meaning “harlot,” “hussy,” or, in Spenser’s
instance, “hag,” is not the same word as queen, and it might be supposed
from the poet’s virulent description that she is an unlikely image of the
Virgin Queen Elizabeth.40 But the word “queane” in this context is not
disposed of so easily, nor is the possibility that this image of the bitter, old
woman glances at the living queen.
Philologists have been reluctant to recognize the likelihood of
the homonymic pun on quean/queen in Renaissance English that exists
in modern English. Helge Kökeritz notes that contemporary philological evidence proves the possibility of such a pun in colloquial speech but
doubts that polite speakers would have found the pun readily accessible.
E. J. Dobson likewise notes the distinction in pronunciation of the two
vowels in educated southern speech but allows for vulgar or dialectical
variations in which the pun would exist. 41 The pun is therefore possible
but unlikely or inappropriate in a polite context, an argument that actually might recommend it on grounds of aesthetic decorum—not to say
political prudence—for the impassioned description of a discourteous
hag. The historical imagination is hard pressed to picture a courtier who
would be likely to explain such a pun to the queen or even willing to admit
recognition of its presence.
Admitting the pun in Spenser’s use of quean, we might regard it as
one of the many signs in Book IV that in some sense the poem is becoming more private and personal, even as its topical concerns—friendship,
justice, courtesy—are becoming more social. We can admit the pun, however, without having to argue that it would not have been recognized
by a number of Spenser’s readers. Wordplay on the combination quean/
queen has a long history, in part because of its alliterative potential, as,
for example, in these lines from Langland’s Piers Plowman: “At churche
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in the charnel cheorles aren vuel to knowe, / Other a knight fro a knaue,
other a queyne fro a queene.”42 In an age of printing like the Renaissance,
the spelling of quean—“queen” and “queyn” in Thynne’s Chaucer—was
also a visual invitation to wordplay, analogous to an eye rhyme, an analogy
that philology might be inclined to discount.43 The same pun occurs as
well in Middleton’s A Trick to Catch the Old One when Witt-Good disclaims youth’s follies, including “sinfull Riotts, / Queanes Evills, Doctors
diets” (V.ii.185–86). The evils of queans are venereal, but highly qualified
readers agree that the pun on quean/queen and the consequent play on
king’s evil (scrofula) are present here. 44 Contemporary, dramatic use of a
pun argues its accessibility to auditors, and a play on diseases dependent
on the pun urges this fact.
To my mind, the most illuminating information about Spenser’s
calling Slander a “queane” is that this is his sole use of the word. Occasion,
Duessa, Impatience, Impotence, the witch who creates False Florimell—
not a one of these hags wears this common Renaissance label, and we
might almost suppose that Spenser was deliberately avoiding it. That he
should suddenly have used the word “queane” accidentally or innocently
in a context inseparable from Belphoebe, Timias, and the relation of Faerie
ideal to present age defies credibility, and does so much more, in view of
Spenser’s verbal sensitivity, than does the possibility that he alludes to the
reigning queen.
As with Belphoebe’s rose in Book III, there are now no precise or
steady equivalents for the figures gathered in Slander’s House: Amoret,
who has a considerable history in the poem, does not simply equal
Elizabeth Throckmorton, Arthur does not equal Ralegh, Aemylia does
not equal anybody, and Slander does not simply equal the queen.45 In the
moments and ways I have suggested, however, what happens to Amoret
reflects the scandal, wrath, and disgrace that Ralegh’s marriage unleashed,
and briefly the poet again holds up to his sovereign the kind of reflection found in a hideous cartoon, as he did less realistically in the figure of
Argante. Where Lucifera, Philotime, and even the much larger-than-life
Argante were threats, Slander is a present reality.46 There is nothing ludic
about Slander, as there is even in the fantastic, hyperbolized lust of the
giantess Argante, who bursts onto the scene with the fabliau figure of the
Squire of Dames and then, snatching the mighty warrior Satyrane by his
collar, plumps him athwart her horse.
***

70  

Chapter 2

Over the course of The Faerie Queene, Belphoebe appears in three Books,
II to IV, and Amoret in two, III and IV. Belphoebe never leaves the woods
during her time in the poem. Despite the promissory fullness when she
is first introduced in that long, complex portrait in Book II, her persistent woodiness suggests something primitive, unsocial, and finally unfinished about her, as Braggadocchio, churlish fool though he be, alleges.
In contrast, Amoret is found in Houses—more broadly in rhetorical
residences, or cultural topoi, such as the Garden of Adonis, the House
of Busirane, and the Temple of Venus, extending even to the House of
Slander as another sociocultural site. The cave of Lust, insofar as it is a
perverse reflection of the bisexed cave with the boar under the mount in
the Garden of Adonis, is arguably yet another, although it might also be
the exception proving the rule. 47 Although the woods—in extreme form
the Wandering Wood—can be considered a topos as well, in their wilder
form, indeed forms, they can also be meaningfully distinguished from the
more cultivated, enclosed places of the poem.
Mainly, Amoret resides in situations set apart from the narrative of
quest, if also in some sense part of it. The exception comes when she travels with Britomart (treated in the next chapter), a liberating experience
that affects her figuration, and then in the sequel to these travels in Book
IV: namely, her capture by Lust and escape, her inadvertent wounding by
Timias, her rescue by Arthur, and her merely presumptive arrival with him
to hear Scudamour recount his raptus of her from the Temple of Venus.
Without a word from her from the time she escapes from Lust’s Cave to
her arrival with Arthur, and without any other closure of her story, her figure disappears from the poem, lingering only as a memory in Scudamour’s
narration of his Temple exploit in the tenth canto of Book IV. In Book III,
Amoret’s early nurture among the happy, mythic personae in the Garden
of Adonis receives two stanzas of narrative in which she plays no active
role. At the end of her story, she is back in the Temple of Venus, where, we
now learn, her story outside the Garden began. Even in outline, it looks
as though something has failed in Amoret’s story and that an entrapping,
unhealthy circularity has replaced narrative progress. It also looks as if the
Spenserian poet explored and improvised as he went along. Certainly, with
respect to the story of Amoret, by the beginning of Book IV, he professes
“oftentimes” to have wished “it neuer had bene writ,” although he notably
continues with its further writing nonetheless (i.1). What is written, especially if then published, like what is otherwise done, belongs to history.
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Does Amoret change in the course of her appearances? Does
Belphoebe? Surely our perceptions of them both develop, doing so as their
figures appear in different contexts and situations. Our sense of Belphoebe
as the figure who fails to comprehend human love differs from our sense
of her in the portrait of Book II, which includes the complexities that her
figure cannot contain in subsequent narrative, and our sense of her rejection of her twin sister and Timias in Book IV differs from our sense of her
earlier generosity to him in Book III. But there is no sense of her developing interiorly or consistently from one of these figurations to another.
She is simply in different situations at different times, always consistently
virginal—like Diana or Minerva, not Venus, even though she is perceived
as Venus by Timias and her initial portrait similarly includes Venerean
allusions. Her generosity to Timias, which is both qualified and inconstant, does not extend to Amoret. There is no other consistency than virginity about her. This looks like allegorical fixation rather than simply an
Aristotelian subordination of character to plot.48 At the same time, however, it is the developing narrative, or plot, that is influenced by events
outside the poem and affects, or is made to affect, the situations in which
the figure of Belphoebe finds herself and must function.49 From this point
of view, she is not a static figure but one who changes over time, even while
she remains both virginal and in the wild woods, in an elemental and primitive environment rather than in one more fully developed. Whereas Una,
another allegorical figure, learns from experience, however, Belphoebe
apparently does not, and this is finally the major difference between their
figurations. Whereas Una’s figural being is continuous, Belphoebe’s is at
best paradoxical, ever imperiled by contradiction, division, and discontinuity—by shades of Duessa.
I doubt that Amoret changes much either, except in a situated,
rather than an interiorized, sense. In terms of the narrative, she might have,
and indeed begins to, but then she wanders away from Britomart’s protection (if, ambiguously, for pleasure or for need) and discovers misery in
the cave of Lust, conversing there with another pitiable woman, Aemylia,
before escaping this cave to become hopelessly entangled in the affairs of
Belphoebe and Timias.50 Although Amoret is said to call out to Britomart
in the House of Busirane and later, in Book IV, is said to converse intimately with her lady knight, she never speaks directly, aside from a feeble
shriek, until she finds herself in Lust’s cave with Aemylia, a sorry situation
if ever there was one. The sad fact is that Amoret’s figure, like Belphoebe’s,
becomes subject to the entangled narrative that is driven by its relation to
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contemporary history in Book IV. As a figure, she is subjected to it, and, if
she is different in different situations, she too is finally discontinuously so.
Adequate links and sufficient development are recurrently missing, as they
are in the argument—endless for lack of enough evidence—as to whether
she lands in Busirane’s clutches because Scudamour is too aggressive or
because she is either too fearful or, conversely, too Venereal.51 Notably, all
these too simple possibilities—even the first—would finally pin her plight
on her, Busirane’s object and victim.
Yet I also doubt that a dismissal of Amoret as a changing figure
is sufficient in itself for several reasons. The first is that her travel with
Britomart has been deferred to the next chapter, and it is her best chance
for development as a figure, to which, arguably, her subsequent flight from
Lust attests, even if it ends with cruel irony in the arms of Timias. This
is a deferral warranted, to my mind, both because of the greater interest
and importance of Britomart in the poem and because its inclusion in this
chapter would require too much repetition in the next one. The second
reason for deferral is that Scudamour’s narrative of the Temple of Venus is
a present reassertion of a bold, too bold beginning, at once a failed possibility within this narrative—or disnarrative—in Book IV and a testament
of unfinished business. Effectually, as the latter, it is also an invitation to
start the story anew or at the very least to reflect on its origin and to ponder its deep cultural roots, “yfounded stronge.”52 That this retelling comes
throughout in Scudamour’s voice only makes it harder to assess, however.
Does the irony that punctuates it signal the possibility of an expanded
awareness on his part or the same old blindnesses? Analogously, in their
final appearances, the figures of Amoret and Belphoebe, not unlike
Shakespeare’s famously inconsistent, if more fully developed, heroines,
such as Desdemona, Olivia, and Lady Macbeth, who change with their
situations in the plot rather than consistently, speak to us at once of lost
possibilities and of still imaginable ones.53
Yet the best reason of all for not dismissing Amoret’s change pertains to the reappearance of her dilemma in the story of Serena that occupies much of Book VI, as well as the final chapter of this book. It is in
Serena’s story, coupled with Mirabella’s, that the misery first voiced briefly
by Amoret and at greater length by Aemylia in Lust’s cave—along with
the nameless old woman—is fully realized. Is that old woman a recontextualized and feminized version of the biblical Old Man, or perhaps
another queanly figure, a hag, whose kindness (in both senses) grimly and
ironically reflects on women’s plight? Be that as it may, Serena’s story is
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where the Spenserian narrator returns to the unfinished business to which
Scudamour’s tale of the Temple of Venus attests. From this vantage point,
the twinned stories of Amoret and Belphoebe change profoundly, involving a substantial refiguration for each that approaches and bids fair to
become a new identity, as the difference in their names in Book VI clearly
signals within this poem. The identity of each becomes at once more affective and more personal, and, to my eyes, the Spenserian poet-narrator is
greatly and personally in sympathy with it. Deferring these refigurations
until chapter 4 respects the unfolding of Spenser’s narrative, while granting to Britomart’s story in Books III to V the prominence it deserves and
actualizes in The Faerie Queene.
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Chapter 3

Britomart: Inside and Outside the Armor

T

he complexity of this chapter asks for an introductory
road map: its first section explores ways in which the depiction of
Britomart answers to traits modern readers, notably Alan Sinfield, have
found in Shakespeare’s characters. The chapter next proceeds to Britomart’s
culminating experience in Book III, namely her adventure in the House
of Busirane. Then it examines her figure through the lens of her defining armor throughout the three books in which she appears, III, IV, and
V, the books of chastity, friendship, and justice. This doubled approach,
occasionally looking back or forward, reflects my own interpretive history
regarding Britomart and further suggests the differences that approaches
themselves—critical lenses—at once reveal and create. Approaching the
House of Busirane, my focus becomes increasingly rhetorical, narrower,
and more detailed—largely responsive to the fact that this place, this cultural topos, is a house in the rhetorical sense—whereas, right afterward,
the focus on Britomart’s armor is mythic, iconological, and wider, traversing more of the narrative. My method also attempts to reflect the actual
experience of reading The Faerie Queene for someone like me, that is, a
rereader with an overview that allows for retrospection, yet one who tries
to respect the forward progression of the narrative, not substituting a later
stage of it for an earlier one.
Britomart is the most fully developed figure of a woman in The Faerie
Queene and, although she could be called a character, she is also appropriately called a figure, both in order to preserve the continuum in Spenser’s
poem from more to less complexity of figuration and to acknowledge her
symbolic dimensions. Her name most simply signifies “martial Briton”;
discussion of other symbolic dimensions of her figure will occur as they
become relevant to this chapter.1 Like Britomart, the dramatis personae,
or characters, in stage plays can also be considered figures, of course, and
symbolic dimensions are easily enough found at once in them and in the
plots in which they operate: Shakespeare’s pairing of Hotspur and Falstaff,
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Ariel and Caliban, Egypt and Rome afford familiar examples.2 The proper
names of Shakespeare’s characters can also be suggestively symbolic, for
example, those in the preceding sentence or Cordelia (Latin cor/cordis,
“heart,” and “delia” as an anagram of “ideal”).3

Britomart and Character Effects
From Britomart’s first appearance in the poem at the beginning of Book
III, the narrator attributes to her an inside that differs from her outside,
and he makes a point of doing so, interrupting the action in the first canto
to identify her as the knight inside the armor who topples Guyon and to
indicate the nature of her Faerie quest (i.8). To suggest that she has “that
within which passes show” is not to claim that she has an interiority (or
a lack of it) the same as Hamlet’s or other representative Shakespearean
characters; instead, it is only to note a certain similarity. 4 A significant
difference between Hamlet and Britomart is that her interiority is subsequently exhibited at length, whereas his remains more of a mystery.
One similarity between the two is that some readers would deny
interiority to them both, either not noticing it for what it is in Britomart’s
case, or in Hamlet’s by refusing or dissolving it, whether rationalizing or
materializing it, or both, into the closed terms of modern systems. Systems
shed light, but they can also destroy the shadows actually present in human
texts. If I had to identify one feature of Renaissance literary texts, dramatic
and nondramatic, that most separates them from modern systems and, for
this very reason, offers to illuminate these systems in turn, it would be
their persistent, insistent resistance of such closure. Modern scientism has
its virtues, but, with rare exceptions, the tendency to closure and certainty
of its typical forms is deceptive when applied to creative writings, especially older ones. Hamlet’s objection that his treacherous friends would
“pluck out the heart of his mystery” is also his awareness that they aim to
do so, his resistance of their efforts, and his determination actively and
antically to frustrate these (III.ii.365–66). Centuries of criticism suggest
that to a significant extent he has succeeded. He is certainly one character,
moreover, for whom the designation “most Shakespearean” is also most
fitting. Older writings were subject to older systems, to be sure, but typically, these were more aware of mystery and more tolerant of it. Perhaps
they had to be; perhaps they chose to be; perhaps neither.
In a couple of ways, the Spenserian narrator’s opening aside to readers in Book III regarding Britomart’s identity and quest differs from the
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extensive presentation of the Renaissance inside/outside topos early in
Book I, specifically in Archimago’s manipulation of Redcrosse’s imagination and his subsequent impersonation of his victim. First, Archimago is
himself an actor in the relevant episode of Book I, rather than the thirdperson narrator of it as in the opening of Book III, and second, in Book
III, the aside in question is the narrator’s straightforward presentation of
background, not his sly insinuation of his protagonist’s insufficiency, an
insinuation effected in Book I, for example, by his making Archimago’s
impersonation of Redcrosse comment on this knight. Such differences
render Britomart a more autonomous figure in Book III. The narrator, so
to speak, respects her difference.
Britomart’s armor in the third book also differs from Una’s veil in
Book I by being primarily a deliberate, strategic disguise, not just protective covering or a necessary disguise for a woman in a world of woods,
caves, and wild creatures, whether human or beastly. By definition,
Britomart’s armor, including sword and spear, is aggressive, not merely
defensive. Further, insofar as Una represents Truth in this fallen world, her
veil is an unavoidable reality, whereas Britomart’s armor is voluntary and
represents a choice. Britomart is hiding a secret; Una is not. The wimpled
Una’s black stole cast “ouer all” expressly suggests that she mourns “inly”
(I.i.4).
As noted in chapter 1, Britomart declines to join the chase of
Florimell and the forester in the first canto of Book III because she is constant to her own “mind,” not to some other dictate. 5 At the outset, she
declines the traditional role of a knight, whether to rescue or to pursue
a maiden and thus typically to make love or war, as knights have done
from time immemorial. Her constant quest for a specific lover is further
distinguished early in canto i even from Arthur’s quest, since, in chasing
Florimell, Arthur moves away from his initial motivation to find his elf
queen and instead seems ready to accept a substitute: later losing sight of
the fleeing Florimell when night falls, “Oft did he wish, that Lady faire
mote bee / His faery Queene . . . Or that his Faery Queene were such,
as shee” (III.iv.54). Although his elf queen is still the gold standard, he
drifts into likeness as an alternative, acceptable possibility (“such, as”).
Britomart, in contrast, is steadfast. While focusing on Shakespeare, Helen
Cooper describes as an inheritance of medieval romance, “the portrayal of
a young woman in love from inside her own mind” and cites Britomart as
a case in point; “typically feisty,” the romance heroine of the Middle Ages
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is self-aware, passionate about “the man she chooses to love” and ready to
go to great lengths to find (or “get”) him.6
Also notable as Book III gets under way is the fact that Britomart
is named almost immediately within the text as well as after first acting,
rather than, for example, after a long description or first only within the
argument heading a canto, as are Una and Belphoebe. 7 Her agency is
foregrounded. Britomart also has a father rather than a myth of origin,
a nurse, not a Palmer, and a history both inherited and destined that is
set firmly on earth. In short, she looks and is more human than her most
memorable predecessors in the poem, as is the potentially virtuous love
for which she quests. But it is even more important that the identification
of Britomart’s quest at the very outset begins to be defined by her differences from and relationships to numerous other actors in the poem. Her
figure has a distinctly social as well as an individualized existence. She is
neither Everywoman, let alone Everyman (humankind, or in premodern
usage, mankind), nor is she wholly unique. Once again such a description
of her looks human.
In a perceptive discussion of character and a defense of its validity
as a current critical topic, Alan Sinfield offers a “redefinition of character
as continuous consciousness,” while barring “establishment of the individual as a single, unified presence,” as distinct from his or her enhanced
subjectivity.8 While thus rejecting the bourgeois individual of “essentialist
humanism,” which is post-Enlightenment anyway, Sinfield opts for more
than “an intermittent, gestural, and problematic subjectivity,” namely, “a
continuous or developing interiority or consciousness” (62). His subsequent discussions of Shakespeare’s characters make clear that such a continuous consciousness doesn’t have to continue throughout a whole play:
it can come and go or, once established, can afterwards simply go, leaving a resistant or unresolvable problem. From this perspective, he looks at
Desdemona, Olivia, and Lady Macbeth. His list could have been extended
to other problematic figures among Shakespeare’s fictive women: Cressida
and Isabella, for a start.9
My intention is not to make Britomart into a cross-dressed
Shakespearean heroine, although I am not the only one long since to have
remarked general similarities between her and Shakespeare’s Rosalind or
Viola. At the same time, however, I am struck by the number of characteristics Britomart’s figure exhibits that correspond to the methods playwrights use to produce “character effects” in dramatis personae, as Sinfield
enumerates them. These include self-reference and self-questioning, which
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might include soliloquy, and also lying, which creates distance between
statement and intention, the latter indicating inwardness. I would add
that intention is a word-concept derived etymologically from Latin in, “in,
within,” and tendere, “to extend, proceed, aim, direct one’s self or one’s
course.” Further included in Sinfield’s enumeration are indecision, more
generally the representation of decision-making, and informative conversations overheard by the audience, which raise questions about intentionality—that among Gloucester, Kent, and Edmund at the opening of King
Lear comes to mind, for instance.10
Britomart lies to Redcrosse when she rides away from Malecasta’s
castle with him, telling him that Artegall has done “Late foule dishonour
and reprochfull spight” to her, but then she waxes “inly wondrous glad”
when Redcrosse tells her he is greatly surprised that Artegall should ever
have done such injury to her (III.ii.8–11). Britomart’s direct conversation with Redcrosse, which continues for nearly ten stanzas, including
narrative framing and commentary, soon after leads in a narrative flashback to the story of her falling in love with the image of Artegall that is
facilitated through a magic globe—an objectification of her waking, and
awaking, pubescent imagination. The flashback then proceeds to her
back-and-forth conversation about her erotic predicament with Glauce,
her comic old nurse, for more than another fifteen stanzas. Not only
does this conversation deliver background information and dramatize a
process of decision-making, it also focuses on Britomart’s inner state and
reveals, in Glauce’s words, that Britomart is making a “Monster of . . . [her]
minde”—imagining horrors and perversions, whereas she should more
simply be recognizing that she is in love (40).11 Their conversation could
readily have been adapted for the Renaissance stage. It has comic features,
as do the visit to Merlin and other aspects of Britomart’s characterization.
Notably, both women converse in terms of mythic figures, Myrrha, Biblis,
Pasiphaë, Narcissus. Like the Elizabethan schoolboys Lynn Enterline has
studied, they use Ovidian mirrors, types or examples, “to understand and
to express” their own perceptions, which are influenced by these types,
even if also reshaped and repurposed by the schoolboys (and girls) as they
mature. Enterline’s proof-texts are Shakespeare’s Lucrece and Hamlet.12
Two other examples of Sinfield’s character effects that produce the
impression of consciousness occur in the first third of Book III. One is
Britomart’s much-discussed soliloquy by the seaside in canto iv, in which,
now imitating a sonnet from Petrarch, she expresses the tempestuous
“sea of sorrow” within her and nearly despairs of a happy outcome until
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Glauce reminds her of Merlin’s dynastic prophecy and a hostile knight
conveniently appears to offer an immediate object on which to vent her
passion (11–16). Significantly, although the ur-text here is mainly (not
exclusively) Petrarchan, it is Britomart herself, not the narrator, who
voices it and, within the poem, thus recreates it.13 My other example is
not the modern word “consciousness,” which is just becoming available in
the first half of the seventeenth century, but “awareness,” or, in the form
in which it recurrently occurs with respect to Britomart, a condition of
being “vnwares.” Her “vnwareness” is obviously based on the presumption
of its opposite as the possibility to which experience leads.14 Britomart
is “vnwares” when she looks into the magic globe to see the vision of
Artegall but later acutely aware of her earlier unawareness when, she tells
Glauce, she swallowed this bait (III.ii.26, 38). Earlier in this book, she was
also “vnwares” when Malecasta slipped into her bed, the climax in Castle
Joyous of the initial stage of her initiation as an active quester into the
bodily and sociocultural context of sexual awareness. At a later stage, she
will be “vnwares” again when Busirane wounds her, a situation to which
I will return (i.61, xii.33). Each of these occurrences of Britomart’s lack
of awareness instances an increasing development of her figure, and the
correction of each leaves her more aware both of herself and of the nature
of her quest. Each is a learning experience that results in growth. At the
same time, there is a perceptible continuity among these experiences. This
is a continuity, however, which, unlike that of the more metaphysically
oriented Una—again, more oriented, not exclusively conceived—will be
disrupted before the poem is finished with Britomart’s figure. With this
change, her figuration will be at once more problematic and more sadly,
historically realistic. Still further Shakespearean?

Britomart’s Awareness in the House of Busirane
When Britomart accepts a knight’s plea to free Amoret from the House
of Busirane, she becomes a radical challenge to the erotic culture in which
she, too, has operated to this point, with the exception of her declining to
rescue Florimell, the anticipatory, threshold image of Book III. Amoret,
if not exactly a prop or just another exhibit in Busirane’s House, has been
imprisoned by the sadistic enchanter and in this way has unwillingly
become his creature, another of his creations, or so his production stages
her. Busirane’s capture of Amoret is what we witness until Britomart ends
it. We last saw Amoret only briefly in the Garden of Adonis, her former
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residence in Book III. Encountering Busirane’s House at the end of this
book, we have only the knight Scudamour’s name (Shield of Love), his
heraldic device (Cupid) and behavior, and his account of why Amoret is
under Busirane’s control, and, for six more years, from the 1590 installment of the poem until the 1596 one, Spenser’s original audience lacked
access to anything more.
In contrast to Amoret, Britomart reaches Busirane by actively
questing and most immediately by chasing the evil Ollyphant (“destructive fantasy”), Argante’s twin brother, to the sight of Scudamour “all wallowed / Vpon the grassy ground” (III.xi.7). This sequence suggests both
Britomart’s opposition to such fantasy and Scudamour’s implication in it.
Simply put, Scudamour replaces Ollyphant. Scudamour tells her that the
enchanter has “pend,” or through his art confined, Amoret, in effect arresting the very possibility of their love (xi.11)—at once imprisoning and paralyzing it. More allegorically, Scudamour, Cupid’s man, has been separated
by Busirane from the object of his love, Amoret, who is “Venus mayd,” or
punningly, Venus-made, ever since Venus discovered and adopted her in
Cupid’s “stead”—in his “place”—earlier in Book III (vi.28).15 The possibility of the love of Scudamour and Amoret is therefore the very possibility
of realizing love, not simply the love of these two figures, but, in terms of
their simple allegorical natures, here Love itself.
Imprisoned in Busirane’s House of perverse, rhetorical art forms,
however, Amoret has become the Ovidian-Petrarchan love object. Her
capture has shaped her figure, indeed, has transfigured it from what it was
in the Garden. For Britomart, confrontation of Busirane is another initiation and a further education, this time with respect to Ovidian myths
and Petrarchan conceits that have informed the erotic culture in which
she functions and, as we have seen, have informed her own awareness. Her
task is to free Amoret from Busirane’s malign control and to enable the
possibility of Amoret’s reunion with Scudamour. Developments in Book
IV subsequently make clear that both Amoret and Scudamour have to
change for this possibility to be truly realized. To glance back to the last
chapter and forward in the present one, in 1596 this realization fails to
happen. In 1590, the lovers’ reunion is greatly compromised, even dubious, a claim to which this chapter will later return.
In recent times, the House of Busirane has variously been seen as
Busirane’s projection, as Amoret’s, as Scudamour’s, as Britomart’s, and,
without regard for these mediating characters, as the Spenserian narrator’s.
This House, like the House of Holiness, the Bower of Bliss, the Garden of
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Adonis, the Temple of Venus, or any other such place in The Faerie Queene,
is a cultural site, a topos or “place.” Its representation is finally the poet’s,
as are all the figures residing in or traveling into it, although the poet’s
control of it, his agency with respect to it, is mediated, limited, and compromised by his own position in language and history. He is nonetheless responsible for it insofar as he is in control of it—again, insofar as.
Although the Temple of Venus in Book IV is a special case whose narration belongs to Scudamour, it, too, is finally the poet’s, as he acknowledges
at its very end. Like other cultural sites in The Faerie Queene, which have
some special pertinence to the figures within them, the House of Busirane
also has special pertinence to Britomart, as well as more immediately to
Amoret and Scudamour, without being solely attributable to any one of
them or even to them all together apart from culture and history. The
nature of this pertinence—moral, theological, psychological, historical, or
a combination of such—is variable, not simply formulaic, and it is subject
to context when it occurs.
In Britomart’s instance, aside from the general, formalized eroticism of Busirane’s House, which has obvious relevance to a love quest, her
progress in Book III more specifically explains why she is there: in canto i,
her vulnerability to Malecasta, realized in her wounding, foreshadows her
vulnerability to Busirane, and, in canto ii, the smoky, sulphurous Etna in
her breast anticipates the Busiranic fire, shaking, and “stench of smoke and
sulphure” (ii.32, xi.21, xii.2). Likewise, in canto ii, the perverted, mythic
forms her explanation takes when she confides in Glauce foreshadow those
in Busirane’s tapestries. In canto iv, the “selfe-pleasing thoughts” that feed
her pain, her guidance by blind Cupid, and her pendulum swing between
“Love and despight,” anticipations of Busirane’s paired masquers, prepare
for Busirane’s pageant, as does her sympathetic recognition of kinship
with Paridell’s pain in canto ix, ominously within the perverted House of
Malbecco and Hellenore.16 Amoret, Ovidian-Petrarchan love object par
excellence, is part of Busirane’s pageant the first time Britomart sets eyes
on her.
Once Britomart enters Busirane’s enchanted House, the first room
of three that she views specifically signals the inevitability of her arrival
there. The tapestries on its walls share both their Ovidian source in the
Metamorphoses and their sense of erotic compulsion with her beholding—
taking in—the tapestry in the House of Malecasta that depicts the fixated,
hyper-sensuous love of Venus for the boy Adonis (a foretaste of Argante’s
preferences) and leads in the narrative to the flashback with Glauce in
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which Britomart expresses her own passion as an erotic perversion in classical myth.17 The specific Ovidian passage on which Busirane’s tapestries
draw is the ecphrasis of Arachne’s art in her ill-fated weaving contest with
Pallas Athena, the Greek Minerva. Immediately, there are ironies and
crossings of gender in this situation, whose many complications must be
unlayered gradually.
When Britomart initially encounters Busirane’s enchanted fire, she
asks Scudamour in dismay, “‘What monstrous enmity prouoke we heare,
/ Foolhardy as th’Earthes children, which made / Batteill against the
Gods? So we a God inuade’” (III.xi.22). Once again, Britomart expresses
herself, and thinks, in the mythic terms studied in the grammar school
texts of the period, which were read by well-educated girls, as well as by
boys. Traditionally, the fire-god is Vulcan, the smith and forger of chains,
as well as the figure of the jealous, overly possessive husband also evoked
allusively by the netting of Acrasia and Verdant, a Venus and a Mars, in
the Bower of Bliss. It is as if Britomart were again upending and improving on Guyon and his Palmer, as she was at the very outset of Book III.
Her ability in her armor to pass unharmed through the fiery entrance of
Busirane’s House contrasts both with the disabling jealousy of Scudamour
and the possessive hoarding of Busirane, throwbacks alike to Malbecco,
the essence of “Gelosy” itself.18
Boldly invading this jealous fire-god and forger of chains, Britomart
next gazes at the tapestries that recreate the one woven by Ovid’s Arachne,
a woman bold—perhaps too bold?—in protesting the violent excesses of
the gods’ passions but also one whose protest is depicted sympathetically in
the eyes of the Roman poet of the Metamorphoses.19 The tapestries Britomart
views similarly show more than one sign of parodic protest: for example,
in Mars’s undignified “shreek” (comically rhyming with “eek”) of passion,
along “With womanish teares, and with vnwarlike smarts,” or in the
sequence of Neptune’s undying love only for Bisaltis in the alexandrine of
one stanza—“Ne ought but deare Bisaltis ay could make him glad”—followed immediately in the next stanza by the laconic statement “He loued eke
Iphimedia deare, / And Aeolus faire daughter Arne hight” (III.xi.41–42, 44).
Yet the cross-dressed knight Britomart finds her tapestry of womanly protest within the chambers of a male enchanter, who, like herself,
is also the creation of a male poet. At this point, we might well stop to
ask, with Susanne Wofford, whose tapestry this is and through whose eyes
we see and, more properly, “rede,” or interpret it. 20 Arachne’s, Ovid’s, his
narrator’s, Britomart’s, Busirane’s, Spenser’s as poet or narrator, the inter-
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pretive tradition’s, or our own? Going beyond the possibilities Wofford
endorses, I would not exclude any of these, and the ecphrasis of the tapestry itself invites them in describing Jove’s rape of Leda, breaking into
apostrophe in the manner of Ovid to do so:
O wondrous skill, and sweet wit of the man,
That her in daffadillies sleeping made,
From scorching heat her daintie limbes to shade:
Whiles the proud Bird ruffing his fethers wyde,
And brushing his faire brest, did her inuade:
She slept, yet twixt her eielids closely spyde,
How towards her he rusht, and smiled at his pryde.
(III.xi.32)

Considerable ambiguity of reference marks this much-discussed stanza.
Is the skilled and sweet-witted man in the first line Busirane or the chameleon-like, negatively capable Spenserian narrator, or the Spenserian
poet in his own voice?21 This time, the lines cited have no direct parallel in Ovid, hence no parallel in Arachne’s tapestry, and they therefore
belong to the three possibilities enumerated. But are we to forget that
Britomart is our gazer and that these lines could also belong to her vision
or response to Arachne’s?22 In whose opinion is the man “sweet-witted”?
And what do the last two lines of the stanza mean: “She slept, yet twixt
her eyelids closely spyde, / How towards her he rusht, and smiled at his
pryde”? Leda sleeps, like Verdant in the Bower of Bliss, and yet, also to an
extent like him, between her eyelids she seems to see—to spy—the swan
rushing toward her. Is she awake or in a trance or in a daydream? Each
of these possibilities would imply a different kind and degree of agency.
The simple adverb “closely” could indicate that her eyes are indeed shut
(“closely twixt”) or that she spies with close attention an object close to
her (“closely spyde”). The word “spy” itself carries an insistent association
with stealth or closeness—intense, secretive observation. The final clause
of the line, as Katherine Eggert has noted, is also ambiguous: does Leda
smile in anticipation of rapture or does the swan, as the assumed form of
Jove, smile in anticipation of ravishment?23 And is the smile one of Jovian
arrogance, of pure pleasure—his, hers, or theirs—or is it an ironic smile,
a self-reflexive, deflating, Ovidian possibility that the availability of the
womanly perspectives of Arachne and Britomart, not to mention some
other readers, enforces? The narrator’s own awareness, often amazing, is
not to be slighted, either.
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Another passage, even more frequently remarked, expresses ambiguity of reference as well. The walls of the enchanter’s House are clothed
with arras,
Wouen with gold and silke so close and nere,
That the rich metall lurked priuily,
As faining to be hidd from enuious eye;
Yet here, and there, and euery where vnwares
It shewd it selfe, and shone vnwillingly:
Like to a discolourd Snake, whose hidden snares
Through the greene gras his long bright burnisht backe
                   declares.
(III.xi.28)

This time, the inwoven threads of metal have an explicit precedent in
Ovid, although it proves as striking in its difference as in its similarity:
“There, too, they [Athena and Arachne] weave in pliant threads of gold,
and trace in the weft some ancient tale (illic et lentum filis inmittitur
aurum / et vetus in tela deducitur argumentum).”24 In Ovid’s version, the
gold thread, belonging to Arachne and Athena alike, lacks the last six
lines of Spenserian description, which call attention—heightened attention—to the serpentine filaments. Rather than betraying the presence of
art, they shout it by comparison with Ovid’s text, unwilling as they may
be, or rather feign to be so. The participial pun “faining”—“As faining
to be hidd”—as easily supports an exhibitionist impulse as it denies one,
since the homonymic pun means either pretending (feigning) or desiring
(faining). The alternative of merely pretending to hide from but actually
enticing the “enuious eye” would relate the serpentine threads to the gold
grapes in Acrasia’s Bower, which enfold themselves among the leaves “As
lurking from the vew of couetous guest”—as if lurking but actually seducing (II.xii.55).
But art in the House of Busirane is not finally the same as in the
Bower, where “The art, which all that wrought, appeared in no place”
(II.xii.58). Here, not unlike the sonneteer’s topos of inarticulateness or
an elaborate declamation uttered in full erotic chase by Ovid’s Apollo,
art may want or pretend to hide but instead displays itself, unwillingly or
not. Like the pun faining/feigning, the word “unwillingly,” which specifically refers to shining or conspicuousness—“It shewed it selfe, and shone
vnwillingly”—again evokes the oscillating play of visual and interpretive
perspectives, along with that of inadvertency and agency. Moreover, it
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does so “vnwares,” which is precisely the ambiguous way Malecasta earlier sneaks up on Britomart and the way Busirane’s knife wounds her and
the knowing and not knowing way that Leda, in all her ambiguity, awaits
the rush of the swan. This is an acute, extraordinarily telling way of realizing the combination of cultural exposure and ignorance, knowing and
not knowing, that characterizes Britomart’s condition and observation, as
indeed her youthful reading of Ovid. Britomart does not cause this cultural site, whose meaning at once precedes and exceeds her role in it, but
this place of rhetorical culture bears special pertinence to her condition
and quest. Again, as with Leda, she is mirrored to an extent in the object
or site.
Britomart passes from the tapestries next to a Mammonic room
overlaid with pure gold, in which the “monstrous formes” of false love are
depicted and on whose glittering walls hang the trophies of love’s wars and
conquests (xi.51–52). Again, Busirane is a hoarder, a self-gratifying one
like Spenser’s Mammon, who autoerotically fingers the gold coins in his
lap “to feede his eye” (II.vii.4–5). In Busirane’s golden room, Britomart
witnesses the procession of Cupid’s masquers, figures that stage the very
process of a false love which is hardly distinguishable at moments from
a true one. Antiquity of origin characterizes the creations of this room,
as before of the tapestries depicted. As A. C. Hamilton’s gloss conveniently summarizes, the masquers draw directly on the conventions of the
medieval courts of love and of Renaissance triumphs, not least Petrarch’s
own, as well as on those of the Renaissance masque.25 Again, these figures are hardly Britomart’s creation, although they have special relevance
to her condition and quest, as they do to Amoret’s and Scudamour’s, and
to those of other characters in Book III. The very fact, long recognized,
that they can be read from either a male or female point of view indicates
their basically cultural rather than exclusively personal status. Their formal
artificiality also proclaims their radical—indeed, their catachrestic—constructedness. Unlike the insidious art forms in Acrasia’s Bower, they make
no claims on nature. On reflection, who would want such mirrors of passion as these?
Their relation to Busirane and ultimately to Britomart is worth pursuing, however. Cupid’s masquers resemble the kind of form Malbecco
becomes at the end of canto x, one that “Is woxen so deform’d, that he has
quight / Forgot he was a man, and Gelosy is hight” (60). Malbecco’s metamorphosis into a “passion . . . in the mind” introduces the first canto, the
eleventh, in which the House of Busirane figures centrally, and, in effect,
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it prepares for the masquers, whose humanity, like Malbecco’s, has either
vanished or failed of realization. 26 Like the fixed and fixated emblem
“Gelosy” that Malbecco has become, the masquers are impostors of the
living and every bit as artificial, as “personified,” hence metaphorized, as
the “carcas dead” of the False Florimell (III.viii.7, xi.1). Malbecco makes
explicit in Book III the connection between sexual and monetary hoarding that was glimpsed earlier in the figure of Mammon. Even though the
masquers are in a procession—a kind of dead march—each pair in itself is
a frozen stage of courtship, removed from the necessarily narrative process
of allegory and quest.27 The masquers are another product of Busirane’s
art, and they issue from an “inner rowme” that is his as well (xii.26).
Years since, Thomas P. Roche, Jr., glossed Busirane as abuse in the
sixteenth-century senses of “imposture, ill-usage, delusion,” or as the
archaic abusion, meaning a “perversion of the truth, deceit, deception,
imposture,” and in the words of Book II, implying “fond . . . illusions”
(xi.11).28 To these meanings, I would add abusio, the familiar Renaissance
word for catachresis, here understood as a wrenching of metaphor or an
extravagant use of it, in the case at hand, a violent (mis)use of language,
of which the masquers’ dead likenesses are a prime exhibit. In Busirane’s
House of rhetorical art and illusion, abusio reigns, or “ranes,” supreme. The
traditional classification of poetry as a branch of rhetoric was still common in the Renaissance, and Busirane is clearly an abuser of poetry, as
well as of rhetoric.29 By now, I imagine, it is also clear that Busirane’s name
puns on abuse/abusio—that is, A-busirane.
Another persistent association of abusio in the rhetorical tradition is
with audacia, or boldness, and it offers a gloss on the strange, forward and
backward, summoning and forbidding, aggressive and maidenly imperatives Britomart reads over the doors in Busirane’s Mammonic second
chamber: “Be bolde, be bolde . . . Be not too bold” (xi.54).30 In a discussion of
metaphor, including catachresis/abusio, in De Oratore, Cicero’s spokesman
praises “paulo audaciores [translationes],” or, “somewhat bolder metaphors” that bring brilliance to a speech but do not violate “ratio”—reason,
purpose, or indeed, the nature of things (rerum natura). Such figures are
bold but not too bold. 31 Read through the lens of Ciceronian rhetoric,
the writing Britomart confronts above the doors in Busirane’s House of
rhetoric has the Ciceronian quality of an invitation to use audacia and
a caution against excess in doing so, as it does in De Oratore. The choice
Britomart faces as reader of Busirane’s art is edged with anxiety and
danger, not unlike that faced by an orator in Cicero’s Rome, as the forced
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deaths of so many of the speakers in De Oratore, as well as of Cicero himself, dramatize. Rhetoric is consequential; it is a social, legal, and political
shaper, not merely a neutral ornament or tool of pedagogues. Britomart,
or any other reader, would do well carefully and cautiously to heed these
warnings about the boldness of rhetorical art, warnings now appearing
elusive and treacherous, yet also beguiling, in the message they send “to
any vnwares” in Busirane’s House. They invite a decision, while undermining assurance, and the only escape from Busirane’s hegemonic cultural trap
here or elsewhere, then or now, starts with awareness.
Britomart’s evident acceptance of the challenge to be bold, but not
too bold, leads to the third chamber of the House of Busirane, where its
patron, the figure or at least the first figure behind the curtains, Busirane
himself, primarily represents the constructedness of the entire place.
Again, this art-full place simply doesn’t make the same claims as Acrasia’s
Bower about its nearness to or indistinguishability from nature. This is art
in capital letters, and alarmingly, Amoret’s life in some sense now depends
on Busirane. Thus “the Lady [Amoret], which by him stood bound, /
Dernly vnto her [Britomart] called to abstaine, / From doing him to dy”
(xii.3: my emphasis). Once in Busirane’s clutches, Amoret recognizes
herself and is recognized as his creation, pleading for his life in order to
preserve her own. Her identity as love, which is presently her whole life,
depends on loving. She is, after all, “Venus mayd” and the complement of
“Cupids man,” as she will be described by Scudamour in Book IV (x.54).
Busirane has arrested her development, both imprisoned her figure and
obstructed the realization of what she could and should be.
The adverb “dernly,” which conveys the tone and manner in which
Amoret calls on Britomart to spare Busirane’s life, means “secretly” or
“privately, confidentially”; it also carries the sense “inwardly.” Dernly
is a strange but suggestive word in this context, one that in the past has
often been glossed too casually in the derived senses “dismally” or “direly.”
More significantly, it intimates a special appeal or relationship, something
understood or otherwise shared between the two women. Yet dern(e) also
means “dark” and “secret” in the sense “done in the dark” and often has
associations with craft, deceit, or evil.32 Conceivably, if disturbingly, it
could further connect Amoret with her captor, at least while in his power.
Associatively, the “dark secret life” that destroys Blake’s rose comes to
mind.
Clearly, however, Britomart cannot destroy Busirane without
destroying what Amoret now is, the cultural love object par excellence.
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This Busiranic figuration underlies Amoret’s development in the company of Britomart after Book III and prior to the intractable, historical
entanglement of Amoret’s figure with the story of Timias and Belphoebe
in Book IV (vii–viii). Amoret’s figuration as love object is also the reason
that, although Busirane’s artworks vanish, he still survives, bound by the
very chain or, in further terms of traditional iconography, by the rhetorical art that he has abused.33 Without him, there is only a vacuum, and this
vacuum might also have something to do with the fact that Spenser’s own
Amoretti, written and published between Book III and the 1596 sequel,
cannot wholly escape the available conventions of erotic discourse but
indeed must use and try to reshape them.34 The furnishings of Busirane’s
rooms may vanish at the end of canto xii, but this is hardly the last we see
of their kind in Spenser’s poetry.
The alternative definition of catachresis/abusio, namely a necessary
extension of the signification of a word to something that lacks a word,
rather than merely a willful wrenching of language, bears both on the emptiness apparent with the vanishing of the artworks in Busirane’s House and
on the persistence of Ovidian, Petrarchan, or otherwise Busiranic forms in
Spenser’s poetry. Abusive as these might have been and still might be, they
are currently and culturally inescapable for a practicing poet who wants his
poems read, even aside from the extent to which he is able, or is not, to get
outside and to critique them. Poetry has never been written in a cultural
vacuum. This is another suggestion conveyed by Spenser’s ending Amoret’s
story with a return to the Temple of Venus in Book IV, right where her
life beyond the Garden of Adonis began, as discussed in chapter 2.
Busirane represents a fantasy and, additionally, a culture of rape,
as others have argued without qualification, but it should be observed as
well that he is not successful. His fantasy remains exactly that, and Amoret
remains a virgin under his roof: “Die had she leuer with Enchanters knife, /
Then to be false in loue, profest a virgine wife”—pledged to Scudamour
but not fully one with him (IV.i.6, III.xii.31). If it were otherwise,
Busirane’s significance as a peculiarly rhetorical form of abuse, an art with
the power in actuality to arrest love, would be lost, and with it the real
cultural critique of Book III. Busirane abuses figuration and the perception based on it to feign that metaphor is the same as reality, that it is absolutely rather than is and is not, as Paul Ricoeur would gloss this figure of
perverse predication—“perverse” (from pervertere), “turned away, around,
about” or “athwart,” hence “tropic.”35 It is Busirane who feigns (and fains)
rape. And his ideological legacy is the reading that believes him.
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Britomart herself is wounded, although not deeply, by Busirane and
therefore proves vulnerable to him. Her heart is also said to be pierced and
her hair stood on end by his bloody verses, even while, her threatening
sword raised above him, she controls him.36 To my mind, this is the one
moment in the scene, rather than any other one, at which Britomart experiences, or truly realizes, Amoret’s condition. For a modern reader invested
in psychoanalytic connections, this could be a moment when Britomart
traverses, enters into, the Busiranic fantasy, even as it is the same moment
in which Busirane “reuerse[s]” his spell, turning it back as when one looks
at the backside of a collar, and his artworks crumble, then vanish, because
there is nothing real there (III.xii.36).37
At one point in the immediate context of Busirane’s disenchanting
verses—a rhetorical spell, which like all spells, must be unbound—a truly
ambiguous pronoun occurs, (con)fusing Britomart with Amoret. With
“threatfull hand” unslackened, Britomart waits “[un]dismaied” (and undis-maided) by the quaking of this House and undeterred by “daungers
dout,” a phrase offering to reassume the familiar form of an actual pair of
the masquers earlier seen (cf. xii.10–11, 37); thus she “Abode,” occupying
and inhabiting this “place,”
to weet, what end would come of all.
At last that mightie chaine, which round about
Her tender waste was wound, adowne gan fall,
And that great brasen pillour broke in peeces small.
(III.xii.37)

The ambiguous referent of the pronoun “her” signals Britomart’s involvement—literally her enwrapping, winding (Latin involvere)—in Busirane’s
“mightie chaine,” in the toils (and coils) of his rhetoric, thus evoking the
familiar iconographic identification of rhetoric with spellbound enchainment that I earlier referenced. Arguably, the first seven lines in the next
stanza also encompass Britomart and Amoret, although my own awareness
of the situation in the narrative just described makes me think such a reading unlikely. Be that as it may, what is significant about the one momentary identification of Britomart with Amoret in the penultimate line of
the last inset is that it comes only with Amoret’s freeing at Britomart’s
hand. It implicates Britomart in Amoret’s predicament, and she could
hardly not be implicated in view of the experiences that brought her to
Busirane’s House in the first place, but again, like Britomart’s superficial
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wounding, in doing so it more tellingly exhibits the superiority and intimacy of her derne, or dark, secret power.
Let us briefly suppose nonetheless that the next stanza, of whose
identification with Britomart I am skeptical, does continue the identification of her with Amoret, since this stanza offers the best evidence for the
actual raping of Amoret and, in Susan Frye’s argument, of Britomart as
well:
The cruell steele, which thrild her dying hart,
Fell softly forth, as of his owne accord,
And the wyde wound, which lately did dispart
Her bleeding brest, and riuen bowels gor’d,
Was closed vp, as it had not beene sor’d [1596,
    1609: “bor’d”],
And euery part to safety full sownd,
As she were neuer hurt, was soone restor’d:
Tho when she felt her selfe to be vnbownd,
And perfect hole, prostrate she fell vnto the grownd.
(III.xii.38)

The crucial words occur in the lines describing the wound in “Her bleeding brest, and riuen bowels” that “Was closed vp, as it [the wound] had
not beene sor’d.” Although these lines are about as transgressively suggestive as The Faerie Queene gets, I would reject a reading that swallows
catachresis whole, actualizing the radical metaphors present here. The
meaning of the lines depends heavily on that of the words “bowels” and
“as” in them. Contrary to the popular modern understanding of bowels
exclusively as “guts,” in the sixteenth century this word commonly referred
to ”the seat of the tender and sympathetic emotions” or the “heart, centre,”
and in Spenser’s writing it frequently, although not always, carries the
latter meaning, as is also true of English translations of the Bible in this
period.38 Doublets, such as “bleeding brest” and “riuen bowels” in the first
of the crucial lines, are rife in Spenser, and the prominence in canto xii of
Amoret’s transfixed heart also favors the meanings, now archaic, that I
have cited. Use of a singular verb (“was”) and singular pronoun (“it”) with
reference to the single wound in “brest” and “bowels” further enforces
identification of this alliterating doublet as a single unit.
The other word, as, in the phrase “as it had not been sor’d,” could be
read “as if,” but it need not be. This word can also mean “inasmuch as” or
“since,” and this is what I take it to mean here: “inasmuch as it had not been
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sor’d.”39 I would not reject the other possible reading out of hand either,
although in context I find it a stretch—“far-fet,” indeed an abusio, and
notably Busiranic in viewpoint. But metaphor, even abusive, catachrestic
metaphor, is, as well as is not. Ricoeur, for one, insists on such “split reference,” a meaning that is there and not there, and Pierre Bourdieu similarly
speaks of the ambivalence of sublation, of a lifting or raising that “simultaneously denies and maintains both the repression and the repressed” and
thus “allows for a doubling of profits: the profit of saying and the profit of
denying what is said by the way of saying it.”40
In the Spenserian passage in question, however, the possibility of the
counterfactual reading “as if,” like the former possibility of reading “bowels” as “guts,” hence “belly” or reproductive organs, would only return us
to the multiple perspectives of the participants in this canto—here specifically those of Amoret, Britomart, Busirane, the sometimes unreliable
narrator, and the Spenserian poet himself. The pun on “whole” in the final
line of the stanza is equally undisturbed by the reading I have advanced or
by the one that chooses Busirane’s perspective on it: Amoret, representative
love object, is rendered “whole and wanting,” at once perfected, or completed, for the passion of Cupid’s man and both lacking and desiring him.
Freely now, her responses, like Britomart’s, are holistic in every sense of
the hopeful or disheartening pun, as the reader will have it.
We hear or half hear submerged, or (im)possible, puns of the sort
just addressed even when prolonged attention to syntax and context
indicates that they are far-fetched or grammatically irrational. They are
plentiful in the literature of the period, in Shakespeare and Donne, for
obvious instances, and notably in Spenser as well. Studying the mental
processes by which we select and comprehend words, the psycho-linguist
Jean Aitchison has found evidence that I see supporting the viability of
such puns: readers or listeners “briefly activate both meanings of a homonym, even in cases where one of them is inappropriate”; in fact, according
to one model, “A whole army of words, it seems, marches up for consideration each time a word begins.”41 Aitchison’s explanation of homonymic
punning is readily extended to a syntactical construction or to any alternative signification of a single word.
Whatever the precise workings of our mental circuitry, a third
Spenserian example of (im)possible punning is ready to hand slightly
earlier in Britomart’s confrontation with Busirane, and it raises similar
issues of reading, thus contributing to this significant interpretive pattern
in Busirane’s third chamber. When Busirane’s knife wounds Britomart,
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“Exceeding wroth therewith the virgin grew, / Albe the wound were nothing deepe imprest” (xii.33). In an examination of Spenser’s puns on the
word “nothing,” Eggert has suggested that nothing here might be a noun
and therefore a sexual pun, the familiar Shakespearean equivalent of “hole,”
or “vagina, genitalia”: in this reading “nothing [is] deepe imprest.”42 Once
again, though surely prematurely, the “virgin” Britomart is presumed to
have been raped. But, as Eggert has agreed, the concessive “Albe” (meaning “albeit, although”) preceding “nothing” syntactically negates such a
pun and indicates instead that “nothing” is an adverb—that is, “nothing
[or not at all] deepe imprest”—with the result that Britomart is far from
having been violated except in a superficial sense. Once the grammatical
reading dominates, the (im)possible pun spectrally present serves to insinuate a more threatening potential in the situation—one submerged and
unrealized—and it may intimate as well the precariousness of Britomart’s
control at this moment, a control, by drawing her sword, that she quickly
asserts and maintains (33–34). Once again, the abusive reading is finally
meaningful only as an expression of the threat and indeed of the projected
fantasy of Busirane. The (im)possible pun would nominalize the word
“nothing,” insisting on its literal sense “no thing”; this is the sense that
negates the male member, or “thing,” in a common Elizabethan sense of
the word thing, while also evoking it, and thus motivates the sexual pun. In
this way, the “abusive,” Busiranic reader deconstructs the more abstractive
(supersessive) adverb to find the material root that makes it a noun and a
metaphor. At the heart of this practice is debate about the viability of dead
metaphors, appropriately mentioned in passing here.43
In both the 1590 and 1596 editions of The Faerie Queene, Busirane’s
artworks disappear once he is captured, and in the 1596 edition Britomart
and Amoret leave his House, only to find that Scudamour and Glauce
have departed, fearing the worst. In the 1590 edition, however, Amoret is
reunited with Scudamour outside Busirane’s House. Hamilton’s gloss on
their embrace is hardly alone in suggesting that the embrace is orgasmic,
and I suppose it might be, but Britomart’s presence as an observer gives me
pause. Certainly their embrace is passionate: Amoret melts in pleasure and
pours out her spirit in “sweete ravishment”; the embracing lovers are “like
two senceless stocks,” and, as if grown together, they resemble the marble
statue of a hermaphrodite (xi.45–46). The fact that Spenser cancelled this
ending in 1596 is the strongest sign that something is wrong with it, however, and the “senceless stocks” and marble hermaphrodite are two others.
A stock is a tree stub or a block of wood, both lifeless, as is the marble
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statue, fixed in its place. 44 The image of the hermaphrodite in this context is at best ambivalent—grotesquely double-limbed, motionless, and
dubiously human. That Britomart is said to half-envy the lovers’ embrace
half-suggests that she does not embrace it herself without reservation and
half-suggests that she does and therefore that she has more learning to do.
Understood sequentially as resulting from Britomart’s victory, the
conclusive image of the hermaphroditic statue reflects ironically on her
triumph. Amoret has been freed, but she remains to an extent Busirane’s
creature, a figure bound to his erotics, even as she is bound to Cupid’s man
Scudamour, whose identifying shield, which is emblazoned with the figure of Cupid, results from his conquest of unwilling womanhood in the
Temple of Venus (see III.7, IV.x.55, 57). Even in Book III, his name and
blazon identify him as Cupid’s surrogate. Aside from the Temple of Venus,
which only appears in the tenth canto of Book IV, Amoret’s sociocultural
shaping preeminently has been at Busirane’s cruel hands. The hermaphrodite is what survives Busirane’s cultural site when all his other erotic
forms have vanished, and its survival will be further apparent when, after
a hiatus of six years, the second installment of The Faerie Queene is published—Books IV to VI. Of course Busirane, like Archimago and Acrasia
before him, survives, too, although we see no more of his figure. The poet
of Faerie may be an idealist, but he is hardly unaware of the real world, as
we call it and as these survivals testify.
As if to observe the hiatus between the first installment of The
Faerie Queene and the poet’s reflections on it in the proem to Book IV, I
want first to review Britomart’s role to this point and then in the next section to begin anew with another, different approach to it, through something at first glance purely external, her armor. This approach will thus use
a new lens, which the 1596 installment does not inaugurate but makes further significant. Republishing Spenser’s first installment together with his
second, with heightened emphasis on Britomart’s armor, the 1596 Faerie
Queene itself invites a review of Book III.
Although Britomart is repeatedly developed at length in relation
to others in the first four cantos of Book III, she still remains focal. Her
quest provides the main story line: Malecasta, the flashback with Glauce,
the visit to Merlin, her complaint by the seaside, which is mirrored by
Cymoent’s and Arthur’s in the same canto (iv). Admittedly, Merlin’s history lesson over twenty-plus stanzas stretches this point, yet his history is
centered on Britomart’s progeny. In the second four cantos—Belphoebe
and Timias, the Garden of Adonis, Florimell, the witch and old fisherman,

Britomart   95

Argante, Satyrane, the Squire of Dames—Britomart is absent as a figure
in the action. Then, in canto ix, she shares a role at and in the castle of
Malbecco, there discovering her genealogical connection with Paridell.
The metamorphosis of Malbecco into the emblem of jealous fixation in
canto x, a story from which Britomart is again absent, introduces the first
of the cantos of Busirane. That Britomart’s absence from nearly half the
cantos in Book III conforms to the structure of romance is important, but,
in a poem that everywhere makes form and structure meaningful, it means
more.
When Britomart reappears for the last two cantos, which are situated in Busirane’s House of Rhetoric, she looks once more like the major
representative of the story line, yet her primary function for stanza after
stanza is to tour the artworks that dominate the scene, and to participate in the multiple points of view explored through them. When she
acts to save Amoret, the heightened, layered ambiguity of what actually
transpires, albeit comprehendible, conspicuously leaves the final decision
to others—viewers and readers as participants. In short, the dominant
subject now looks cultural, and the primary focus thematic rather than
characterological. Whereas the characterological features of the first four
cantos might have invited the view that Britomart is in herself the subject, the final eight cantos, including the adventure of Busirane, have readjusted it. The Faerie Queene is never static, let alone formulaic. In Book IV,
Britomart’s figure will become less conventionally cross-dressed, and, in
accordance with the more generally experimental nature of this book, her
figure will also become more experimentally so. This is the development
that I intend to trace next by considering Britomart’s armor, from Book
III through Book V, where her story shifts again before ending.

Britomart’s Armor
Throughout Book III, Britomart has been vested in armor that forms and
masks, expresses and veils, defends and contains her. She has been further
invested in finding Artegall, whose identity is known to her by his own
vesting in the conquered arms of Achilles. By the opening of Book IV,
Britomart, the armed but nubile virgin, not only Venus-Virgo but more
radically Venus within Mars, has become a complicated cultural signifier implicated in cultural conceptions of gender. Riding into Book IV,
Britomart and Amoret share a single horse, a traditional symbol of passion,
as well as a single saddle, unless Amoret perches on the horse’s rump—a
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passing, parodic thought. Since Britomart wears a full suit of armor, their
combined silhouette on the horse recalls the hermaphrodite in the original
ending of Book III. This transposed, catachrestic, hermaphroditic form at
the outset of Book IV, which replaces the one in the original ending, is in
effect a continuation of unfinished business. Their silhouette also anticipates the statue of Venus with “both kinds in one, / Both male and female,
both vnder one name” that presides over the Temple of Venus in the tenth
canto of this fourth book (41).
A fixed, emblematic statue is not a figure developing in figured narrative, however, and sex need not be equated with gender. Nonetheless, by
Book IV it is clear that a binaristic conception of gender is inadequate. 45
Clearly now, there are four terms in play, and, with the benefit of retrospection, at least two in each of the major amatory players of the books
featuring Britomart. The play of these terms with respect to Britomart
is my major focus in what follows, but, with respect to Artegall, it bears
mention, precisely because four terms, not just Britomart’s two, are vital
to it. When Artegall appears at a tournament in Book IV of the poem, his
first appearance as an actor rather than merely as an image, he is “the saluage knight” with “Saluagesse sans finesse”—artless, uncivilized savagery—
emblazoned on his shield (IV.39, 42). Encountering Britomart’s spear after
toppling all other knightly contestants, he is summarily knocked from his
horse. A poor loser who harbors a grudge, he still sports his savage identity when he next meets Britomart and engages in hand-to-hand combat
with her, an episode that I will subsequently examine in detail. Its result is
Artegall’s assumption of his true identity as he yields to Britomart.
Both armed encounters of Artegall with Britomart dramatize that
his savagery needs softening, refining, civilizing. As the loaded term softening signals in a context of gender and sexuality, softening suggests his
need of the Venerean principle, ranging from love to courtesy, gentleness,
generosity, and compassion, a principle that has been hidden, indeed
absent, from his actions as the savage knight. In mythological terms, this
principle might be dubbed his inner Venus. It will moderate and civilize
his hyper-masculinity, his exclusive maleness. Much more happens in
Artegall’s own book, the fifth, although its complexities exceed my present
focus. Yet briefly, in a parody of Artegall’s yielding to Britomart in Book
IV, he yields again to a woman, the wrong one, in Book V, and his doing
so results in his punitive cross-dressing as a woman. He is humiliated and
effeminized but simultaneously humanized—once again civilized—by
this fall, and with it, for the first time in Book V, he recalls his betrothal to
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Britomart: Inside and Outside the Armor

T

he complexity of this chapter asks for an introductory
road map: its first section explores ways in which the depiction of
Britomart answers to traits modern readers, notably Alan Sinfield, have
found in Shakespeare’s characters. The chapter next proceeds to Britomart’s
culminating experience in Book III, namely her adventure in the House
of Busirane. Then it examines her figure through the lens of her defining armor throughout the three books in which she appears, III, IV, and
V, the books of chastity, friendship, and justice. This doubled approach,
occasionally looking back or forward, reflects my own interpretive history
regarding Britomart and further suggests the differences that approaches
themselves—critical lenses—at once reveal and create. Approaching the
House of Busirane, my focus becomes increasingly rhetorical, narrower,
and more detailed—largely responsive to the fact that this place, this cultural topos, is a house in the rhetorical sense—whereas, right afterward,
the focus on Britomart’s armor is mythic, iconological, and wider, traversing more of the narrative. My method also attempts to reflect the actual
experience of reading The Faerie Queene for someone like me, that is, a
rereader with an overview that allows for retrospection, yet one who tries
to respect the forward progression of the narrative, not substituting a later
stage of it for an earlier one.
Britomart is the most fully developed figure of a woman in The Faerie
Queene and, although she could be called a character, she is also appropriately called a figure, both in order to preserve the continuum in Spenser’s
poem from more to less complexity of figuration and to acknowledge her
symbolic dimensions. Her name most simply signifies “martial Briton”;
discussion of other symbolic dimensions of her figure will occur as they
become relevant to this chapter.1 Like Britomart, the dramatis personae,
or characters, in stage plays can also be considered figures, of course, and
symbolic dimensions are easily enough found at once in them and in the
plots in which they operate: Shakespeare’s pairing of Hotspur and Falstaff,
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Ariel and Caliban, Egypt and Rome afford familiar examples.2 The proper
names of Shakespeare’s characters can also be suggestively symbolic, for
example, those in the preceding sentence or Cordelia (Latin cor/cordis,
“heart,” and “delia” as an anagram of “ideal”).3

Britomart and Character Effects
From Britomart’s first appearance in the poem at the beginning of Book
III, the narrator attributes to her an inside that differs from her outside,
and he makes a point of doing so, interrupting the action in the first canto
to identify her as the knight inside the armor who topples Guyon and to
indicate the nature of her Faerie quest (i.8). To suggest that she has “that
within which passes show” is not to claim that she has an interiority (or
a lack of it) the same as Hamlet’s or other representative Shakespearean
characters; instead, it is only to note a certain similarity. 4 A significant
difference between Hamlet and Britomart is that her interiority is subsequently exhibited at length, whereas his remains more of a mystery.
One similarity between the two is that some readers would deny
interiority to them both, either not noticing it for what it is in Britomart’s
case, or in Hamlet’s by refusing or dissolving it, whether rationalizing or
materializing it, or both, into the closed terms of modern systems. Systems
shed light, but they can also destroy the shadows actually present in human
texts. If I had to identify one feature of Renaissance literary texts, dramatic
and nondramatic, that most separates them from modern systems and, for
this very reason, offers to illuminate these systems in turn, it would be
their persistent, insistent resistance of such closure. Modern scientism has
its virtues, but, with rare exceptions, the tendency to closure and certainty
of its typical forms is deceptive when applied to creative writings, especially older ones. Hamlet’s objection that his treacherous friends would
“pluck out the heart of his mystery” is also his awareness that they aim to
do so, his resistance of their efforts, and his determination actively and
antically to frustrate these (III.ii.365–66). Centuries of criticism suggest
that to a significant extent he has succeeded. He is certainly one character,
moreover, for whom the designation “most Shakespearean” is also most
fitting. Older writings were subject to older systems, to be sure, but typically, these were more aware of mystery and more tolerant of it. Perhaps
they had to be; perhaps they chose to be; perhaps neither.
In a couple of ways, the Spenserian narrator’s opening aside to readers in Book III regarding Britomart’s identity and quest differs from the
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extensive presentation of the Renaissance inside/outside topos early in
Book I, specifically in Archimago’s manipulation of Redcrosse’s imagination and his subsequent impersonation of his victim. First, Archimago is
himself an actor in the relevant episode of Book I, rather than the thirdperson narrator of it as in the opening of Book III, and second, in Book
III, the aside in question is the narrator’s straightforward presentation of
background, not his sly insinuation of his protagonist’s insufficiency, an
insinuation effected in Book I, for example, by his making Archimago’s
impersonation of Redcrosse comment on this knight. Such differences
render Britomart a more autonomous figure in Book III. The narrator, so
to speak, respects her difference.
Britomart’s armor in the third book also differs from Una’s veil in
Book I by being primarily a deliberate, strategic disguise, not just protective covering or a necessary disguise for a woman in a world of woods,
caves, and wild creatures, whether human or beastly. By definition,
Britomart’s armor, including sword and spear, is aggressive, not merely
defensive. Further, insofar as Una represents Truth in this fallen world, her
veil is an unavoidable reality, whereas Britomart’s armor is voluntary and
represents a choice. Britomart is hiding a secret; Una is not. The wimpled
Una’s black stole cast “ouer all” expressly suggests that she mourns “inly”
(I.i.4).
As noted in chapter 1, Britomart declines to join the chase of
Florimell and the forester in the first canto of Book III because she is constant to her own “mind,” not to some other dictate. 5 At the outset, she
declines the traditional role of a knight, whether to rescue or to pursue
a maiden and thus typically to make love or war, as knights have done
from time immemorial. Her constant quest for a specific lover is further
distinguished early in canto i even from Arthur’s quest, since, in chasing
Florimell, Arthur moves away from his initial motivation to find his elf
queen and instead seems ready to accept a substitute: later losing sight of
the fleeing Florimell when night falls, “Oft did he wish, that Lady faire
mote bee / His faery Queene . . . Or that his Faery Queene were such,
as shee” (III.iv.54). Although his elf queen is still the gold standard, he
drifts into likeness as an alternative, acceptable possibility (“such, as”).
Britomart, in contrast, is steadfast. While focusing on Shakespeare, Helen
Cooper describes as an inheritance of medieval romance, “the portrayal of
a young woman in love from inside her own mind” and cites Britomart as
a case in point; “typically feisty,” the romance heroine of the Middle Ages
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is self-aware, passionate about “the man she chooses to love” and ready to
go to great lengths to find (or “get”) him.6
Also notable as Book III gets under way is the fact that Britomart
is named almost immediately within the text as well as after first acting,
rather than, for example, after a long description or first only within the
argument heading a canto, as are Una and Belphoebe. 7 Her agency is
foregrounded. Britomart also has a father rather than a myth of origin,
a nurse, not a Palmer, and a history both inherited and destined that is
set firmly on earth. In short, she looks and is more human than her most
memorable predecessors in the poem, as is the potentially virtuous love
for which she quests. But it is even more important that the identification
of Britomart’s quest at the very outset begins to be defined by her differences from and relationships to numerous other actors in the poem. Her
figure has a distinctly social as well as an individualized existence. She is
neither Everywoman, let alone Everyman (humankind, or in premodern
usage, mankind), nor is she wholly unique. Once again such a description
of her looks human.
In a perceptive discussion of character and a defense of its validity
as a current critical topic, Alan Sinfield offers a “redefinition of character
as continuous consciousness,” while barring “establishment of the individual as a single, unified presence,” as distinct from his or her enhanced
subjectivity.8 While thus rejecting the bourgeois individual of “essentialist
humanism,” which is post-Enlightenment anyway, Sinfield opts for more
than “an intermittent, gestural, and problematic subjectivity,” namely, “a
continuous or developing interiority or consciousness” (62). His subsequent discussions of Shakespeare’s characters make clear that such a continuous consciousness doesn’t have to continue throughout a whole play:
it can come and go or, once established, can afterwards simply go, leaving a resistant or unresolvable problem. From this perspective, he looks at
Desdemona, Olivia, and Lady Macbeth. His list could have been extended
to other problematic figures among Shakespeare’s fictive women: Cressida
and Isabella, for a start.9
My intention is not to make Britomart into a cross-dressed
Shakespearean heroine, although I am not the only one long since to have
remarked general similarities between her and Shakespeare’s Rosalind or
Viola. At the same time, however, I am struck by the number of characteristics Britomart’s figure exhibits that correspond to the methods playwrights use to produce “character effects” in dramatis personae, as Sinfield
enumerates them. These include self-reference and self-questioning, which
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might include soliloquy, and also lying, which creates distance between
statement and intention, the latter indicating inwardness. I would add
that intention is a word-concept derived etymologically from Latin in, “in,
within,” and tendere, “to extend, proceed, aim, direct one’s self or one’s
course.” Further included in Sinfield’s enumeration are indecision, more
generally the representation of decision-making, and informative conversations overheard by the audience, which raise questions about intentionality—that among Gloucester, Kent, and Edmund at the opening of King
Lear comes to mind, for instance.10
Britomart lies to Redcrosse when she rides away from Malecasta’s
castle with him, telling him that Artegall has done “Late foule dishonour
and reprochfull spight” to her, but then she waxes “inly wondrous glad”
when Redcrosse tells her he is greatly surprised that Artegall should ever
have done such injury to her (III.ii.8–11). Britomart’s direct conversation with Redcrosse, which continues for nearly ten stanzas, including
narrative framing and commentary, soon after leads in a narrative flashback to the story of her falling in love with the image of Artegall that is
facilitated through a magic globe—an objectification of her waking, and
awaking, pubescent imagination. The flashback then proceeds to her
back-and-forth conversation about her erotic predicament with Glauce,
her comic old nurse, for more than another fifteen stanzas. Not only
does this conversation deliver background information and dramatize a
process of decision-making, it also focuses on Britomart’s inner state and
reveals, in Glauce’s words, that Britomart is making a “Monster of . . . [her]
minde”—imagining horrors and perversions, whereas she should more
simply be recognizing that she is in love (40).11 Their conversation could
readily have been adapted for the Renaissance stage. It has comic features,
as do the visit to Merlin and other aspects of Britomart’s characterization.
Notably, both women converse in terms of mythic figures, Myrrha, Biblis,
Pasiphaë, Narcissus. Like the Elizabethan schoolboys Lynn Enterline has
studied, they use Ovidian mirrors, types or examples, “to understand and
to express” their own perceptions, which are influenced by these types,
even if also reshaped and repurposed by the schoolboys (and girls) as they
mature. Enterline’s proof-texts are Shakespeare’s Lucrece and Hamlet.12
Two other examples of Sinfield’s character effects that produce the
impression of consciousness occur in the first third of Book III. One is
Britomart’s much-discussed soliloquy by the seaside in canto iv, in which,
now imitating a sonnet from Petrarch, she expresses the tempestuous
“sea of sorrow” within her and nearly despairs of a happy outcome until
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Glauce reminds her of Merlin’s dynastic prophecy and a hostile knight
conveniently appears to offer an immediate object on which to vent her
passion (11–16). Significantly, although the ur-text here is mainly (not
exclusively) Petrarchan, it is Britomart herself, not the narrator, who
voices it and, within the poem, thus recreates it.13 My other example is
not the modern word “consciousness,” which is just becoming available in
the first half of the seventeenth century, but “awareness,” or, in the form
in which it recurrently occurs with respect to Britomart, a condition of
being “vnwares.” Her “vnwareness” is obviously based on the presumption
of its opposite as the possibility to which experience leads.14 Britomart
is “vnwares” when she looks into the magic globe to see the vision of
Artegall but later acutely aware of her earlier unawareness when, she tells
Glauce, she swallowed this bait (III.ii.26, 38). Earlier in this book, she was
also “vnwares” when Malecasta slipped into her bed, the climax in Castle
Joyous of the initial stage of her initiation as an active quester into the
bodily and sociocultural context of sexual awareness. At a later stage, she
will be “vnwares” again when Busirane wounds her, a situation to which
I will return (i.61, xii.33). Each of these occurrences of Britomart’s lack
of awareness instances an increasing development of her figure, and the
correction of each leaves her more aware both of herself and of the nature
of her quest. Each is a learning experience that results in growth. At the
same time, there is a perceptible continuity among these experiences. This
is a continuity, however, which, unlike that of the more metaphysically
oriented Una—again, more oriented, not exclusively conceived—will be
disrupted before the poem is finished with Britomart’s figure. With this
change, her figuration will be at once more problematic and more sadly,
historically realistic. Still further Shakespearean?

Britomart’s Awareness in the House of Busirane
When Britomart accepts a knight’s plea to free Amoret from the House
of Busirane, she becomes a radical challenge to the erotic culture in which
she, too, has operated to this point, with the exception of her declining to
rescue Florimell, the anticipatory, threshold image of Book III. Amoret,
if not exactly a prop or just another exhibit in Busirane’s House, has been
imprisoned by the sadistic enchanter and in this way has unwillingly
become his creature, another of his creations, or so his production stages
her. Busirane’s capture of Amoret is what we witness until Britomart ends
it. We last saw Amoret only briefly in the Garden of Adonis, her former
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residence in Book III. Encountering Busirane’s House at the end of this
book, we have only the knight Scudamour’s name (Shield of Love), his
heraldic device (Cupid) and behavior, and his account of why Amoret is
under Busirane’s control, and, for six more years, from the 1590 installment of the poem until the 1596 one, Spenser’s original audience lacked
access to anything more.
In contrast to Amoret, Britomart reaches Busirane by actively
questing and most immediately by chasing the evil Ollyphant (“destructive fantasy”), Argante’s twin brother, to the sight of Scudamour “all wallowed / Vpon the grassy ground” (III.xi.7). This sequence suggests both
Britomart’s opposition to such fantasy and Scudamour’s implication in it.
Simply put, Scudamour replaces Ollyphant. Scudamour tells her that the
enchanter has “pend,” or through his art confined, Amoret, in effect arresting the very possibility of their love (xi.11)—at once imprisoning and paralyzing it. More allegorically, Scudamour, Cupid’s man, has been separated
by Busirane from the object of his love, Amoret, who is “Venus mayd,” or
punningly, Venus-made, ever since Venus discovered and adopted her in
Cupid’s “stead”—in his “place”—earlier in Book III (vi.28).15 The possibility of the love of Scudamour and Amoret is therefore the very possibility
of realizing love, not simply the love of these two figures, but, in terms of
their simple allegorical natures, here Love itself.
Imprisoned in Busirane’s House of perverse, rhetorical art forms,
however, Amoret has become the Ovidian-Petrarchan love object. Her
capture has shaped her figure, indeed, has transfigured it from what it was
in the Garden. For Britomart, confrontation of Busirane is another initiation and a further education, this time with respect to Ovidian myths
and Petrarchan conceits that have informed the erotic culture in which
she functions and, as we have seen, have informed her own awareness. Her
task is to free Amoret from Busirane’s malign control and to enable the
possibility of Amoret’s reunion with Scudamour. Developments in Book
IV subsequently make clear that both Amoret and Scudamour have to
change for this possibility to be truly realized. To glance back to the last
chapter and forward in the present one, in 1596 this realization fails to
happen. In 1590, the lovers’ reunion is greatly compromised, even dubious, a claim to which this chapter will later return.
In recent times, the House of Busirane has variously been seen as
Busirane’s projection, as Amoret’s, as Scudamour’s, as Britomart’s, and,
without regard for these mediating characters, as the Spenserian narrator’s.
This House, like the House of Holiness, the Bower of Bliss, the Garden of
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Adonis, the Temple of Venus, or any other such place in The Faerie Queene,
is a cultural site, a topos or “place.” Its representation is finally the poet’s,
as are all the figures residing in or traveling into it, although the poet’s
control of it, his agency with respect to it, is mediated, limited, and compromised by his own position in language and history. He is nonetheless responsible for it insofar as he is in control of it—again, insofar as.
Although the Temple of Venus in Book IV is a special case whose narration belongs to Scudamour, it, too, is finally the poet’s, as he acknowledges
at its very end. Like other cultural sites in The Faerie Queene, which have
some special pertinence to the figures within them, the House of Busirane
also has special pertinence to Britomart, as well as more immediately to
Amoret and Scudamour, without being solely attributable to any one of
them or even to them all together apart from culture and history. The
nature of this pertinence—moral, theological, psychological, historical, or
a combination of such—is variable, not simply formulaic, and it is subject
to context when it occurs.
In Britomart’s instance, aside from the general, formalized eroticism of Busirane’s House, which has obvious relevance to a love quest, her
progress in Book III more specifically explains why she is there: in canto i,
her vulnerability to Malecasta, realized in her wounding, foreshadows her
vulnerability to Busirane, and, in canto ii, the smoky, sulphurous Etna in
her breast anticipates the Busiranic fire, shaking, and “stench of smoke and
sulphure” (ii.32, xi.21, xii.2). Likewise, in canto ii, the perverted, mythic
forms her explanation takes when she confides in Glauce foreshadow those
in Busirane’s tapestries. In canto iv, the “selfe-pleasing thoughts” that feed
her pain, her guidance by blind Cupid, and her pendulum swing between
“Love and despight,” anticipations of Busirane’s paired masquers, prepare
for Busirane’s pageant, as does her sympathetic recognition of kinship
with Paridell’s pain in canto ix, ominously within the perverted House of
Malbecco and Hellenore.16 Amoret, Ovidian-Petrarchan love object par
excellence, is part of Busirane’s pageant the first time Britomart sets eyes
on her.
Once Britomart enters Busirane’s enchanted House, the first room
of three that she views specifically signals the inevitability of her arrival
there. The tapestries on its walls share both their Ovidian source in the
Metamorphoses and their sense of erotic compulsion with her beholding—
taking in—the tapestry in the House of Malecasta that depicts the fixated,
hyper-sensuous love of Venus for the boy Adonis (a foretaste of Argante’s
preferences) and leads in the narrative to the flashback with Glauce in
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which Britomart expresses her own passion as an erotic perversion in classical myth.17 The specific Ovidian passage on which Busirane’s tapestries
draw is the ecphrasis of Arachne’s art in her ill-fated weaving contest with
Pallas Athena, the Greek Minerva. Immediately, there are ironies and
crossings of gender in this situation, whose many complications must be
unlayered gradually.
When Britomart initially encounters Busirane’s enchanted fire, she
asks Scudamour in dismay, “‘What monstrous enmity prouoke we heare,
/ Foolhardy as th’Earthes children, which made / Batteill against the
Gods? So we a God inuade’” (III.xi.22). Once again, Britomart expresses
herself, and thinks, in the mythic terms studied in the grammar school
texts of the period, which were read by well-educated girls, as well as by
boys. Traditionally, the fire-god is Vulcan, the smith and forger of chains,
as well as the figure of the jealous, overly possessive husband also evoked
allusively by the netting of Acrasia and Verdant, a Venus and a Mars, in
the Bower of Bliss. It is as if Britomart were again upending and improving on Guyon and his Palmer, as she was at the very outset of Book III.
Her ability in her armor to pass unharmed through the fiery entrance of
Busirane’s House contrasts both with the disabling jealousy of Scudamour
and the possessive hoarding of Busirane, throwbacks alike to Malbecco,
the essence of “Gelosy” itself.18
Boldly invading this jealous fire-god and forger of chains, Britomart
next gazes at the tapestries that recreate the one woven by Ovid’s Arachne,
a woman bold—perhaps too bold?—in protesting the violent excesses of
the gods’ passions but also one whose protest is depicted sympathetically in
the eyes of the Roman poet of the Metamorphoses.19 The tapestries Britomart
views similarly show more than one sign of parodic protest: for example,
in Mars’s undignified “shreek” (comically rhyming with “eek”) of passion,
along “With womanish teares, and with vnwarlike smarts,” or in the
sequence of Neptune’s undying love only for Bisaltis in the alexandrine of
one stanza—“Ne ought but deare Bisaltis ay could make him glad”—followed immediately in the next stanza by the laconic statement “He loued eke
Iphimedia deare, / And Aeolus faire daughter Arne hight” (III.xi.41–42, 44).
Yet the cross-dressed knight Britomart finds her tapestry of womanly protest within the chambers of a male enchanter, who, like herself,
is also the creation of a male poet. At this point, we might well stop to
ask, with Susanne Wofford, whose tapestry this is and through whose eyes
we see and, more properly, “rede,” or interpret it. 20 Arachne’s, Ovid’s, his
narrator’s, Britomart’s, Busirane’s, Spenser’s as poet or narrator, the inter-
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pretive tradition’s, or our own? Going beyond the possibilities Wofford
endorses, I would not exclude any of these, and the ecphrasis of the tapestry itself invites them in describing Jove’s rape of Leda, breaking into
apostrophe in the manner of Ovid to do so:
O wondrous skill, and sweet wit of the man,
That her in daffadillies sleeping made,
From scorching heat her daintie limbes to shade:
Whiles the proud Bird ruffing his fethers wyde,
And brushing his faire brest, did her inuade:
She slept, yet twixt her eielids closely spyde,
How towards her he rusht, and smiled at his pryde.
(III.xi.32)

Considerable ambiguity of reference marks this much-discussed stanza.
Is the skilled and sweet-witted man in the first line Busirane or the chameleon-like, negatively capable Spenserian narrator, or the Spenserian
poet in his own voice?21 This time, the lines cited have no direct parallel in Ovid, hence no parallel in Arachne’s tapestry, and they therefore
belong to the three possibilities enumerated. But are we to forget that
Britomart is our gazer and that these lines could also belong to her vision
or response to Arachne’s?22 In whose opinion is the man “sweet-witted”?
And what do the last two lines of the stanza mean: “She slept, yet twixt
her eyelids closely spyde, / How towards her he rusht, and smiled at his
pryde”? Leda sleeps, like Verdant in the Bower of Bliss, and yet, also to an
extent like him, between her eyelids she seems to see—to spy—the swan
rushing toward her. Is she awake or in a trance or in a daydream? Each
of these possibilities would imply a different kind and degree of agency.
The simple adverb “closely” could indicate that her eyes are indeed shut
(“closely twixt”) or that she spies with close attention an object close to
her (“closely spyde”). The word “spy” itself carries an insistent association
with stealth or closeness—intense, secretive observation. The final clause
of the line, as Katherine Eggert has noted, is also ambiguous: does Leda
smile in anticipation of rapture or does the swan, as the assumed form of
Jove, smile in anticipation of ravishment?23 And is the smile one of Jovian
arrogance, of pure pleasure—his, hers, or theirs—or is it an ironic smile,
a self-reflexive, deflating, Ovidian possibility that the availability of the
womanly perspectives of Arachne and Britomart, not to mention some
other readers, enforces? The narrator’s own awareness, often amazing, is
not to be slighted, either.
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Another passage, even more frequently remarked, expresses ambiguity of reference as well. The walls of the enchanter’s House are clothed
with arras,
Wouen with gold and silke so close and nere,
That the rich metall lurked priuily,
As faining to be hidd from enuious eye;
Yet here, and there, and euery where vnwares
It shewd it selfe, and shone vnwillingly:
Like to a discolourd Snake, whose hidden snares
Through the greene gras his long bright burnisht backe
                   declares.
(III.xi.28)

This time, the inwoven threads of metal have an explicit precedent in
Ovid, although it proves as striking in its difference as in its similarity:
“There, too, they [Athena and Arachne] weave in pliant threads of gold,
and trace in the weft some ancient tale (illic et lentum filis inmittitur
aurum / et vetus in tela deducitur argumentum).”24 In Ovid’s version, the
gold thread, belonging to Arachne and Athena alike, lacks the last six
lines of Spenserian description, which call attention—heightened attention—to the serpentine filaments. Rather than betraying the presence of
art, they shout it by comparison with Ovid’s text, unwilling as they may
be, or rather feign to be so. The participial pun “faining”—“As faining
to be hidd”—as easily supports an exhibitionist impulse as it denies one,
since the homonymic pun means either pretending (feigning) or desiring
(faining). The alternative of merely pretending to hide from but actually
enticing the “enuious eye” would relate the serpentine threads to the gold
grapes in Acrasia’s Bower, which enfold themselves among the leaves “As
lurking from the vew of couetous guest”—as if lurking but actually seducing (II.xii.55).
But art in the House of Busirane is not finally the same as in the
Bower, where “The art, which all that wrought, appeared in no place”
(II.xii.58). Here, not unlike the sonneteer’s topos of inarticulateness or
an elaborate declamation uttered in full erotic chase by Ovid’s Apollo,
art may want or pretend to hide but instead displays itself, unwillingly or
not. Like the pun faining/feigning, the word “unwillingly,” which specifically refers to shining or conspicuousness—“It shewed it selfe, and shone
vnwillingly”—again evokes the oscillating play of visual and interpretive
perspectives, along with that of inadvertency and agency. Moreover, it

86  

Chapter 3

does so “vnwares,” which is precisely the ambiguous way Malecasta earlier sneaks up on Britomart and the way Busirane’s knife wounds her and
the knowing and not knowing way that Leda, in all her ambiguity, awaits
the rush of the swan. This is an acute, extraordinarily telling way of realizing the combination of cultural exposure and ignorance, knowing and
not knowing, that characterizes Britomart’s condition and observation, as
indeed her youthful reading of Ovid. Britomart does not cause this cultural site, whose meaning at once precedes and exceeds her role in it, but
this place of rhetorical culture bears special pertinence to her condition
and quest. Again, as with Leda, she is mirrored to an extent in the object
or site.
Britomart passes from the tapestries next to a Mammonic room
overlaid with pure gold, in which the “monstrous formes” of false love are
depicted and on whose glittering walls hang the trophies of love’s wars and
conquests (xi.51–52). Again, Busirane is a hoarder, a self-gratifying one
like Spenser’s Mammon, who autoerotically fingers the gold coins in his
lap “to feede his eye” (II.vii.4–5). In Busirane’s golden room, Britomart
witnesses the procession of Cupid’s masquers, figures that stage the very
process of a false love which is hardly distinguishable at moments from
a true one. Antiquity of origin characterizes the creations of this room,
as before of the tapestries depicted. As A. C. Hamilton’s gloss conveniently summarizes, the masquers draw directly on the conventions of the
medieval courts of love and of Renaissance triumphs, not least Petrarch’s
own, as well as on those of the Renaissance masque.25 Again, these figures are hardly Britomart’s creation, although they have special relevance
to her condition and quest, as they do to Amoret’s and Scudamour’s, and
to those of other characters in Book III. The very fact, long recognized,
that they can be read from either a male or female point of view indicates
their basically cultural rather than exclusively personal status. Their formal
artificiality also proclaims their radical—indeed, their catachrestic—constructedness. Unlike the insidious art forms in Acrasia’s Bower, they make
no claims on nature. On reflection, who would want such mirrors of passion as these?
Their relation to Busirane and ultimately to Britomart is worth pursuing, however. Cupid’s masquers resemble the kind of form Malbecco
becomes at the end of canto x, one that “Is woxen so deform’d, that he has
quight / Forgot he was a man, and Gelosy is hight” (60). Malbecco’s metamorphosis into a “passion . . . in the mind” introduces the first canto, the
eleventh, in which the House of Busirane figures centrally, and, in effect,
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it prepares for the masquers, whose humanity, like Malbecco’s, has either
vanished or failed of realization. 26 Like the fixed and fixated emblem
“Gelosy” that Malbecco has become, the masquers are impostors of the
living and every bit as artificial, as “personified,” hence metaphorized, as
the “carcas dead” of the False Florimell (III.viii.7, xi.1). Malbecco makes
explicit in Book III the connection between sexual and monetary hoarding that was glimpsed earlier in the figure of Mammon. Even though the
masquers are in a procession—a kind of dead march—each pair in itself is
a frozen stage of courtship, removed from the necessarily narrative process
of allegory and quest.27 The masquers are another product of Busirane’s
art, and they issue from an “inner rowme” that is his as well (xii.26).
Years since, Thomas P. Roche, Jr., glossed Busirane as abuse in the
sixteenth-century senses of “imposture, ill-usage, delusion,” or as the
archaic abusion, meaning a “perversion of the truth, deceit, deception,
imposture,” and in the words of Book II, implying “fond . . . illusions”
(xi.11).28 To these meanings, I would add abusio, the familiar Renaissance
word for catachresis, here understood as a wrenching of metaphor or an
extravagant use of it, in the case at hand, a violent (mis)use of language,
of which the masquers’ dead likenesses are a prime exhibit. In Busirane’s
House of rhetorical art and illusion, abusio reigns, or “ranes,” supreme. The
traditional classification of poetry as a branch of rhetoric was still common in the Renaissance, and Busirane is clearly an abuser of poetry, as
well as of rhetoric.29 By now, I imagine, it is also clear that Busirane’s name
puns on abuse/abusio—that is, A-busirane.
Another persistent association of abusio in the rhetorical tradition is
with audacia, or boldness, and it offers a gloss on the strange, forward and
backward, summoning and forbidding, aggressive and maidenly imperatives Britomart reads over the doors in Busirane’s Mammonic second
chamber: “Be bolde, be bolde . . . Be not too bold” (xi.54).30 In a discussion of
metaphor, including catachresis/abusio, in De Oratore, Cicero’s spokesman
praises “paulo audaciores [translationes],” or, “somewhat bolder metaphors” that bring brilliance to a speech but do not violate “ratio”—reason,
purpose, or indeed, the nature of things (rerum natura). Such figures are
bold but not too bold. 31 Read through the lens of Ciceronian rhetoric,
the writing Britomart confronts above the doors in Busirane’s House of
rhetoric has the Ciceronian quality of an invitation to use audacia and
a caution against excess in doing so, as it does in De Oratore. The choice
Britomart faces as reader of Busirane’s art is edged with anxiety and
danger, not unlike that faced by an orator in Cicero’s Rome, as the forced
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deaths of so many of the speakers in De Oratore, as well as of Cicero himself, dramatize. Rhetoric is consequential; it is a social, legal, and political
shaper, not merely a neutral ornament or tool of pedagogues. Britomart,
or any other reader, would do well carefully and cautiously to heed these
warnings about the boldness of rhetorical art, warnings now appearing
elusive and treacherous, yet also beguiling, in the message they send “to
any vnwares” in Busirane’s House. They invite a decision, while undermining assurance, and the only escape from Busirane’s hegemonic cultural trap
here or elsewhere, then or now, starts with awareness.
Britomart’s evident acceptance of the challenge to be bold, but not
too bold, leads to the third chamber of the House of Busirane, where its
patron, the figure or at least the first figure behind the curtains, Busirane
himself, primarily represents the constructedness of the entire place.
Again, this art-full place simply doesn’t make the same claims as Acrasia’s
Bower about its nearness to or indistinguishability from nature. This is art
in capital letters, and alarmingly, Amoret’s life in some sense now depends
on Busirane. Thus “the Lady [Amoret], which by him stood bound, /
Dernly vnto her [Britomart] called to abstaine, / From doing him to dy”
(xii.3: my emphasis). Once in Busirane’s clutches, Amoret recognizes
herself and is recognized as his creation, pleading for his life in order to
preserve her own. Her identity as love, which is presently her whole life,
depends on loving. She is, after all, “Venus mayd” and the complement of
“Cupids man,” as she will be described by Scudamour in Book IV (x.54).
Busirane has arrested her development, both imprisoned her figure and
obstructed the realization of what she could and should be.
The adverb “dernly,” which conveys the tone and manner in which
Amoret calls on Britomart to spare Busirane’s life, means “secretly” or
“privately, confidentially”; it also carries the sense “inwardly.” Dernly
is a strange but suggestive word in this context, one that in the past has
often been glossed too casually in the derived senses “dismally” or “direly.”
More significantly, it intimates a special appeal or relationship, something
understood or otherwise shared between the two women. Yet dern(e) also
means “dark” and “secret” in the sense “done in the dark” and often has
associations with craft, deceit, or evil.32 Conceivably, if disturbingly, it
could further connect Amoret with her captor, at least while in his power.
Associatively, the “dark secret life” that destroys Blake’s rose comes to
mind.
Clearly, however, Britomart cannot destroy Busirane without
destroying what Amoret now is, the cultural love object par excellence.
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This Busiranic figuration underlies Amoret’s development in the company of Britomart after Book III and prior to the intractable, historical
entanglement of Amoret’s figure with the story of Timias and Belphoebe
in Book IV (vii–viii). Amoret’s figuration as love object is also the reason
that, although Busirane’s artworks vanish, he still survives, bound by the
very chain or, in further terms of traditional iconography, by the rhetorical art that he has abused.33 Without him, there is only a vacuum, and this
vacuum might also have something to do with the fact that Spenser’s own
Amoretti, written and published between Book III and the 1596 sequel,
cannot wholly escape the available conventions of erotic discourse but
indeed must use and try to reshape them.34 The furnishings of Busirane’s
rooms may vanish at the end of canto xii, but this is hardly the last we see
of their kind in Spenser’s poetry.
The alternative definition of catachresis/abusio, namely a necessary
extension of the signification of a word to something that lacks a word,
rather than merely a willful wrenching of language, bears both on the emptiness apparent with the vanishing of the artworks in Busirane’s House and
on the persistence of Ovidian, Petrarchan, or otherwise Busiranic forms in
Spenser’s poetry. Abusive as these might have been and still might be, they
are currently and culturally inescapable for a practicing poet who wants his
poems read, even aside from the extent to which he is able, or is not, to get
outside and to critique them. Poetry has never been written in a cultural
vacuum. This is another suggestion conveyed by Spenser’s ending Amoret’s
story with a return to the Temple of Venus in Book IV, right where her
life beyond the Garden of Adonis began, as discussed in chapter 2.
Busirane represents a fantasy and, additionally, a culture of rape,
as others have argued without qualification, but it should be observed as
well that he is not successful. His fantasy remains exactly that, and Amoret
remains a virgin under his roof: “Die had she leuer with Enchanters knife, /
Then to be false in loue, profest a virgine wife”—pledged to Scudamour
but not fully one with him (IV.i.6, III.xii.31). If it were otherwise,
Busirane’s significance as a peculiarly rhetorical form of abuse, an art with
the power in actuality to arrest love, would be lost, and with it the real
cultural critique of Book III. Busirane abuses figuration and the perception based on it to feign that metaphor is the same as reality, that it is absolutely rather than is and is not, as Paul Ricoeur would gloss this figure of
perverse predication—“perverse” (from pervertere), “turned away, around,
about” or “athwart,” hence “tropic.”35 It is Busirane who feigns (and fains)
rape. And his ideological legacy is the reading that believes him.
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Britomart herself is wounded, although not deeply, by Busirane and
therefore proves vulnerable to him. Her heart is also said to be pierced and
her hair stood on end by his bloody verses, even while, her threatening
sword raised above him, she controls him.36 To my mind, this is the one
moment in the scene, rather than any other one, at which Britomart experiences, or truly realizes, Amoret’s condition. For a modern reader invested
in psychoanalytic connections, this could be a moment when Britomart
traverses, enters into, the Busiranic fantasy, even as it is the same moment
in which Busirane “reuerse[s]” his spell, turning it back as when one looks
at the backside of a collar, and his artworks crumble, then vanish, because
there is nothing real there (III.xii.36).37
At one point in the immediate context of Busirane’s disenchanting
verses—a rhetorical spell, which like all spells, must be unbound—a truly
ambiguous pronoun occurs, (con)fusing Britomart with Amoret. With
“threatfull hand” unslackened, Britomart waits “[un]dismaied” (and undis-maided) by the quaking of this House and undeterred by “daungers
dout,” a phrase offering to reassume the familiar form of an actual pair of
the masquers earlier seen (cf. xii.10–11, 37); thus she “Abode,” occupying
and inhabiting this “place,”
to weet, what end would come of all.
At last that mightie chaine, which round about
Her tender waste was wound, adowne gan fall,
And that great brasen pillour broke in peeces small.
(III.xii.37)

The ambiguous referent of the pronoun “her” signals Britomart’s involvement—literally her enwrapping, winding (Latin involvere)—in Busirane’s
“mightie chaine,” in the toils (and coils) of his rhetoric, thus evoking the
familiar iconographic identification of rhetoric with spellbound enchainment that I earlier referenced. Arguably, the first seven lines in the next
stanza also encompass Britomart and Amoret, although my own awareness
of the situation in the narrative just described makes me think such a reading unlikely. Be that as it may, what is significant about the one momentary identification of Britomart with Amoret in the penultimate line of
the last inset is that it comes only with Amoret’s freeing at Britomart’s
hand. It implicates Britomart in Amoret’s predicament, and she could
hardly not be implicated in view of the experiences that brought her to
Busirane’s House in the first place, but again, like Britomart’s superficial
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wounding, in doing so it more tellingly exhibits the superiority and intimacy of her derne, or dark, secret power.
Let us briefly suppose nonetheless that the next stanza, of whose
identification with Britomart I am skeptical, does continue the identification of her with Amoret, since this stanza offers the best evidence for the
actual raping of Amoret and, in Susan Frye’s argument, of Britomart as
well:
The cruell steele, which thrild her dying hart,
Fell softly forth, as of his owne accord,
And the wyde wound, which lately did dispart
Her bleeding brest, and riuen bowels gor’d,
Was closed vp, as it had not beene sor’d [1596,
    1609: “bor’d”],
And euery part to safety full sownd,
As she were neuer hurt, was soone restor’d:
Tho when she felt her selfe to be vnbownd,
And perfect hole, prostrate she fell vnto the grownd.
(III.xii.38)

The crucial words occur in the lines describing the wound in “Her bleeding brest, and riuen bowels” that “Was closed vp, as it [the wound] had
not beene sor’d.” Although these lines are about as transgressively suggestive as The Faerie Queene gets, I would reject a reading that swallows
catachresis whole, actualizing the radical metaphors present here. The
meaning of the lines depends heavily on that of the words “bowels” and
“as” in them. Contrary to the popular modern understanding of bowels
exclusively as “guts,” in the sixteenth century this word commonly referred
to ”the seat of the tender and sympathetic emotions” or the “heart, centre,”
and in Spenser’s writing it frequently, although not always, carries the
latter meaning, as is also true of English translations of the Bible in this
period.38 Doublets, such as “bleeding brest” and “riuen bowels” in the first
of the crucial lines, are rife in Spenser, and the prominence in canto xii of
Amoret’s transfixed heart also favors the meanings, now archaic, that I
have cited. Use of a singular verb (“was”) and singular pronoun (“it”) with
reference to the single wound in “brest” and “bowels” further enforces
identification of this alliterating doublet as a single unit.
The other word, as, in the phrase “as it had not been sor’d,” could be
read “as if,” but it need not be. This word can also mean “inasmuch as” or
“since,” and this is what I take it to mean here: “inasmuch as it had not been
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sor’d.”39 I would not reject the other possible reading out of hand either,
although in context I find it a stretch—“far-fet,” indeed an abusio, and
notably Busiranic in viewpoint. But metaphor, even abusive, catachrestic
metaphor, is, as well as is not. Ricoeur, for one, insists on such “split reference,” a meaning that is there and not there, and Pierre Bourdieu similarly
speaks of the ambivalence of sublation, of a lifting or raising that “simultaneously denies and maintains both the repression and the repressed” and
thus “allows for a doubling of profits: the profit of saying and the profit of
denying what is said by the way of saying it.”40
In the Spenserian passage in question, however, the possibility of the
counterfactual reading “as if,” like the former possibility of reading “bowels” as “guts,” hence “belly” or reproductive organs, would only return us
to the multiple perspectives of the participants in this canto—here specifically those of Amoret, Britomart, Busirane, the sometimes unreliable
narrator, and the Spenserian poet himself. The pun on “whole” in the final
line of the stanza is equally undisturbed by the reading I have advanced or
by the one that chooses Busirane’s perspective on it: Amoret, representative
love object, is rendered “whole and wanting,” at once perfected, or completed, for the passion of Cupid’s man and both lacking and desiring him.
Freely now, her responses, like Britomart’s, are holistic in every sense of
the hopeful or disheartening pun, as the reader will have it.
We hear or half hear submerged, or (im)possible, puns of the sort
just addressed even when prolonged attention to syntax and context
indicates that they are far-fetched or grammatically irrational. They are
plentiful in the literature of the period, in Shakespeare and Donne, for
obvious instances, and notably in Spenser as well. Studying the mental
processes by which we select and comprehend words, the psycho-linguist
Jean Aitchison has found evidence that I see supporting the viability of
such puns: readers or listeners “briefly activate both meanings of a homonym, even in cases where one of them is inappropriate”; in fact, according
to one model, “A whole army of words, it seems, marches up for consideration each time a word begins.”41 Aitchison’s explanation of homonymic
punning is readily extended to a syntactical construction or to any alternative signification of a single word.
Whatever the precise workings of our mental circuitry, a third
Spenserian example of (im)possible punning is ready to hand slightly
earlier in Britomart’s confrontation with Busirane, and it raises similar
issues of reading, thus contributing to this significant interpretive pattern
in Busirane’s third chamber. When Busirane’s knife wounds Britomart,
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“Exceeding wroth therewith the virgin grew, / Albe the wound were nothing deepe imprest” (xii.33). In an examination of Spenser’s puns on the
word “nothing,” Eggert has suggested that nothing here might be a noun
and therefore a sexual pun, the familiar Shakespearean equivalent of “hole,”
or “vagina, genitalia”: in this reading “nothing [is] deepe imprest.”42 Once
again, though surely prematurely, the “virgin” Britomart is presumed to
have been raped. But, as Eggert has agreed, the concessive “Albe” (meaning “albeit, although”) preceding “nothing” syntactically negates such a
pun and indicates instead that “nothing” is an adverb—that is, “nothing
[or not at all] deepe imprest”—with the result that Britomart is far from
having been violated except in a superficial sense. Once the grammatical
reading dominates, the (im)possible pun spectrally present serves to insinuate a more threatening potential in the situation—one submerged and
unrealized—and it may intimate as well the precariousness of Britomart’s
control at this moment, a control, by drawing her sword, that she quickly
asserts and maintains (33–34). Once again, the abusive reading is finally
meaningful only as an expression of the threat and indeed of the projected
fantasy of Busirane. The (im)possible pun would nominalize the word
“nothing,” insisting on its literal sense “no thing”; this is the sense that
negates the male member, or “thing,” in a common Elizabethan sense of
the word thing, while also evoking it, and thus motivates the sexual pun. In
this way, the “abusive,” Busiranic reader deconstructs the more abstractive
(supersessive) adverb to find the material root that makes it a noun and a
metaphor. At the heart of this practice is debate about the viability of dead
metaphors, appropriately mentioned in passing here.43
In both the 1590 and 1596 editions of The Faerie Queene, Busirane’s
artworks disappear once he is captured, and in the 1596 edition Britomart
and Amoret leave his House, only to find that Scudamour and Glauce
have departed, fearing the worst. In the 1590 edition, however, Amoret is
reunited with Scudamour outside Busirane’s House. Hamilton’s gloss on
their embrace is hardly alone in suggesting that the embrace is orgasmic,
and I suppose it might be, but Britomart’s presence as an observer gives me
pause. Certainly their embrace is passionate: Amoret melts in pleasure and
pours out her spirit in “sweete ravishment”; the embracing lovers are “like
two senceless stocks,” and, as if grown together, they resemble the marble
statue of a hermaphrodite (xi.45–46). The fact that Spenser cancelled this
ending in 1596 is the strongest sign that something is wrong with it, however, and the “senceless stocks” and marble hermaphrodite are two others.
A stock is a tree stub or a block of wood, both lifeless, as is the marble
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statue, fixed in its place. 44 The image of the hermaphrodite in this context is at best ambivalent—grotesquely double-limbed, motionless, and
dubiously human. That Britomart is said to half-envy the lovers’ embrace
half-suggests that she does not embrace it herself without reservation and
half-suggests that she does and therefore that she has more learning to do.
Understood sequentially as resulting from Britomart’s victory, the
conclusive image of the hermaphroditic statue reflects ironically on her
triumph. Amoret has been freed, but she remains to an extent Busirane’s
creature, a figure bound to his erotics, even as she is bound to Cupid’s man
Scudamour, whose identifying shield, which is emblazoned with the figure of Cupid, results from his conquest of unwilling womanhood in the
Temple of Venus (see III.7, IV.x.55, 57). Even in Book III, his name and
blazon identify him as Cupid’s surrogate. Aside from the Temple of Venus,
which only appears in the tenth canto of Book IV, Amoret’s sociocultural
shaping preeminently has been at Busirane’s cruel hands. The hermaphrodite is what survives Busirane’s cultural site when all his other erotic
forms have vanished, and its survival will be further apparent when, after
a hiatus of six years, the second installment of The Faerie Queene is published—Books IV to VI. Of course Busirane, like Archimago and Acrasia
before him, survives, too, although we see no more of his figure. The poet
of Faerie may be an idealist, but he is hardly unaware of the real world, as
we call it and as these survivals testify.
As if to observe the hiatus between the first installment of The
Faerie Queene and the poet’s reflections on it in the proem to Book IV, I
want first to review Britomart’s role to this point and then in the next section to begin anew with another, different approach to it, through something at first glance purely external, her armor. This approach will thus use
a new lens, which the 1596 installment does not inaugurate but makes further significant. Republishing Spenser’s first installment together with his
second, with heightened emphasis on Britomart’s armor, the 1596 Faerie
Queene itself invites a review of Book III.
Although Britomart is repeatedly developed at length in relation
to others in the first four cantos of Book III, she still remains focal. Her
quest provides the main story line: Malecasta, the flashback with Glauce,
the visit to Merlin, her complaint by the seaside, which is mirrored by
Cymoent’s and Arthur’s in the same canto (iv). Admittedly, Merlin’s history lesson over twenty-plus stanzas stretches this point, yet his history is
centered on Britomart’s progeny. In the second four cantos—Belphoebe
and Timias, the Garden of Adonis, Florimell, the witch and old fisherman,
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Argante, Satyrane, the Squire of Dames—Britomart is absent as a figure
in the action. Then, in canto ix, she shares a role at and in the castle of
Malbecco, there discovering her genealogical connection with Paridell.
The metamorphosis of Malbecco into the emblem of jealous fixation in
canto x, a story from which Britomart is again absent, introduces the first
of the cantos of Busirane. That Britomart’s absence from nearly half the
cantos in Book III conforms to the structure of romance is important, but,
in a poem that everywhere makes form and structure meaningful, it means
more.
When Britomart reappears for the last two cantos, which are situated in Busirane’s House of Rhetoric, she looks once more like the major
representative of the story line, yet her primary function for stanza after
stanza is to tour the artworks that dominate the scene, and to participate in the multiple points of view explored through them. When she
acts to save Amoret, the heightened, layered ambiguity of what actually
transpires, albeit comprehendible, conspicuously leaves the final decision
to others—viewers and readers as participants. In short, the dominant
subject now looks cultural, and the primary focus thematic rather than
characterological. Whereas the characterological features of the first four
cantos might have invited the view that Britomart is in herself the subject, the final eight cantos, including the adventure of Busirane, have readjusted it. The Faerie Queene is never static, let alone formulaic. In Book IV,
Britomart’s figure will become less conventionally cross-dressed, and, in
accordance with the more generally experimental nature of this book, her
figure will also become more experimentally so. This is the development
that I intend to trace next by considering Britomart’s armor, from Book
III through Book V, where her story shifts again before ending.

Britomart’s Armor
Throughout Book III, Britomart has been vested in armor that forms and
masks, expresses and veils, defends and contains her. She has been further
invested in finding Artegall, whose identity is known to her by his own
vesting in the conquered arms of Achilles. By the opening of Book IV,
Britomart, the armed but nubile virgin, not only Venus-Virgo but more
radically Venus within Mars, has become a complicated cultural signifier implicated in cultural conceptions of gender. Riding into Book IV,
Britomart and Amoret share a single horse, a traditional symbol of passion,
as well as a single saddle, unless Amoret perches on the horse’s rump—a
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passing, parodic thought. Since Britomart wears a full suit of armor, their
combined silhouette on the horse recalls the hermaphrodite in the original
ending of Book III. This transposed, catachrestic, hermaphroditic form at
the outset of Book IV, which replaces the one in the original ending, is in
effect a continuation of unfinished business. Their silhouette also anticipates the statue of Venus with “both kinds in one, / Both male and female,
both vnder one name” that presides over the Temple of Venus in the tenth
canto of this fourth book (41).
A fixed, emblematic statue is not a figure developing in figured narrative, however, and sex need not be equated with gender. Nonetheless, by
Book IV it is clear that a binaristic conception of gender is inadequate. 45
Clearly now, there are four terms in play, and, with the benefit of retrospection, at least two in each of the major amatory players of the books
featuring Britomart. The play of these terms with respect to Britomart
is my major focus in what follows, but, with respect to Artegall, it bears
mention, precisely because four terms, not just Britomart’s two, are vital
to it. When Artegall appears at a tournament in Book IV of the poem, his
first appearance as an actor rather than merely as an image, he is “the saluage knight” with “Saluagesse sans finesse”—artless, uncivilized savagery—
emblazoned on his shield (IV.39, 42). Encountering Britomart’s spear after
toppling all other knightly contestants, he is summarily knocked from his
horse. A poor loser who harbors a grudge, he still sports his savage identity when he next meets Britomart and engages in hand-to-hand combat
with her, an episode that I will subsequently examine in detail. Its result is
Artegall’s assumption of his true identity as he yields to Britomart.
Both armed encounters of Artegall with Britomart dramatize that
his savagery needs softening, refining, civilizing. As the loaded term softening signals in a context of gender and sexuality, softening suggests his
need of the Venerean principle, ranging from love to courtesy, gentleness,
generosity, and compassion, a principle that has been hidden, indeed
absent, from his actions as the savage knight. In mythological terms, this
principle might be dubbed his inner Venus. It will moderate and civilize
his hyper-masculinity, his exclusive maleness. Much more happens in
Artegall’s own book, the fifth, although its complexities exceed my present
focus. Yet briefly, in a parody of Artegall’s yielding to Britomart in Book
IV, he yields again to a woman, the wrong one, in Book V, and his doing
so results in his punitive cross-dressing as a woman. He is humiliated and
effeminized but simultaneously humanized—once again civilized—by
this fall, and with it, for the first time in Book V, he recalls his betrothal to
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Britomart in Book IV. His regressive, brutal figuration as Justice earlier in
Book V effectually enters a Venerean world of romance in which love can
redeem him.46 His quest as both knight and justicer thereafter is beyond
my present concern with Britomart, since she, having saved Artegall, disappears from the poem.
A major problem with the fusing of Scudamour with Amoret,
Cupid’s man with Venus’s maid, at the end of Book III in 1590 is precisely that only two terms, opposite ones, male and female, are involved.
Venus-Virgo does not sufficiently represent the doubled perception that
four terms require either, no matter whether Virgo is perceived as Diana
or Minerva/Athena. Unless seen as a cultural inflection of the composite Venus-Mars, Venus-Virgo masks the truly Martian, martial, masculine
nature of Britomart’s figure—her “manly terror,” as the poem puts it early
in Book III (i.46). Venus-Virgo elides the hard questions that her armor
presents, those involving combinations of nubility and firm resistance,
incorporation and active, assertive agency, the kinds of questions involving degrees, kinds, and causes of what the early modern period perceived
as masculinity, whose relation to maleness per se was not well defined
or neatly separated from other spheres and aspects of life. Edgar Wind’s
familiar reflections on Venus as Mars, Mars as Venus, are informative for
their stress on the compounding of the nature of each of them: “Dressed
in armour . . . the Venus victrix or Venus armata signifies the warfare of
love; she is a compound of attraction and rejection, fostering her gracious
aims by cruel methods. . . . Even Virgil’s Diana-like Venus . . . is but a variant of the Venus armata: a bellicose Venus who has donned the weapons
that normally belong to her opponent—either Diana, Minerva, or Mars.”
Wind’s conception might be analogized to a compound sentence, which
connects two independent clauses. Pertinent to “Venus as a Mars,” James
Nohrnberg further observes that “All Amazons are . . . ‘daughters of Mars,’”
to which I would add emphatically with respect to Britomart, even Venus
manifested as Jove’s daughter Minerva and vice versa.47
In what follows, my intention is to work with Spenser’s poem without imposing on it a clarity it does not have or, perhaps, want. Although
acknowledging the relation of Venus-Virgo to Britomart, I find that its
exclusive use figures a woman apart from a man without pressing specifically enough the nature of this a-partness—this compounding—or pressing it to the extent that the poem does.48 Accordingly, I plan to highlight
the Venus armata composite as Venus-Mars and to trace how a doubled
perception of Britomart’s gender develops. As before, my approach will
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continue to engage the process of figuration in Britomart’s story. Britomart
is an evolving figure, and her armor conspicuously participates in—indeed
figures—both the development of her integrity and its loss.
My method reflects what happens to mythological sources in their
creative revision within the movement of metaphorical narrative and, in
the focal instance at hand, to Britomart. In this respect it differs, while
benefitting, from the central concerns of an art historian such as Wind,
whose work is primarily grounded in paintings, medals, sculptures, and
other more stationary forms. Instead, it seeks to approach a process of figural thinking that overlaps with allegory but also loosens it. 49 This process produces figures that are considerably fuller and less simply abstract,
perhaps closer to the figuration of the gods and goddesses of ancient myth
themselves, who have sometimes been classed with allegory or subjected to
reductive allegoresis and sometimes have not been. Basically, however, this
process of thinking is yet another, further extension of continued or moving metaphor, as classical and early modern rhetoricians have described
allegory itself. In Cicero’s immensely influential De Oratore, for example,
Crassus, one of two major spokesmen, considers allegory an extension of
metaphor in “a chain of words linked together: ex pluribus [verbis] continuatis connectitur” and thus, in modern terms, in the contiguous relationship that characterizes narrative (II:130: Bk III.xli.166). On this note,
furnished with immediately relevant principles of gendering and reflections on method, I would return to Britomart herself in the early cantos
of Book III.
The Briton Princess Britomart wears the armor of the Saxon Queen
Angela, but armor itself is coded male in Spenser’s culture, as is evident
whenever Britomart encounters a knight with her visor down and, in the
Castle of Malecasta, even with her visor up.50 Britomart’s vesting herself
in this armor narratively follows on, and causally results from, her visit
to Merlin, who has been Arthur’s armorer and therefore in some sense
his maker, and Britomart’s use of her armor not surprisingly remakes her
as well. 51 Her arming is also a process that her motherly nurse Glauce
first suggests and then facilitates following their crucial visit to Merlin,
which is itself Glauce’s womanly conception. So vested, Britomart is
no longer the merely frustrated and enclosed pubescent child, the sheltered girl, of the second canto, but suddenly refigured as a knight “trained
vp in warlike stowre, / To tossen speare and shield, and to affrap / The
warlike ryder to his most mishap.” These lines, spoken by Britomart to
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Redcrosse (erroneously printed Guyon) would have sufficed to explain her
quest, but gratuitously she adds,
Sithence I loathed haue my life to lead,
As Ladies wont, in pleasures wanton lap,
To finger the fine needle and nyce thread;
Me leuer were with point of foemans speare be dead.
(III.ii.6)

Ostensibly, Britomart here rejects the weaving, spinning, and other crafts
of “needle and nyce thread” especially associated with Minerva (not to
mention Arachne). She is not simply dressed but is vested in her armor and
the knightly role it represents. Although she feigns in the lines just cited,
she is also describing the way she actually behaves once she is in Faerie
Land, where all figures are feigned and defined by what they do. Like all
the young men in The Faerie Queene who seem to have some future—
Arthur, Redcrosse, Artegall, and Tristram, for example—Britomart is here
separated from her family, significantly armed, and thereby reinvented. In
order to survive or to find the possibility of a future—purpose, being, or
justice—escape to Faerie appears as necessary in this epic romance as to
Arden in Shakespeare’s As You Like It.52 Aside from this constructive reading of Britomart’s enabling armor, the last line cited in the inset could be
taken with comic irony as Britomart’s inadvertent expression of a desire
to find her “foeman” Artegall’s spear and thereby to consummate her love
quest. More than once, the representation of Britomart in Books III and
IV is touched by parody or comic wit. This is another humanizing touch
in her figuration, as it recurrently is in that of Spenser’s Arthur and Una.53
Like Artegall’s armor, a sign of his Trojan and British lineage,
Britomart’s Saxon armor also has a dynastic function.54 Since Britomart is
a Briton princess, it figures the eventual joining of Briton with Saxon, as
predicted by Merlin, who, as maker of the magic globe belonging to King
Ryence, Britomart’s father, is not surprisingly the expositor of Britomart’s
“heuenly destiny,” which her deliberate, conscious speculation, as distinguished from her initially empty, passive viewing in the self-reflective
globe, first intimates (III.iii.22–24). King Ryence never appears in the
poem, and his shadowy presence serves mainly to validate Britomart’s
dynastic role, which is more directly scripted by Merlin, the wizard with
a sense of humor whose comic ancestry includes a “Lady Nonne” (lady
none, or nun), Matilda (Teutonic: battle-maid, or battle-made), and
Pubidius, a historical nonentity with a name glancing at Latin pubes/pubis,
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“puberty” (iii.13).55 Such ancestors could hardly better befit Britomart’s
condition: they are made for her, and the same is true of Merlin’s dynastic prophecy, which at once reflects and guides her wishes. Although the
male/female cooperation here has been read as compromising her agency,
I see it as potentially further empowering her—again, potentially. On the
one hand, in “this man’s world,” as too common a saying of the twentieth
century went, she has to start somewhere if she is to have a viable quest.
On the other hand, if she really is, or is to become, a composite of Mars
and Venus, the male/female cooperation expresses rather than compromises her integrity.
Britomart’s Saxon armor was acquired by a band of Britons on a
“forray”—a raiding party bent on pillage—a “Few dayes before” when they
“had gotten a great pray / Of Saxon goods, emongst the which was seene
/ A goodly Armour” belonging to Queen Angela (iii.58). This account
highlights the fortuitous, even casual, quality of the armor’s acquisition. Angela was not defeated by the Briton king in battle; in fact, the
account suggests that the pillagers might have broken into one of Angela’s
storehouses or, perhaps more ingloriously, into her country house in her
absence.
Angela herself and Britomart’s father, King Ryence, do not even
seem directly involved, and the fact that Ryence’s acquisition of the
armor is subsequently termed a “gladfull victory” renders it about as glorious as Artegall’s winning the arms of Achilles is actual (59). As Ryence’s
“onely daughter and his hayre” from whom “nothing he . . . reseru’d
apart,” Britomart might actually be thought to have a right to the captured armor—in legal terminology a vested right (III.ii.22): in English
law, women had full rights to inheritance when sons were lacking. In this
connection, two attributes of Minerva, as identified with Athena, come
to mind, namely her unique possession of her father Jove’s thunderbolt
and aegis with the Gorgon’s head.56 In sum, Britomart’s robbery of her
armor from a church is on the transgressive scale of her later white lies to
Redcrosse, who is himself Saxon-born. In Faerie, Saxons and Britons such
as Redcrosse and Arthur mingle readily.
Britomart’s martial accoutrements actually combine Saxon with
Briton. Although her Saxon armor is not magical, her ebony spear, made
by Bladud, a Briton king, has been produced by magic and has magical
powers that an opposing rider cannot withstand.57 Although Britomart
also has a sword, the spear is her ultimate weapon, and it is alike an
attribute of Mars and Minerva. The spear has been stored in King Ryence’s
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church, which begins to sound like an armory or virtual history museum.
Even Glauce finds her nondescript suit of armor there. Since Britomart’s
shield, emblazoned with Brutus’s lion passant, is simply said to be beside
the spear, it too could be associated with Bladud or with her dynastic
genealogy. When Britomart sets off for Faerie immediately after her arming, the hunched figure of old Glauce trails her: the lady knight brings
with her, so to speak, her own gently comic visual parody.
Variously glossing Glauce, the name of Britomart’s nurse, A. C.
Hamilton suggests Greek “owl,” a bird traditionally associated with
Minerva, as well as Greek “grey” (that is, old Glauce), and the mother of
Diana in Cicero’s De natura deorum.58 As a combination of Venus and
Mars, the amorously motivated Britomart is as much a parody of the
fiercely, eternally virginal Minerva herself as is Glauce of Minerva’s owl.
Notably, Glauce as a visual form of parody trailing Britomart disappears
by the end of Book III, although then she ludicrously trails Scudamour
instead. Given Hamilton’s glosses of Glauce’s name, a more appropriate
verb for her presence with respect to him might be “shadows” or, better
still, “haunts.” When Britomart finds Artegall in Book IV, Glauce briefly
reappears in the conventional role of complicit nursely matchmaker, a version of Fair Welcome (Bialacoyle, in Chaucer’s rendering of Le Roman
de la Rose), after which point she vanishes from the poem (IV.vi.25:
“belaccoyle”).59 With significant figural difference, in Book V an armed
Britomart will resume her Faerie quest accompanied by the iron man
Talus.
Momentarily excepting the sojourn with Malecasta, Britomart
removes either her helmet or all her armor twice in Book III: first at the
seashore and then in the castle of Malbecco. In both instances, the danger
of containment by the protective armor in the negative sense of suppression and self-enclosure becomes evident. Both witness an outpouring of
what is inside this armored and self-contained figure—frustrated desire,
patriotic affection, a kind of figural voice, since she, not the narrator, is
the speaker. In Philip Sidney’s term, at these moments she is literally and
memorably a speaking picture.60 Sitting unhelmeted beside the seashore,
she utters her passionate love-longing in a notably Petrarchan form, but
then she suits up again in the enabling armor to get on with the quest and
to topple “loues enimy,” the aggressor Marinell, who has rashly advised her
to retreat (III.iv.26).61 Later, within the Castle of Malbecco, and now fully
divested of her armor, she discovers and reveals her kinship to Paridell, not
only as a Trojan descendant but also, in a phrase that refuses containment,
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as “another partner of . . . [his] payne” and of his “pitifull complaint” of
his lost homeland (III.ix.40). The inner Britomart, so to speak, takes surprising cultural forms, not merely borrowing those of males but truly vesting herself in them. The cultural alternative for her in the poem would
appear to be silence, and the cultural challenge to modify or to exceed
these inherited forms in some way.
In the Castle of Malecasta, Britomart remains fully suited, although,
to her mischance, she has her visor up, thus projecting “amiable grace,”
along with her “manly terror” (III.i.46). She later unsuits in private; her
bed is invaded by the deluded and delusional Malecasta; and, as a result,
she is slightly wounded by Gardante (Looking ), who leers at her when
she is clad only in a smock. Punningly, she is further vulnerable as well for
having let her guard down, whether by having a look around Malecasta’s
domain or by “dissembl[ing ]” her disapproval of the temptress’s outrageously open advances “with ignoraunce” (i.e., playing dumb) and by
“entertayn[ing]” her instead with “faire countenaunce” (i.50, 55). Delude,
incidentally, is another word deriving from ludere, “play,” and surely there
is something parodic about this incident in Castle Joyous. (Intertextually,
the plight of Sir Gawain comes to mind.)62 Britomart, as we know, will
also be wounded, although again not deeply, in the House of Busirane, but
this later time, with significant difference, through her full suit of armor.
Here the wound will signify her vulnerability to Busirane despite the
armor, but this is not all. The armor, including shield and sword, its phallic
“point direct[ed] . . . forward right,” has helped her through the flames of
Busirane’s porch, which divide themselves, allowing her to pass through,
“as a thonder bolt / Perceth the yielding ayre” (III.xi.25).63 The image is
distinctively Jovian; that Jove’s cerebral offspring Minerva can also be represented hurling the thunderbolt makes it no less so. Like father, like son;
is it really like daughter, too? Britomart will be wearing the same armor
when she meets and crucially engages Artegall in Book IV, where the
thunderbolt will be his.
When Britomart is wounded through the armor by Busirane and
yet is victorious, it is as if the armor had become more fully a part of her
in some way, at least while she is in the condition of possibility and creative figuration that Faerie affords. An analogy to the shifting relation of
Christian armor to what is inside it at various points in Book I is available,
as is the implication of such shifts for the broader relation of surface to
substance in the poem. 64 This developing relation may be a constructive
reason, in addition to the deceptive and abusive ones, the throwbacks to
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Busirane, why Britomart stays safely within her armor at the beginning of
Book IV where, rather than reveal herself to Amoret, she “fain[s]”—ambiguously pretends, desires, or both—her sex male and thereby “maske[s] her
wounded mind” (i.7). She has, after all, been thrice wounded by love—
first by her vision of Artegall in the magic globe and twice by love’s perversion at the hands of Malecasta/Gardante and Busirane. All these wounds
were painful.
Along with the narrator’s word “abusion” characterizing Britomart’s
deception of Amoret, the other words I have just quoted from the first
appearance of the two women together in Book IV, namely “fain” and
“maske,” enforce the specter of Busirane. Britomart’s masking her female
sex from the anxious, defenseless Amoret, while feigning and faining to be
a man, both reflects Busirane’s abusive masking and ironically suggests that
Britomart is at once the heir of his art and of Amoret, its ultimate object.65
Surely cruel, not merely comic, Britomart’s abusive playing with and upon
Amoret’s responses suggests both curiosity and resentment—an openness
to experience and a resistance to the stock-in-trade of conventional womanhood, to something of what Shakespeare’s Angelo calls the “destin’d
livery” of woman. 66 Yet it also enables her exploratory performance of
manhood, an alternative and possibly liberating identity. This is another
point at which her figuration as Mars clashes more noticeably with her figuration as Minerva, both figural possibilities present in the Venus armata
composite. For a modern reader, it is also a point at which the Renaissance
figure of Britomart strongly suggests Judith Butler’s emphasis on the performativity of a gendered identity.67
Like Britomart’s momentary identification with Amoret in the
House of Busirane, her “abusion” of her charge at the beginning of Book
IV might again suggest a Lacanian traversal of the fantasy, a completing
or an experiencing of both (or all) sides of it—earlier of victimhood, this
time of Busiranic abuse.68 Accordingly, Britomart might turn from a projected identification of herself as the object of desire, that is, an identification with Amoret in the House of Busirane, to an introjected identification of herself as the agent of desire, or Busirane himself, at the beginning
of Book IV. As signaled by the similarity of the word traverse (“turn across,
athwart”) to translate (“carry across”), the latter a term specifically for metaphor and alternatively for tropicality in general, this notion is allegorical,
whether metonymic and substitutive or more properly metaphorical, the
latter being at once constructive and differential, never just the same. 69
Such traversal offers a useful connection and insight, since it further

104  

Chapter 3

highlights Britomart’s characterological features, as long as it does not
produce sameness at the expense of difference—the difference between
identification and Britomart’s sustained control over Busirane in his
House, despite her momentary vulnerability, and the difference between
mere abusion of Amoret and Britomart’s constructive, experimental performance of manhood.70 This is also the difference between armor that is
merely alienating and armor that is constructively enabling.
In sum, at the outset of Book IV, the true Britomart is no longer
simply within the armor, if, once armed, she could ever have been characterized this way. Her figure continues to exhibit characteristics of interiority and awareness—Sinfield’s “consciousness”—but even so, as this book
begins, she is more fully invested in armored form and expression than
ever before. The potential of her figure as at once Mars and Venus, aggressive boar and sensuous flower, male and female, hard-edged form and melting passion has increasingly been realized in Book III, yet, when her own
book ends and Book IV opens, her armored form and her performance of
manhood are further definitive.71 In view of her final adventure in Book
III in which the armor is already so much a part of her, this is less a deepening revelation, a word I used with respect to Una, than a further development, a broadening of her figure—a greater comprehension. Subjected
to friendship, the form of love thematic in Book IV, Britomart’s figure will
be at once different and still continuous by Book IV’s end. Both Una and
Britomart learn from experience in their own Books (I and III), but the
shaping of Britomart in the course of Books III to V is more extensive,
prolonged, and remarkable with respect to her awareness and, be it added
in a glance forward to Book V, with respect to her unawareness, as well.
***
Further discussing composite forms in Renaissance art, Edgar Wind offers
the images of a closed fist and an unfolded palm to illustrate how a composite image, such as Venus and Mars or amiable Concordia and martial
Constantia, might be represented: “Normally, Constantia would hold
a lance or lean on a column. . . . But the lance is replaced by an arrow
of love which she swings in a defiant bellicose manner, and the column
on which she leans is formed by a bundle of arrows, the traditional symbol of Concordia. The visibly fierce, unassailable Constantia is therefore
a concealed Concordia; like a closed fist withholding an open palm. . . .
[Thus] Constantia is represented as an ‘infolded’ Concordia—Concordia
as an ‘unfolded’ Constantia” (76). In a variation on Wind’s image, at the
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beginning of Book IV, mounted on that single horse with Britomart,
the Venerean Amoret is this knight’s love outfolded, the best outward,
unfolded expression presently available, while Britomart herself remains
the outfolded form of Mars, whom the enabling armor expresses. Ideally,
the Venerean Amoret, as a generative symbol of Britomart’s love, will be
incorporated—perhaps more accurately reincorporated—into Britomart,
and Amoret herself, as a separate figure, will somehow find a viable external form and reformed cultural expression. 72 The alternative to such
constructive, figural reformation will be Amoret’s discarding, not entirely
unlike the disappearing Fool in King Lear, whose role Lear subsumes in
the storm and whose figure he replaces with Poor Tom’s. Realism of plot
and character in the modern quotidian sense is foreign to the constructive, bold process that Spenser’s fourth book undertakes, as well as more
broadly to his culture.73 Form, too, has a cultural history that remains
conspicuously significant in The Faerie Queene, where Amoret as a figure
differs formally from the relatively greater complexity and awareness of
Britomart. Both the conventions of narrative and of symbolism in the
Renaissance bear on Book IV, and the conflict between them becomes
focal as the book develops.
More than once, Book IV refers suggestively to Amoret as
Britomart’s love. A telling example occurs in Satyrane’s tournament in
canto v, when the lady knight will not forgo “her owne Amoret” for False
Florimell (20). The possessive adjective “owne” accentuates Amoret’s
figural signification as Love: Britomart’s own Amoret is both her friend
and the love she possesses and continues to nurture. Earlier in this book,
Britomart’s abusive deception of Amoret ceases once she meets and overcomes the nameless, faceless knight outside the nameless castle in canto i,
subsequently unhelmeting herself to reveal her womanhood and thus enabling all three of them (Britomart, Amoret, and the young male knight) to
enter the castle, each as a pair (IV.i.10–13). The young knight’s namelessness has particular significance in an allegory, one of whose characteristics is significant naming. His anonymity facilitates his interchangeability with Britomart, and hers with Amoret as well—a triangulation of the
three, with the lady knight performing as Venus and Mars, simultaneously
man and woman, and thus conceived as at once a mean point and a moving one. The mathematical diction seems appropriate. There is an abstract
logic to the plot at this moment.
This new Britomart behaves differently from the one in Book III;
she reveals her erotic beauty voluntarily and for a socially constructive
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purpose, not simply in response to discomfort within her armor, whether
from a surge of emotion at the sight of the surging sea or a downpour outside the Castle of Malbecco, as happened in the third book. Britomart’s
self-revelation now comes while she still wears the rest of her armor, and
it is actually more wondrous for combining the armor with her cascading golden hair. The narrator celebrates the occasion with rhetoric that at
once recalls Acrasia’s Venerean veil in the Bower of Bliss and the cometlike appearance of Florimell at the outset of Book III.74 The imagery of fire
and light rather than of showers or cloudbursts predominates:
With that her glistring helmet she vnlaced:
Which doft, her golden lockes, that were vp bound
Still in a knot, vnto her heeles downe traced,
And like a silken veile in compasse round
About her backe and all her bodie wound:
Like as the shining skie in summers night,
What time the dayes with scorching heat abound,
Is creasted all with lines of firie light,
That it prodigious seemes in common peoples sight.
(IV.i.13)75

All glistening, golden, fiery, and bright, there is nothing abstract about
the cascading hair. With this unfolding of Venus from within Mars, the
Venerean figure of Amoret draws “freely” and naturally to Britomart’s bed
in another memory of Book III, where Malecasta, free in the licentious
sense, has earlier done so. This all makes figural sense. Amoret’s attraction
necessarily derives from her figural nature as “Venus mayd” (IV.x.54).
“All that night” the two women, inside the castle and together in
bed, as old Glauce and Britomart were in Book III, “of their loues did
treat” (1.16). In Spenser’s time beds were valuable commodities, and it was
common to share one. Notable are the plural “loues,” the information in
the immediately following lines that the two women “priuately bemone”
one another’s plight with “griefull pittie,” and especially the conspicuous
figural dimension of both women from the outset of Book IV, which here
is singularly affected by Britomart’s being divested of the armor that has
increasingly become a part of her. These considerations noted, the phrase
“their loues” remains susceptible to a homoerotic reading, which history
justifies and others have observed. That this, and more, is Ate’s reading
later in the same canto ensures rather than erases its textual existence. 76
Without her armor, Britomart is more simply female, like Amoret.
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The women’s treating of their loves lasts all of four lines. At dawn,
Britomart is revested (and reinvested) in armor, and she and Amoret ride
again on a single horse, together a hermaphroditic silhouette atop that
traditional symbol of passion. Again in an exteriorized, exposed, and less
private landscape, they are not long on the horse before the fickle knight
Blandamour challenges Britomart for possession of Amoret. Now occurs
the strange but crucial stanza in which perspectives repeatedly oscillate
between Britomart’s and Blandamour’s points of view and simultaneously
between chivalric and erotic, outer and inner, and narrative and symbolic
values. (All these pairs, especially the last pair, are not simply and synonymously exchangeable with each other, though all are in play.) Although
familiar to Spenserians, the stanza bears citing:
The warlike Britonesse her soone addrest,
And with such vncouth welcome did receaue
Her fayned Paramour, her forced guest,
That being forst his saddle soone to leaue,
Him selfe he did of his new loue deceaue
And made him selfe thensample of his follie.
Which done, she passed forth not taking leaue,
And left him now as sad, as whilome iollie,
Well warned to beware with whom he dar’d to dallie.
(IV.i.36)

The combination of Britomart’s armed form with the outward possession and expression of her own Amoret—Amor, her love—causes still
further confusion between merely fleshed and more inclusively figural
meanings—again, genuine confusion, not the simple fusion of both terms
of a single binary. The combination is problematical: whether Blandamour
is Britomart’s or Amoret’s “fayned Paramour” is uncertain, as are the
location and identity of “his new loue”—inner or outer, Britomart
or her Amoret. The motivations, erotic or chivalric, of Britomart and
Blandamour are similarly uncertain, as are narrative and symbolic dimensions more broadly. A reader might even wonder whether the assault of
the fickle Blandamour, the object of whose loves is ever shifting, is a further comment on the night Britomart and Amoret have spent together,
an accusation of infidelity like Ate’s, only eleven stanzas later (47–49).
The result of the encounter of Blandamour with Britomart and Amoret
is a blur, but a meaning ful blur, analogous to—that is, like and unlike—
the endless, undefined (formless), regressive, and chaotic fighting of the
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false friends in Book IV’s first and ninth cantos. It is also a situation in
a single stanza that is momentary; it cannot be lasting without signaling
poetic negligence rather than poetic significance. Clearly significant, it
participates in a recurrent pattern in the experimentally figured narrative
of Book IV.
Amoret accompanies armed Britomart in the rest of Book IV only
until Amoret walks off “for pleasure, or for need” while Britomart is sleeping, as Britomart recounts much later (vii.4). Said to be “vnwares” and,
though in a forest, “of nought affeard,” Amoret may suppose herself free of
courtly danger, the only sort she knows, when she wanders off, or she may
even fancy herself back with Pleasure, her youthful companion amid the
myrtle trees in the Garden of Adonis. Then the figure of beastly Lust seizes
her. Thereafter, abandoned by Belphoebe and Timias and found in the
woods by Arthur, she returns to her former status as a separate figure with
her own story line, such as it now is. She is now a desperately wounded
figure who seems to have nowhere to go and no story to fit into. Arthur
feels only pity for her, and she is a fifth wheel in the story of the look-alike
squires and their morally compromised ladies, which comes next.77
It makes a kind of figural sense that Amoret should have to withdraw from Britomart’s company before Britomart can achieve loving
“accord”—heartfelt harmony—with Artegall (IV.vi.41). Yet even in this
“accord,” Amoret’s presence lingers punningly: the word with which
Spenser thus characterizes it plays etymologically on Latin ad, “to,
toward,” and cor/cordis, “heart,” and phonologically on English chord and
cord. English chord enriches the harmony signaled by the word accord
itself, but resonant in the homonymous cord there is also a memory of the
chain Busirane used to bind Amoret. Is the tie that binds creatively revised
in the accord of Britomart and Artegall, or is this transformation merely
apparent? Could the tie that binds still be enchainment? Submerged in a
pun in Book IV, this question emerges openly in Book V, whose time, to
paraphrase Merlin’s prophetic words, is not yet. Puns can work this way in
The Faerie Queene, as memorably in other writers of the period.
Earlier in Book IV, Britomart, fully suited and still with Amoret,
fights Artegall in Satyrane’s tournament and again later on foot, when her
armor is breached as Artegall shears off her ventail, the first step toward a
truce between them. When she and Artegall subsequently retire to solace
and feasting, reach their “accord,” consent to marriage, and are privately
betrothed, Britomart is presumably unarmored, but this is a point the
poem passes over in silence, perhaps signaling its lack of significance now
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(IV.vi.39, 41).78 When she and Artegall separate again—specifically and
importantly with her assent (vi.43: “wonne her will”)—and, promisingly,
she now accompanies Scudamour in his search for Amoret, she is again
armored and committed to “vertues onely sake, which doth beget / True
loue and faithfull friendship” rather than to the marital love quest that
initially led to her arming (vi.46). Clearly, Amoret no longer belongs to
Britomart in the same sense as when Amoret was “her owne” in Satyrane’s
tournament (IV.v.20). Although in Book IV we never see Britomart without her armor after her accord with Artegall, the armor now appears more
practical than significant. This situation will change again in Book V.
***
Before moving on to Book V, however, I want to look again at developments in the fourth book over which I have just skimmed—briefly to
recapitulate Amoret’s capture by Lust, along with her subsequent history
in Book IV, and then more closely to examine the combat that leads to
Britomart’s and Artegall’s accord, insofar as Britomart’s armor plays a
notably figural role in the latter and, doing so, provokes a nagging question: why does Spenser, the poet of the Amoretti and Epithalamion, deny
the principal couple of the poem a conciliation less steely (and likely offputting) than clashing and clanging armor? The mix of genres in Book IV
hardly accounts for this denial. To my mind, the significance of Britomart’s
armor to this point is again the major reason for it, the inescapable specter
of Busiranic art forms continuing to be another, as was evidenced in the
hermaphroditic figure concluding the 1590 edition and as it will be again
by Scudamour’s raptus in the Temple of Venus.79 A third reason is the persistent, recurrent, significantly thematized disjunction and confusion of
the merely fleshly and the more inclusive figural, of the inner and outer,
and of the narrative and the symbolic in Book IV that is at once exemplified and crystalized in the early encounter of Blandamour with Britomart
and Amoret that I recently examined.
Achieving accord, Britomart’s battle with Artegall surmounts these
thematized problems, at least as much as is possible in Book IV. Seen retrospectively through the same problematized, thematic lenses, the poem
then cedes Amoret to genital Lust, a bisexual, hence hermaphroditic, figure that could hardly be depicted in more explicitly physical, fleshy terms
and one whose cave alludes parodically in its bisexuality to that beneath
the Garden of Adonis.80 Although Amoret escapes from Lust, as my last
chapter indicated, she continues to be compromised in the narrative,
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which answers to events outside it, even while her figure is once and forever idealized by the sublating lyric voice of the Spenserian poet, who, for
this purpose, abruptly and impulsively interrupts his bleak narrative of a
night with Slander during the eighth canto, as also treated in chapter 2
(65, 67–69). In other words, in Amoret’s story, apart from Britomart’s,
disjunction merely increases. Her reappearance in the Temple of Venus
then becomes at once a discouraging memory of the forms that led to
the House of Busirane in the first place and, perhaps, as I tentatively suggested, the defiant intimation of a rebeginning. Understandably, the figure of Amoret nonetheless disappears from the poem, evidently having
become a property too hot for the poet to handle.
In contrast, for better or worse, the accord of Britomart and
Artegall, the latter masking as the Salvage Knight, represents in armed
combat the principle of erotic coupling in The Faerie Queene. Their combat, which simultaneously climaxes both their relationship and the first
half of Book IV, is both focal and distinctive. Its position in a central canto
of this book corresponds to that of the Garden of Adonis in Book III. In
terms that I variously derive from Jean-François Lyotard on the figurality
of the dream-work and from Ricoeur on iconic metaphor, their combat
is highly figural—embodied but not simply fleshly—and, in the main,
its contours are cognitive, imaginative, and affective, rather than directly
emotional or passionate.81 As a battle, the ur-conflict of epic romance, it
is also a narrative moment in the poem that belongs to the quest, rather
than to a statue, an extended emblem, or a lyric. It is full of mutual, developmental action.
In Ricoeur’s theory, the iconic dimension of metaphor, which, like
other figures of speech, has a “quasi-bodily externalization,” also carries
feeling (as distinguished from raw emotion). Ricoeur describes this feeling as a complex form of affection, intentionality, “interiorized thoughts,”
“felt participation,” and the like (142, 154–55). Lyotard, opposing the
Lacanian view that dream-work is a form of discourse, argues instead for
its less abstract, more Freudian figurality; for Lyotard, “An imaged text
is a discourse that is very close to the figure.” Its proximity inheres in
“the figurative power of a word, of course, but also the rhythmic power
of syntax, and at an even deeper level, the matrix of narrative rhythm.”82
Addressing this matrix, Lyotard explains that, “The great linguistic figures,
of discourse, of style, are the expression, right in the heart of language, of
a general disposition of experience, and the phantasm is the matrix of that
ordering, that rhythm, which will henceforth be imposed on everything
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that happens on the levels of ‘reality’ and expression” (245: my emphasis).
As form, matrix, and rhythm, the figure “jam[s]” the communicative constraints inscribed in “any language. . . . By virtue of the fact that it sets up a
closed circuit intercom system of the work with itself.” Lyotard concludes
that, “language, at least in its poetic usage, is possessed, haunted by the
figure” (246).
Characterized by elemental and animal imagery, by reference to
religious forms, by wounds, sweat, and blood, the combat of Britomart
with Artegall is violent and erotic as well as figurative. It is sexually suggestive, for example, when Artegall “Thrust[s]” at Britomart from below
as if “an eger hound” were thrusting “to an Hynd within some couert
glade”; Artegall has a couchant hound on the crest of his helmet (presently masked by “woody mosse”), and a hind is a female deer.83 Similarly
suggestive, he next deeply wounds the “hinder parts” of Britomart’s horse,
that conventional symbol of bodily passion earlier shared by Britomart
with Amoret (vi.13). But the combat of Britomart and the (still) Salvage
Knight is not directly and immediately genital the way Lust’s fleshy figure
is, instead being relatively and significantly more masked, sublimated, and,
in a word, civilized. Their combat is not merely chaotic and endless as is
the initial and later battling of Blandamour, Paridell, and the like (e.g.,
ix.20–33). Rather, it has a kind of form and pattern, a rhythm and, crucially, a progression. It is at once Typhonic-Chthonic and dance-like—
both explosive and generative, both Hate and Love, in terms I take from
the Temple of Venus. This is the sort of figuration that Lyotard intends
when he refers to the matrix of narrative rhythm.
In the heat of their encounter the knights exchange the roles of
hunter and hunted recurrently—either of them “Sometimes pursewing,
and sometimes pursewed” (vi.18).84 Britomart wounds Artegall directly
despite his armor: his “mayle [punningly male] yriv’d, and plates yrent,”
his blood pours to the ground (vi.15). In contrast, Britomart’s armor twice
deflects the force of Artegall’s blows, his first consequential stroke glancing down her back to light on her horse:
Like as the lightning brond from riuen skie,
Throwne out by angry Ioue in his vengeance,
With dreadfull force falles on some steeple hie,
Which battring, downe it on the church doth
    glance,
And teares it all with terrible mischance.
(IV.vi.14)
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With this imagery Scudamour’s less violently graphic church-robbery
later in the Temple of Venus comes to a rereader’s mind, as does the earlier, bizarre containment of chaotic urge and violent desire in the religious
idolatry and ritual battle of Satyrane’s tournament, which, with all its primitive and parodic limitations, is a relatively civilizing form, greatly superior to the still more formless, endless fighting at the outset of this book
(Blandamour, Paridell, etc.). The limitations termed primitive and parodic in the preceding sentence include Florimell’s girdle enshrined within
an ark, insistent images of animality and elemental force, and knightly
figures named Bruncheval, Sangliere, Brianor, and Ferramont (Brown
Horse, Wild Boar, Bear, and, ludically, Iron Mount). Similarly in the present combat, Artegall’s lightning is significantly Jovian, formed into myth,
as well as elemental. The steeple on which it falls is as pointedly phallic,
moreover, as is Britomart’s magic spear, which Artegall’s Jovian blow to
her horse renders ineffectual.85
Artegall’s second crucial stroke lights on Britomart’s helmet and
glances harmlessly down the front of her body armor, yet it shears away
her ventail en route and exposes her face, framed by wisps of golden hair,
which is culturally coded female. This partial breach of her armor is an
unmasking rather than a total divesting, however. The difference is vital for
a poem in which masking, with its Busiranic potential for abuse, has been
thematically recurrent and specifically vital for the figure of Britomart,
whose armor is integral to her quest and whose outfolded figural integrity
is armored. Now without her spear, Britomart crucially retains her raised
sword, exactly as she did in her vulnerability both within Malecasta’s bedroom and the House of Busirane. Yet no more than Artegall is simply
lightning, hail, hound, Jove, or an idolator is Britomart simply her horse’s
animality, a church, an angel, an artwork, a goddess, priestess, or even her
own armor. The armor itself, moreover, cannot be translated simply as her
chastity, as Hamilton’s second edition might suggest (e.g., 453n13.4). The
armor is at once multivalent and responsive to specific context. By this
point in the poem, it signals her agency and specifically her will to resist
and act freely.86 It further represents the force of her virtue, not merely its
moral form but also its Machiavellian virtù, control and ability to effect,
and Latin virtus, “power, strength, value.”87 Virtus, of course, derives from
vir, “man.” Most striking of all, Britomart’s armor signifies her hardness
and even her hate, again, as this concept appears in the Temple of Venus, as
a cosmic force harmoniously, concordantly balanced by love, and finally,
her armor signifies her masculinity, if not her maleness per se.88
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Tellingly, Britomart’s armor, though culturally coded male, has
been a queen’s from the start—a good “fitt,” in the punning, physical sense
of this word in the third proem.89 Although her figure wears a habergeon,
or coat of mail, it has never explicitly received the descriptor “mayle” (or
male), a recurrent Spenserian pun applied to other knights. This is merely
a negative piece of evidence about her, minuscule yet still notable. By the
end of her battle with Artegall, her integrity has been figured not as anatomically doubled like the hermaphroditic statue imaged in 1590 but as
truly, integrally both Martian and Venerean in effectual, psychological,
and agential terms. In these telling respects, her figure is androgenous.
The distinction between an adjectival and a nominal form, here between
androgenous and androgyne, is relevantly significant, comparable to that
between allegorical and allegory, distinctive property and defining literary form, for example. Distinguishing such verbal forms in terms of their
grammatical and semantic functions, as in traditional logics and rhetorics,
simultaneously enables preservation of relation and acknowledgment of
difference: an allegorical figure, like one on a shield or in a tableau, is not
just by virtue of the adjective a literary allegory if an allegory is a moving metaphor, that is, a narrative or dramatic one.90 The adjectival form
also sits more comfortably with mythic forms creatively revised within
a moving, metaphorical narrative of the sort that is found in The Faerie
Queene and most complexly exemplified by the story of Britomart. When
Britomart finds Artegall, the difference between her evolving role as an
actor and the function of an emblematic statue such as the bisexual Venus
of canto x, not to mention the one that survives the capture of Busirane,
becomes quite definite.
In a useful discussion of intellectual sources for Spenser’s Garden
of Adonis, Jon Quitslund highlights some aspects of Leone Ebreo’s influential Dialoghi d’Amore of 1535, which bears on imaginative writing in
England from Spenser through Donne and Milton.91 Leone reverses the
amorous roles our own age still considers conventional, not to say hegemonic or “normal.” His male lover is maternal, and his engendering female
beloved is paternal—the true father of love. Here, the woman’s fatherhood
occurs within a culture and context that still attribute originary potency
to men, yet it is nonetheless striking that for Leone this fathering resides in
the woman. As Quitslund summarizes Leone, “each sex or gender is not an
autonomous entity but an aspect of mankind (‘l’ homme’ in Tyard’s translation). . . . ‘Each of them has a masculine part, perfect and active, which is
the intellect, and a feminine part, imperfect and passive, which is the body
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and matter’” (235). Clearly these parts are not reducible to genital differences, and they both underwrite human eros.92 Suggestively in Leone’s
statement, sex and gender are also not differentiated from one another as
fully or neatly as our age still tends to think of them. 93 The potential for
their confusion is evident and often occurs in The Faerie Queene, whether
in comic, threatening, or constructive modes, or in varied combinations
of them.
In the combat of Britomart and Artegall, he is overcome by her
beauty, available to him only in her flushed and sweating face, framed by
wisps of hair. Once his phallic sword has fallen from his correspondingly
“slacke” fingers, Britomart’s long-lost nurse Glauce intervenes to persuade Britomart to offer Artegall a truce, which eventually turns out to
be a mutual recognition of love or overwhelming attraction (vi.21). This
enabling truce extends to Scudamour, still the totally conventional bearer
of Cupid’s shield. Glauce salutes Britomart with “seemely belaccoyle” and
here, in effect, is transformed to a figure straight from The Romance of
the Rose who helps the Lover gain access to the Rose, or nubile Woman
(vi.25). This Romance (and its tradition) is another source at once underlying the Temple of Venus and Busirane’s masquers. Not long after these
pronounced inclusions of convention, Britomart accepts the unmasked
Artegall as her future “Lord,” or husband, another glance at conventional,
sociocultural assumptions (vi.41). 94 Recognizing all these as shadows of
the ever present Busiranic forms, I look again to Britomart’s armor, still
encasing her, as the sign of her strength—her virtue—even while her
experience incorporates these reminders of contemporary erotic culture,
including and subordinating them in what could be or become a better
possibility. In this way, the accord of Britomart and Artegall is not simply
a fiction opposed to contemporary culture and denying it. Instead, like
metaphor and allegory, as a form of metaphor, whose “as if ” is and is not,
it doubles what we know and reaches beyond it.95
Any inclusion in the poem of the unreformed sociocultural past,
which remains alive and well in Elizabethan England, brings subversive
ironies and huge future risks, however. Relevantly and realistically, the
concluding stanza of Book IV will reaffirm these, remarking ambivalently of Florimell’s affection for Marinell: “Ne lesse was she in secret hart
affected, / But that she masked it with modestie, / For feare she should
of lightnesse be detected” (xii.35: my emphasis). The specter of Busiranic
form is persistent.
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Reversing Britomart’s Figuration
As earlier indicated, Britomart’s amor, having made its point, has little
import in the rest of Book IV, but Book V is another matter. In this book,
the armor is so undistinctive that Britomart’s pairing with Talus leads
to misrecognition of her armed figure as a substitute—merely a metonym—for Artegall. This new effort to transform her figure and willfully
to unmake its complex wholeness is the more significant insofar as she
does not participate voluntarily in it. To invoke my earlier pun, she does
not per-form it. Instead, her figure is passively subjected to this change.
Still more importantly, this process openly occurs despite her feelings and
intentions. In other words, the poem makes sure that we notice it. It is
as if figure and fated plot, figure and ongoing narrative—for Britomart,
developed character and prophesied marriage—were somehow separate
or separating, as memorably happens at times in Shakespearean drama,
notably in Hamlet, wherein the prince resists his narrative fate, the familiar revenge plot. As William Morse has suggested, one word for such
Shakespearean separation is irony, which might more broadly be glossed
for my purpose as double vision.96
For Britomart, the first stage of this ironic process comes in the
episode of misrecognition by Dolon and his sons, who mistake her for
Artegall mainly because she has the iron man Talus with her. In the second stage, the authoritative priestly interpretation of her experience in Isis
Church (i.e., the Temple of Isis), it comes in an emphatically ideological
simplification of her figural integrity to this point. 97 Whereas in Book
III, Merlin, together with Glauce, could offer the pubescent Britomart a
future beyond herself that purposed her feelings without denying them,
Isis’s chief priest simply displaces them. Britomart, at this stage, is not the
same uninitiated, “vnwares” girl she was early in Book III, and the distance
between her experience in Isis Church and what the priest would make
of it is glaring. A character’s growth has consequences for her author, a
developing creature for her creator, as any reader of Paradise Lost comes to
see with respect to Eve, as well as to Adam and Satan. The more developed
a character is, the harder it is to repurpose or reverse our awareness of her
being.
The first and second stages, Dolon and Isis Church, are further
comparable with respect to Britomart’s armor. In Dolon’s chamber,
Britomart utters an impassioned complaint while fully armored, and, her
helmet only unlaced, in Isis Church nonetheless experiences “troublous
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passion,” “fearfull fright,” and doubtful “dismay,” all of which are justified
by what is happening to her figural integrity, indeed, to her very being. 98
In the Temple, the flames that grow outrageously “vnwares,” along with
the rest of her visionary experience, recapitulate the course of her fearful
fall into love, then her finding and fighting Artegall, his surrender, their
accord, and Merlin’s earlier prophecy of their future progeny, in short her
history through Books III and IV (vii.14–16). Venus and Mars, infolded
and unfolded opposites, her own inside and outside, are not at variance in
the Dolon and Temple episodes, but her mature, composite figure is now
quite at odds with the readings conspicuously imposed on it by others in
the poem. The Merlin ploy, so to speak, is no longer enough. Britomart’s
being is no longer so simple.
The first of these misreaders is the deceitful Dolon, named for a
Trojan spy who betrays his own side, ironically a side from whom the figure of Britomart is descended. The crow of a cock, “The Bird, that warned
Peter of his fall,” right before Dolon activates the would-be entrapping
bed, suggests that Britomart’s figure is experiencing some form, or forms,
of self-betrayal—her jealousy, yes, but much more (vi.27, cf. 25). Who
besides Dolon is betraying her self—Britomart, Artegall, the Spenserian
narrator? Who is unclear, but Dolon is not alone. When Dolon misrecognizes Britomart, the narrator intervenes to let us know what is going
on, but makes a point of telling us that Britomart does not know—“Now
mote ye know (that which to Britomart / Vnknowen was)” (vi.31)—and
that she will never know. He now treats Britomart the way he treated
Guyon at the outset of Book III (i.8), whereas, at that earlier point, in contrast to this one, he respected her figural integrity. Now he seems to want
us to notice that he no longer does. The next day Britomart meets two of
Dolon’s sons, who misrecognize her again and accuse her of killing the
third son, but “Strange were the words in Britomartis eare,” the narrator
tells us, before she summarily dispatches the brothers (38).
Britomart’s next misreader, her third, is Isis’s chief priest, a celibate
ascetic, and his interpretation smothers her richly mythopoeic vision of
sexuality, birth, and death into wooden exegesis and legal-dynastic anodyne. Her fourth reinterpreter will again be the narrator himself, whose
rendering of her final acts in canto vii, the battle with Radigund and its
sequel, produces comparable reduction, then stasis.99 This development
is the final stage of her transformation. If we were to take the effectual
disabling of Britomart’s armor only to signal that her passionate response
to Artegall’s capture is excessive, that she must sacrifice herself to save

Britomart   117

Artegall, or that the figure of Artegall has simply replaced hers through
legal coverture, which could suspend a woman’s “very being”—all readings
to which her figure has been subjected by critics—we would have to overlook the fact that the poet appears to have written her journey precisely to
make us notice this process of denial and suppression and to heighten our
awareness of its ugly cost.100 We might also notice in passing that coverture is absent actual marriage in Britomart’s instance unless it is off stage,
or page—that is, simply not there. We even assume her earlier betrothal,
rather than witnessing it as we do Una’s. Given opposition in Spenser’s
Shepheardes Calender and Mother Hubberds Tale to a marriage by the
queen, the compromising of Britomart’s identity as she travels toward
Artegall adds a political dimension to our awareness of its personal cost.
The poet has had further opportunity over time to reflect on these costs,
and doing so has apparently affected his own awareness. 101 The recurrent
confusion of the queen’s two bodies in the poem has also made the danger
to a woman’s agency, indeed to her “very being,” more threatening.
Britomart’s climactic fight with Radigund reopens the issue of the
armor’s signification with a vengeance. Strikingly, the two women do
not first fight with spears on horseback but on foot with curved swords,
whose semicircularity qualifies their phallic potency. Like “a Tygre and
a Lionesse” fighting to possess the carcass of some prey, they “hack” and
“hew” each other, not sparing their breasts or other “dainty parts,” the
latter a coy phrase even without the whiff of Victorian priggery sensed
by a modern reader (vii.29–30): “so dainty they say maketh derth,” as the
Spenserian sage once wryly forewarned us (I.ii.27). Furious, both women
forget their martial skill and fight to maim and spoil as much as to win.
There is a chaotic, disturbing excess to this battle that is wasteful specifically in sexual and generative terms: blood flows from their sides and
gushes through their armor; they tread “in gore . . . and on the ground
their liues did strow, / Like fruitles seede, of which vntimely death should
grow” (V.vii.31). As the whole encounter suggests, their battle is the
undoing of Mars and Venus, tiger and lionesse, both.102 Like the misrecognitions and misreadings of Britomart’s figure earlier in Book V, battle and
battlers participate in her figure’s undoing. This narrator is now more than
Dolon. He is Busirane, abusing and reversing his own forms.
The blood gushing from multiple wounds blazons Britomart’s vulnerability to Radigund, but it is the blow glancing from Britomart’s shoulder-plate to bite deeply to the bone instead of glancing harmlessly down
her armor that signals most sharply the difference between the present
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encounter and her earlier combat with Artegall. Clearly the armor is now
mere armor, finally and fully drained of its potency and multivalence. Of
all the violations Britomart’s figure receives in The Faerie Queene, this is the
one that seals her figural fate, despite her summary dispatch of Radigund
right after. Redcrosse’s Pyrrhic victories over Error, Sans Foy, and Sans Joy
come analogously and worrisomely to mind.
As the destructive wastefulness of the battle with Radigund has certainly suggested, killing Radigund, Britomart has lost too much of herself. Radegone, the city Radigund has named after herself, is the state of
a selfish woman, enclosed upon itself, a mirror of self-regard. Yet if the
only alternative to it is Britomart’s repeal of the “liberty of women,” this is
also blatantly the repeal of her own figure as we have seen it developing in
earlier books (vii.42).103 In these books, she is self-centered in productive
senses, and she has to be so. Otherwise she is a suit of armor with nothing
at all within it, and certainly not a version of Venus. Like but also unlike
Jove’s brain child Athena, born after the god has swallowed the nymph
Metis, Venus is born from the foamy sea-sperm outside and beyond a male
god: Gaea (Earth) has brought this sea forth of herself; the sperm is that
of castrated Uranus, son and husband of Gaea. “Male and female through
commixture joynd” in this way, Venus quickly becomes a various, multiple,
material other and a distinct form, who will only join Mars as an equal.104
***
When Book IV makes an issue of interpretive readings, it chiefly does so
obliquely through modes and cumulative patterns of meaning. In comparison, Book V makes an outright and eventually blatant issue of such
readings, to be followed in this kind of questioning still more blatantly
and thematically in Book VI. The arch-villain of Book VI, the Blatant
Beast, like his predecessors Ate, Slander, Envy, and Detraction, is ostensibly, at least, a vicious misreader. Put simply, in the interpretive context
of Book V and of the books on either side of it, and especially in that of
the conspicuously imposed misreadings that have accompanied Britomart
to Radegone, I do not trust the narrative voice that tells me Britomart’s
replacement of women’s liberty with their subjection to men is true
justice, “That all they [the women?] as a Goddesse her adoring, / Her
wisedome did admire, and hearkned to her loring” (vii.42). This voice is
similar to, if still more excessive than, that of the priestly interpreter in
the Temple of Isis. It does not belong to the poet of Book IV or Book III.
From the beginning, Book V has more openly than ever before advertised
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its narrator as a persona, himself a mask, now to be trusted, now not, now
within the fiction, now apart from it, as even a casual reading of the fifth
proem makes clear.105 The chaff of this persona’s misreading comes home
in Britomart’s last appearance. Almost nothing is left of her figure, Venus
within Mars, the richly valent figure of Books III and IV.
Although in Book III Merlin prophesied a son for Britomart and
Artegall, the fulfillment of his prophecy defies belief in Book V. Now
alone, Britomart leaves the poem in sorrow and anguish, seeking some
other place, and Artegall, who earlier won the legendary armor of Achilles
and whose name once intimated equality with the legendary Prince Arthur,
rides off at last to become the equal of Arthur, Lord Grey de Wilton, chased
out of Ireland by the Blatant Beast of Envy and Detraction.106 Effectually,
Artegall’s figure enters present time, from which there will be no credible
return to Faerie for him. Protesting his innocence of the charges against
him, he appears just long enough in the restorative Faerie context of Book
VI to pass the baton to Calidore and then, like Britomart, to vanish.
Whether the unnamed “Goddesse” to whom Britomart is assimilated at the end of her mission to subdue the liberty of women should
be imagined as equitable Isis or as wise Minerva hardly matters. In either
case, her divinity offers a substitute for Britomart’s former figural integrity. As earlier in Britomart’s progress through Book V, this assimilative
process is basically metonymic and therefore substitutive, but with a final
difference: the figure of Britomart now cooperates in it.107 Her integrity
bled out of her, so to speak, in the battle with Radigund, the process of her
incremental figuration is finished by being undone. She is immobilized
and effectually outside further narrative process. Now, she is properly statuesque. As a modern film-goer, I am reminded of the startling, disturbing
transformation of a once lively face, that of Cate Blanchett’s Elizabeth I,
into the white grease-paint mask of Elizabeth’s court portraits, the frozen
mask-face on which the camera fixes at the end of Shekhar Kapur’s 1998
depiction of this queen.108
***
Honoring the fact that an epic romance is by virtue of its structure potentially endless, I have two more observations about Britomart’s figure in
The Faerie Queene. I would stress again that the process by which her
figure is reduced is made obvious to us in Book V. It is something that the
Spenserian poet-narrator wants us to see. The only escape from an otherwise enveloping ideology is awareness of it and the agency this awareness
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makes possible. Awareness crucially comes first. This is what Britomart’s
progress through Books III and IV most importantly shows a reader, and
in a different, more disturbing way, Book V does as well. But what is done
to her figure in Book V, the Book of Justice, which by definition has no
respect of persons, subjects her awareness to her function as a vehicle of
merciful redemption for Artegall, after which she is effectually discarded,
like Amoret. In both characterological and allegorical terms, her figure
becomes subject to a changed context, a different surround, another lens,
that of justice. But is this justice? This is the question Book V repeatedly
asks about all its episodes. Again those inconsistent, problematical women
in Shakespeare’s plays also come back into view. In Britomart’s instance,
however, a narrator is openly involved at the end, in addition to a thematized change of context. We might ask what happens to the narrator
or replaces a narrator’s role when shifted to drama, as in the related instances of Shakespeare’s figures of women, and conversely, what happens to
dramatized silence (or silencing) when shifted to narrative. With respect
to The Faerie Queene’s narrative in the books added in 1596, the role of
the narrator, or poet-narrator, which has recurrently been self-reflexive,
becomes outspokenly so regarding the ethics of his own culture. This fact
makes the very end of Britomart’s story, like the silencing of women at the
end of Shakespeare plays, even more troubling. This could be precisely its
point.

Chapter 4

Phantasies, Pains, and Punishments:
A Still-Moving Coda

T

he main title of this chapter comes from the end of Busirane’s
pageant, where the narrator describes the “many moe like maladies”
that he can neither count nor name, “So many moe, as there be phantasies
/ In wauering wemens witt, that none can tell, / Or paines in loue, or punishments in hell.”1 All these march in symbolic attire and accoutrements—
“in masking wise”—as did the pairs that the narrator earlier named. They
include mind-made and emotional disorders and their consequences.
Moving from Spenser’s major figures of women in The Faerie Queene, namely
Una, Belphoebe, Britomart, and, to a related extent, Amoret and Florimell,
to the rest, I newly appreciate the narrator’s sense of inadequacy. The rest
at this point seem endless. Writing in the early 1960s, Anne Paolucci compared Dante’s women in The Divine Comedy to Spenser’s in The Faerie
Queene; her work was not published until 2005.2 It includes brief chapters
on the “Spectrum of Female Types,” “Dress and Physical Features,” “General
Properties,” “Techniques of Characterization” (figurative language, parallels, and the like), and, finally, “Allegorical Significance.” Paolucci’s book is
relatively short and, in the main, her approach is general and taxonomic.
Other, more recently conceived approaches, many included in my text and
notes to this point, have valuably and more narrowly focused on a single
topic or on one or more aspects of the women in Spenser’s poem, such
as Amazons or erotic politics, as well as on selected episodes, such as the
initial portrait of Belphoebe or the Marriage of Rivers.3 For the purpose
of this final chapter, an approach between the all-inclusive and the highly
selective looks like the best option. I derive it from my preceding chapters.
In them, a recurrent drumbeat has been the opposition or the paradoxical conjuncture of stillness and movement, constancy and change.
Negatively, in further expansion of these terms, stillness suggests fixation
and death; positively, it suggests inclusion, for example as conceptualization and lyric sublation (cancelation, continuity, and transcendence, each
of which is partial). Movement positively suggests life, temporal develop-
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ment, and narrative; negatively, it suggests instability, shapelessness, inconstancy: in the Mutabilitie Cantos, “all that moueth, doth mutation loue,”
a resonant line that plays on the Renaissance commonplace that whatever lives moves and therefore changes (VII.vii.55). Stillness and movement hardly constitute the only binary relevant to figuration in The Faerie
Queene, but they are a recurrent one, as noted, for example, in the description of Florimell “Still as she fledd,” which anticipates the focal punning
on still movement, “still moouing,” in the Mutabilitie Cantos, as well as
elsewhere in Spenser and other poets of the period, such as Jonson and
Shakespeare (VII.vii.13).4 Cosmic love and hate, attraction and repulsion,
centripetal and centrifugal forces, for instance, are variations of another
relevant binary, one that bears on the decisive battle between Britomart
and Artegall in Book IV, yet this binary has proved less useful to my specific concern with the figurations of women that remain to be considered
than has the relation of stillness and movement.
Among these are Duessa, Hellenore, Aemylia and Poeana, and
Mirabella and Serena, most importantly this last pair in Book VI. As earlier suggested, it is in Serena’s story, intersecting with Mirabella’s, that the
twinned stories of Amoret and Belphoebe both recognizably reappear and
change profoundly. This recurrence involves a substantial refiguration—
stillness and movement for each—that entails a new identity, as their new
names in Book VI unmistakably indicate within this poem. The identity
of each figure becomes at once more affective and more personal, signaling as well the Spenserian poet-narrator’s sympathy for each. Deferring
these refigurations until the present chapter, rather than trying to treat
them in Belphoebe’s, has respected the unfolding of Spenser’s narrative
and the crucial temporality of its movement, indeed, its still movement, in
The Faerie Queene. This is a movement that includes sameness and difference, still points and changes, a memorable past and a present newness. It
realizes a developing process of creative thought and exploration. Before
turning to Serena and Mirabella, however, I want to account in a general
way for the numerous figures of women I do not treat in detail and thereby
at least to gesture toward the taxonomy that Paolucci offers. Stillness and
movement are my organizing principles in what follows, or, more exactly,
still movement is.
***
Figures of women found in a single location and condition in The Faerie
Queene are situated—placed—in both these senses. They may move

Phantasies, Pains, and Punishments   123

within their site but not beyond it: Alma moves within the body, for
example, and Lucifera moves from her throne to a coach for a drive around
her estate. Coelia’s movement within the House of Holiness is implicit
in the other figures dwelling there. This situated sort of figure is the
good or evil genius presiding over a place: Lucifera, Coelia, Medina,
Alma, Acrasia, Malecasta, Isis, Radigund, Mercilla, and, together,
Nature and Mutability, who share Arlo Hill.5 That the presiding figure
in these rhetorical places, or cultural topoi, is a womanly figure is largely
conventional, although the figures of Acrasia and Malecasta also have
a specifically sexual and gendered charge, as do the figures of Radigund
and Isis. Given that a queen reigned from the English throne for nearly
the entirety of Spenser’s lifetime, we generally recognize that many of
the presiding figures glance at her in some way: for example, the maiden
Queen Lucifera as a warning, and Queen Mercilla, her throne embossed with the royal arms of England, as a more direct representation.
Radig und, Acrasia, and others have also been thought to allude
to her.6
Acrasia, whose seductive figure occurs at the end of Book II, which,
excepting only Amavia, otherwise features strumpets and virgins, has
proved the most engaging and challenging of these figures of women for
contemporary readers. Her figure is central to questions of sex and gender
in The Faerie Queene. Accordingly, although I have treated her and her
Bower of Bliss elsewhere in detail, I want to pause over her image at least
in a truncated version here, before returning to further enumerations and
distinctions.7 My pause starts with the second view of Acrasia that readers
get. This view begins where the first left off, with the captivated Verdant’s
“sleepie head” softly positioned in her lap, following sexual intercourse.
(II.xii.76). The stanzas describing her, this time without intrusive moralizing, speak affectively and effectively for themselues:
Vpon a bed of Roses she was layd,
As faint through heat, or dight to pleasant sin,
And was arayd, or rather disarayd,
All in a vele of silke and siluer thin,
That hid no whit her alabaster skin,
But rather shewd more white, if more might bee:
More subtile web Arachne cannot spin,
Nor the fine nets, which oft we wouen see,
Of scorched deaw, do not in th’ayre more lightly flee.
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Her snowy brest was bare to ready spoyle
Of hungry eies, which n’ote therewith be fild,
And yet through languour of her late sweet toyle,
Few drops, more cleare then Nectar, forth distild,
That like pure Orient perles adowne it trild,
And her faire eyes sweet smyling in delight,
Moystened their fierie beames, with which she thrild
Fraile harts, yet quenched not; like starry light
Which sparckling on the silent waues, does seeme more
                   bright.
(II.xii.77–78)

The audible attraction of the words and rhythm in these lines, reinforced
by visual, tactile, and other sensuous and associative suggestions, is amazing. Like the word “crime” at the end of the Song of the Rose in Acrasia’s
Bower, the word “sin,” rhyming with “thin,” “skin,” and “spin,” is barely
distinguished in this context.8 By the outset of the second stanza, it has
effectually been forgotten, and, if we actually read and listen without
presuming misogyny, the narrator sounds as eager to enjoy this “snowy
brest” as either to scorn “hungry eies” that greedily seek “spoyle” or to
decry Acrasia’s readiness. The appeal of the stanzas exceeds sharply defined barriers of gender and other rational determinants. At moments,
the landscapes and soundscapes of Acrasia’s Bower, which further express
her, evoke a sense of wondrous pleasure that together with her own image
has often been likened to the description of Shakespeare’s Cleopatra at
Cydnus (and elsewhere), who, where “Other women cloy / The appetites
they feed, . . . makes hungry / Where most she satisfies.9
Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of the image, primarily the painted
image but also the literary one, is here suggestive for its use of such terms
as reflection, or mere mirroring; of form as essential surface and force, and
of affective participation and contagion. Nancy observes that, “Even when
the image is mimetic, it must fundamentally by itself and for itself, count
for more than an image; otherwise, it will tend toward being nothing but
a shadow or a reflection [a mirroring ].” For Nancy, who addresses both
Renaissance and modern images, the “mimesis [of the image] encompasses
methexis, a participation or a contagion through which the image seizes
us.” The surface of the image is “Not an ‘idea’ (idea or eidolon), which is an
intelligible form, but a force that forces form to touch itself.”10 Similarly,
an image in allegory Acrasia may be, but, as image, she, like her garden,
nonetheless exceeds and surpasses rationality, or even intelligibility, alone.
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That an image in an allegory of temperance should do so is in some way a
greater expression of artistic power than that one less morally contextualized should. Acrasia’s image compels participation—perhaps contagion—
and serves to suggest the power Spenser’s situated figures of women can
project.
Acrasia’s veil, spun as subtly as, or even more subtly than, a web by
Arachne, suggests arachnidan entrapment, of course, but as a woven fabric,
or text (Latin textum: “web, fabric, text”), it also associates Acrasia with
Book II’s Palmer, since he, like her—or is it she like him?—is a fabricator,
a maker of nets, and, elsewhere in Book II, a spinner of landscapes and
stories. In short, Acrasia, like the Palmer and also like the Spenserian poet,
is an artist.11 Ovid’s Arachne, last discussed as a presence in Busirane’s tapestry and here implicit in Acrasia’s art, is a woman bold (too bold as her
tale eventuates) in protesting the violent excesses of the gods’ passions and
one whose protest is depicted with positive sympathy and possible ambivalence by the male Roman poet.12 As Ovid depicts Arachne’s weaving, it
is deeply subversive, and reference to it in describing Acrasia conveys this
suggestion as well. Arachne’s eyes gaze defiantly, intertextually back from
her image, and, whether they are beside or within Acrasia’s, they are ostensibly, disturbingly those of a woman for viewers with eyes to see them.
Like the figures in Busirane’s pageant, including his figuration of Amoret,
and like Leda in his tapestry, Acrasia can be read from both a man’s and
a woman’s point of view, and appropriately so, insofar as she inhabits a
cultural site.
Listing the major, situated figures of women, and illustrating the
potency of their roles by its most powerful example, Acrasia, I have set
aside the figure of Venus in the Garden and Temple of Books III and IV,
respectively, first because Venus is a mythic goddess and second because,
in Book III, her avatar is seen outside as well as inside the Garden, of
which Adonis, not she, is the eponymous figure. 13 In the Temple, Venus
is a statue, albeit one to whom Scudamour attributes sexes, gender, assent,
and thus animation; her spirit certainly animates the place. Isis is a goddess and a statue, too, and perhaps I should have set her aside with Venus,
but the historical origin (among others) that Plutarch attributes to her
was well known in Spenser’s time, and her relation to Britomart leads
me to keep her within my present list. A sea nymph, such as Cymoent,
and Chrysogonee, daughter of a faerie, belong to another order of figural
being—earthly and natural, yet nonetheless mythic. My concern in this
chapter is primarily with more distinctly human figures.
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Reviewing my list of the major, situated figures of women to this
point, and excepting traditional figures of myth, I note that the romance
Books, III, IV, and VI, do not have as pronounced a centering figure of
this type or as many of these as to be found in Books I, II, and V. In the
romance books, the womanly figure (or figures) is less centripetal and contained (in both senses), another suggestive change reflecting the romance
form. In these books, the extremes of woman on a pedestal or in the
brothel, woman as either virgin or strumpet, are likewise loosened. In the
Renaissance, romance was traditionally and not surprisingly associated
with women as readers. Of course, there are additional, minor Spenserian
instances of womanly figures who remain in a single location and condition, such as Corceca (and her daughter) and the witch and her son
(another incidental alignment of Una’s experiences with Florimell’s). Also
memorably situated are Amavia, Phaedria, Slander, Poeana, Lady Munera,
and Briana, the last together with a number of other figures of women in
Book VI. As here, my examples are exemplary rather than exhaustive, and
my groupings include localized figures in other respects quite disparate.14
A poem as massive and various as Spenser’s invites provisional groupings
that attend to differences and exceptions, while resisting tight categorization.
Most often, the quest of a protagonist leads into the houses, or situations, of centering woman-figures such as Lucifera, Coelia, Alma, and
Acrasia, and the condition encountered there bears in some way on the
quest itself. That is, the landscape of quest effectually includes these places,
even while they are set apart from it, and the resident woman-figure who
presides over each place is for a time (or time-out) its focal expression.
But it is the visitor who is changed, informed, tempted, initiated, imperiled, or otherwise affected, not the tutelary denizen of the place or topos.
Even the capture of Acrasia or the death of Radigund effects no change
in what either figurally is, although it violently arrests the former’s spell
and it claims, at great cost, to eliminate the latter’s injustice. The presiding figure is basically fixed and isomorphic with her location, whether
she is good or evil, whether she is depicted with psychic depth like the
glittering, discontented, joyless Lucifera, beneath whose House is a hell,
or whether she is depicted more simply like the bead-bidding, physically
aged yet spiritually joyful Coelia.15 She might be fascinating for imagistic,
historical, theological, or other sociocultural reasons, but not primarily
in herself, so to speak. That is, not primarily as a person with her own
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story, or narrative. This difference strikes me again as important, and it is a
narrative difference, as the preceding chapters have shown.
***
Other Spenserian figures of women besides the major ones move into different places and contexts, and at least one, Duessa, has a role in four different books: I, II, IV, and V. She is Arthur’s nearest competitor in this respect. Like Acrasia’s, her womanly figure, the radical enemy of Una’s figure,
as treated in chapter 1, asks for additional attention. Duessa’s thematic
and historical manifestations change in the course of the poem, but she
remains at bottom the same—fundamentally wicked and duplicitous, in
this regard a constant that is minimally affected by her changing situations.
(Compare Belphoebe’s more virtuous fixation?) If Duessa’s condition is
still moving, it is so in a perverse sense. Movement and stillness are for her
little more than illusions, as they are for her sidekick in Book IV, namely
Ate, or hellish discord, “raised,” presumably by Duessa, “from below / Out
of the dwellings of the damned sprights” (IV.i.19). Like the walking dead
in Busirane’s pageant and the “carcas dead” of False Florimell, neither
Duessa nor Ate is capable of changing. Theirs is a negative life that feeds
on the living like a necrotic disease, thus realizing the traditional sense of
evil as negation. This is why Duessa pleads for Redcrosse’s life in Book I
when Orgoglio threatens to destroy him (vii.14): she needs him to live.
Like Archimago, Duessa assumes various guises in the poem, some comic,
others debatably so, but none leads to good. Evil lacks dignity—human
worth, as defined in chapter 1. It is fissiparous, seeking incoherence, formlessness, disorder, cosmic hatred, dis-creation as its end and, in personified
form, doing so on purpose. (As Milton discovered in Paradise Lost, the
sense in which Evil, literally the personified abstraction Satan slips into, is
free remains at best a knotty conundrum.) Unmasked in Book I, Duessa is
monstrous, and her escape into the wilderness recalls her earlier passage in
Night’s chariot to Hell, via a parodic allusion to the wooded entrance into
the Aeneid’s underworld—in the traditional interpretation, thus entering
the nether world through matter (hyle, silva).16 Although she returns to
the poem in various guises thereafter, she remains fundamentally wicked
and duplicitous, Duo-esse.
The last of Duessa’s appearances, which occurs in Mercilla’s court
in Book V, might appear to challenge her figuration in the first two and
fourth books, though I doubt it.17 Her figure participates in the vexed
problem of justice that Book V explores. In the episode at issue, the figure
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of Mercilla barely, only nominally, masks reference to the living Queen
Elizabeth, as do Duessa to Mary Stuart and Duessa’s trial to Mary’s. To say
that this episode has been much discussed would be an understatement;
the poem makes the issues involved in the trial unavoidable.18 The problem is that Duessa’s figuration comes too close to history, bringing with it
the complexities of human life and justice in a real-life world. At the same
time, her figure, nominally a fictional one, has become oddly attenuated—
again hardly more than a name—and effectually abstracted from movement, as well as subjected to one near-bodiless abstraction after another:
Zeal, Kingdom’s Care, Authority, Religion, Pity, Regard of Womanhead,
Danger, Nobility, Grief. Even Ate is now said to testify against Duessa/
Mary, her brief testimony suggesting that of a co-conspirator turned witness for the prosecution and furthering the discord on which she thrives.
Ate, like Duessa, has a body to match her intent, a “lying tongue . . . in two
parts diuided” and feet that simultaneously move in opposite directions,
one going backwards, one forwards (IV.i.27). Reminding us of Duessa’s
misdeeds in earlier books, the narrator makes specific mention of Ate’s
mischief in Book IV, where this hag was introduced into the action by
Duessa, raised from hell as we heard.19 Ate’s testimony adds another flurry
of charges, this time including several more personal ones—Incontinence,
Adultery, and Impiety, along with Murder and Sedition. Seemingly a collective noun for all social, political, and personal ills and thus a common
name, Duessa has little other figural substance in Book V. She remains
wicked and duplicitous, nominally figured still as a woman, even while
her figuration signals, not to say screams, that something is wrong here,
perhaps in this way also figuring the voice of the poet whose tongue is
nailed to a post at the very entrance to Mercilla’s court. If so, the poet has
effectually, startlingly become another cross-gendered figure in this same
episode, as well as a self-reflexive one.
Joan Copjec offers a Lacanian description of Vergil’s Fama (rumor
or report) as a paranoid image of the dismembered body that casts a suggestive light on Spenser’s silenced and immobilized poet and its self-reflexive cross-gendering. This paranoid image of dismemberment “appears at
a point where the narration has reason to doubt its own omniscience, its
own position as source of knowledge”; it is at this point that “a cry [in
the form of Fama] is torn from the throat of the narrative which [forcefully] reattaches it to the events of the world.”20 Like Fama, Spenser’s poet,
tongue nailed to a post, can be seen as “a “hypostasized image of speech,
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an intrusion that is simultaneously the very substance of the narrative”—
indeed, in my terms, its own self-reflexive commentary (44).
This silenced, immobilized poet, dubbed Malfont, inescapably
recalls the figure of another womanly figure in Book V, Lady Munera,
whose hands and feet are nailed to a post to become an emblem of the brutal miscarriage of true justice. Munera is duplicitous in more than a moral
sense, her figure being double-sided and having, with utter equivocation,
hands and feet of precious metal or else of human flesh, that is, figurative or real ones.21 In Book V, Duessa, the very agent of division, similarly
lacks figural integrity in a way she earlier did not. Earlier, she was herself
single-mindedly wicked and divisive, with a monstrously misshapen body,
once she is unmasked in Book I, to match her evil intent. Nominally, in
her final appearance in Mercilla’s court, she has a past in the poem that
her name signals, but her attenuated, nigh-bodiless, abstracted presence
explicitly, overwhelmingly also signals her dubiously just transfiguration
into a woman once actually living—Mary Stuart. As in the episode involving Artegall and Burbon, which soon follows the trial of Duessa/Mary,
here Faerie fiction temporarily collapses into history.22 (A Spenserian pun
on the derivation of temporarily from tempus, “time,” is welcome.)
Aside from Duessa, the more interesting figures in the mobile
grouping of relatively minor figures of women are those with some degree
of movement within a canto or between cantos within a single book.
Although lacking the prominence of the mobile figures of women treated
in my first three chapters, who either play a central role in one book or
play significant roles in several books or do both, such figures are more
than features of the landscape and often are problematical or puzzling
with respect to it. They appear after the tightly structured Books I and
II and especially in the books with romance structures. Among them are
Pastorella, Aemylia, Mirabella, and Serena, on the four of whom I will
spend the rest of this chapter. Each of them has narrative life—a story. I
shall consider Hellenore here as well, in part for lack of somewhere else
to put her and also in part because her husband Malbecco usually gets all
the coverage, despite the fact that she, too, has a notable story.23 She is also
thematically relevant.
Malbecco becomes a fixated form, Hellenore a form of natural
mutability. Curiously, only Una and Hellenore get to spend time in the
woods with satyrs. Both episodes are comic, one high, the other low, and
both also celebrate nature. In Una’s experience, this is mainly kindness
conceived as generosity, in Hellenore’s as hyperbolized sexuality—merely
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animal as portrayed, but also vital, alive by contrast with Malbecco’s fixated fate as Jealousy, and, indeed, a kind of energeia. Instead of expressing
surprise at the relatively sympathetic, if also ironic, tone of the narrator’s
treatment of Hellenore, we might look at Spenser’s fabliaux elements in
Book III through a Chaucerian rather than a Victorian lens and see this
tone for what it is. As his narrator comically remarks of Hellenore, “not
for nought” she “loued [the satyrs] so well / When one so oft a night did
ring his matins bell” (III.x.48). The punning, bawdy, double negative is
tonally telling, as is that irreverent moment of sacred parody in the matins bell. Hellenore’s mobility and mutability enable her escape from what
Malbecco is: an unnatural, frozen, deathly being, comparable to the figure
of Despair in Book I, as well as to Busirane’s masquers. When Hellenore
chooses (“chose”) “emongst the iolly Satyres still to wonne,” she freely and
parodically embraces a form of still movement—always (still) moving—
but a vital, living one in this instance (x.51).
In chapter two, in connection with Amoret, I described Aemylia
and Poeana, both found in Book IV, as morally compromised figures insofar as they have been marked by lust. The look-alike squires they are to
marry are similarly marked, although one of them is lustful, gigolowise; he
is so on behalf of friendship in order to free his look-alike from the dungeon of Corflambo, another figure of lust, who has separately seized the
imprisoned look-alike, namely, Aemylia’s lover. But this is multi-figured
romance, and I get ahead of the complicated story. Aemylia, daughter of a
“Lord of high degree,” encounters Amoret in the cave of Lust and tells her
how she was seized by this cave-creature when she attempted, against her
father’s and “all her friends” wishes, to meet her lover Amyas, a squire of
low degree, and “away to flit” with him (IV.vii.16–17). Hardly by coincidence, this failed tryst happened the same night Corflambo seized Amyas,
before the actualization of the lovers’ tryst and apparently as a substitute
for it. The rest of Aemylia’s story includes her rescue, in sequential order,
as a result of Amoret’s flight from Lust, Belphoebe’s killing this cave-creature, Arthur’s aiding the abandoned Aemylia and Amoret in the forest
and his night with these two women and Slander, then Arthur’s killing
Corflambo, and finally Aemylia’s happy reunion with her lover Amyas.
This reunion apparently countenances Aemylia’s violation of her father’s
and friends’ wishes, although only after hardships and the death of mutual
lust (the figures Lust and Corflambo).24 Viewed in this light, so far the
story of Aemylia and Amyas bears witness at once to suffering and to
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reform, that is, to change for the better. In this respect, it looks ahead to
Book VI.
Yet the imprisoned Amyas, whom Poeana wants as her lover, has
already granted her wishes, though coldly, we hear, in the hope of winning his freedom. He is only freed, however, when Placydas, his lookalike friend, intervenes, an effort that unexpectedly leads to the death
of Corflambo at Arthur’s hands and then to the liberation of his castle.
Again, I am ahead of the story and need to fill in the parts of Poeana
and Placydas, as I shall after pausing to offer a mnemonic assist with the
confusion of names and roles in this foursome. That it is needed (as I
hope by now to have demonstrated) strategically underscores the extent
to which they are relatively attenuated figures, simple in striking contrast
to Una, Belphoebe, and especially Britomart. The foursome’s tangled
story is a bare exemplum, so much so as to enable a reader to recognize
that it actually parodies the interlaced complications of the romance
form, even as it accentuates sociable interlinkages in this, the Book of
Friendship.
Conveniently, the alliterating A-names, the coupled Aemylia
and Amyas, both phonically suggest love and friendship, Latin amo and
French ami, and the P-names, Poeana and Placydas, also go together. The
latter two suggest Latin poeana, “punishment, satisfaction” on the one
hand and, on the other, Latin placeo, “to please, satisfy.” In short, together
the P-names signal pain and pleasure. A. C. Hamilton notices that, twice
in the 1596 edition, Poeana’s name is later spelled “Paeana,” from paean,
“a shout of joy,” and he takes the new spelling to reflect her changed condition—in my terms, formerly pain but now pleasure for both lovers
(473n49.4–7). Hamilton also takes Poeana’s punishment as the pain and
grief of her rejection, that is, as the coldness of the love, or rather lust, that
Amyas nonetheless grants her.25 But it might better refer to the death of
her father and her surrender of control to Placydas in the end, and I take it
to do so. She pays for her pleasure.
Placydas, having learned of his friend Amyas’s imprisonment by
Corflambo and his daughter, manages to insert himself into the prison and
to pose as his look-alike friend. Coming to Poeana without the restraint
of a former erotic commitment to another woman, he satisfies her lust
and eventually abducts the keeper of the keys to her prison, absconding
with both keeper and keys. This is the point at which Corflambo, Poeana’s
father, follows in wrathful pursuit, meets Arthur, and is duly beheaded.
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Poeana’s castle is then liberated through a ruse, the requisite scene of recognition occurs, and Placydas accepts Poeana “to his wedded wife,” along
with “all her land and lordship during life” (ix.15). The happy foursome,
Amyas, Aemylia, Placydas, and Poeana, all formerly lustful and all now
reformed, look like a parodic, more imperfect, and arguably more human
version of the idealized foursome Canacee, Triamond, Campbell, and
Cambina met earlier in the same book (IV).
Substitution, extending even to the old woman’s substituting for
Aemylia in the cave of Lust, is so conspicuous in the story of the present
foursome as to become itself an issue, as Jonathan Goldberg noticed long
since.26 Perhaps through substitution with Aemylia, Poeana, whose two
names (Poeana, Paeana) fit Aemylia’s story along with her own, might
also be considered a mobile figure: even though Poeana remains in her
castle, her father extends their range outside it, and, far more significant,
she reforms, even getting a new name or at least a meaningful new spelling of her old name, as if she had actually changed her location together
with her condition. 27 This would be yet another strange variant of still
movement, one that complements Aemylia’s and Amyas’s constancy in the
course of changed locations.
Yet, with all this substituting, it is remarkable that Aemylia does
not for a moment take Placydas for Amyas when she first sees him. She
recognizes Placydas as Amyas’s friend: embracing him, she inquires, “And
liues yet Amyas?” to which Placydas immediately responds in the third
person as well, “He liues . . . and his Aemylia loues” (viii.63). Continuing
the same stanza, she replies, after reference to her own trials, in the present
tense, “what mishap thus long him fro my selfe remoues?” and Placydas
again recounts the tale of his effort to free Amyas that he has already told
Arthur. (That he has already done so further enforces our awareness that
he is Placydas.) Only Poeana, her perception weakened by lust, is wholly
fooled by the look-alike squires, as is Lust in the dark cave by the old
woman. Evidently, likeness is not identity, and difference still matters,
except to Lust. But the more significant takeaway in the present story is
the possibility of reform among the compromised and fallen, apparently
after or through suffering of some sort. Amoret alone seems excluded (by
Belphoebe) from this ethic of forgiveness in Book IV. She escapes Lust’s
cave only to be actually wounded by Lust.
In Book VI, Serena’s story, which resonates variously and recurrently
with Amoret’s, spans six cantos (iii–viii) and overlaps with Mirabella’s
in two of these (vii–viii, although Mirabella is briefly mentioned in vi).
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Mirabella’s story resonates at first distantly and then more closely with
that of Belphoebe, as it alludes unmistakably to the reigning queen.
Notably, Belphoebe and Mirabella even share part of their names, Bel/
bella (beautiful, beauty). Both Serena’s and Mirabella’s stories also concern
choice, fortune, and responsibility, which are interlocked thematically
throughout Book VI, and thereby they serve to introduce the more localized stories of Melibee and Pastorella in cantos ix–x (and with a difference
in cantos xi–xii).28 Agency is a major theme in Book VI, and Serena’s and
Mirabella’s participation in it goes a long way emotionally to deepen and
personalize their figures, especially Serena’s.
Synoptically, Serena moves from dalliance with Calepine, to the
venomous bite of the Blatant Beast, to rescue by the Salvage Man, to a
second rescue by Arthur and then, together only with Timias, to ministration by the old hermit. Later, she flees the prospect of Mirabella, her
torturers, and their captives, now including Timias, and finally, she is captured by cannibals, from whom Calepine saves her, if anyone really can.
This overview makes a point: no other character in The Faerie Queene has
a story that less fits her name than does Serena (from Latin serenus/-a,
“fair, serene,” usually in reference to the weather, but tropologically, “glad,
joyous, tranquil”). Serena keeps moving from one location to another,
apparently constant to Calepine, although her stillness in this respect is
not emphasized to the extent that his is. Whereas he searches actively for
her, she seems only to move from place to place. What comes to the fore
is her constant misery and finally her total lack of serenity, which looks
as much like self-cancellation as does Turpine’s total ignominy—his ultimate namelessness (< Latin in, “not,” and nomen/-inis, “name”)—his fate
of inverted, degraded, dis-figured knighthood in this same book. Further
pertinent to self-cancellation is Timias’s shaming, or loss of honor (Greek
timē, “honor,” “dignity,” “worth”), the source of his name, at the hands of
Mirabella’s tormentors.29 His having caused, if accidentally, the wounding
of Amoret by Lust in Book IV might be seen in this loss to catch up with
him.
Defeat of the Blatant Beast is the objective of the nominal protagonist of Book VI, Calidore, knight of Courtesy. This Beast serves Envy and
Detraction; he specifically wounds human names, that is, human identity
and dignity, thus specifically human being : no other kind of wound “so
sore doth light, / As doth the poysnous sting, which infamy / Infixeth
in the name of noble wight” (VI.vi.i). Names, though not always in the
same way, have been highly significant throughout the poem. Serena’s
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story, which meaningfully intersects with those of multiple others in
Book VI—Calidore, Turpine, the Salvage Man, Arthur, the hermit, Timias,
Mirabella, the cannibals, and, of course, her lover Calepine and the
Blatant Beast30—also presses and probes hard questions about the relation of responsibility to fortune and of agency to suffering and in doing
so bears some relation, not only to Amoret’s story, but also to Florimell’s,
as remarked on several occasions in chapter 1. Serena’s story presses this
relation to a degree and an extent that Florimell’s does not in Books III
and IV, however.
Spanning six cantos in Book VI, Serena’s story indicates a thematic importance at once continuous and developing that is not usually
attributed to her figure. Converting it into economic, colonial, political, religious, and other ideological dimensions in selected incidents can
be illuminating (and has been), but tropicality, especially discontinuous
tropicality, cannot replace or displace her figural basis, which is distinctly
that of a woman and which I mean to reaffirm.31 At its most pronounced,
such tropic conversion itself becomes the cancelation of her own identity
as a womanly figure. Ironically, with the destruction of her serenity, this
has proved, not surprisingly, indeed her fate. In her figure, the violence of
tropic extremity finally takes over. Although I do not share the view that
allegory is ipso facto violent, its abuse can be.32 The Faerie Queene examines and brutally exposes this fact—this catachrestic, Busiranic allegory—
in the story of Serena, as it does less affectively and complexly in the trial
of Duessa/Mary Stuart. Significantly, this fuller exposure occurs in Book
VI, not in earlier books and certainly not in Book I, in which the dominant figure of a woman is Una, or even in the relatively more symbolic
and sublated—artistic and civilized—horrors of Busirane in Book III, in
which the dominant figure is Britomart. Book VI, whose arch-villain is a
blatant and beastly misuser of language, is still more fundamentally and
insistently about words, names, interpretations, and poetic forms, and
Serena is its major figure of a woman.
If Serena’s trials are not treated in detail, as they regularly are not,
what matters in her story, which is also the story of her figuration, gets
lost. What follows will accordingly be detailed. Serena’s trials begin when
Calidore happens upon her together with Calepine, enjoying “their quiet
loues delight” in the shade of a covert (VI.iii.21). Mutual abashment overcome, the two knights pleasure themselves with knight-talk, and Serena,
both shut out of the conversation and
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Allur’d with myldnesse of the gentle wether
And pleasaunce of the place, the which was dight
With diuers flowres distinct with rare delight,
Wandred about the fields, as liking led
Her wauering lust after her wandering sight,
To make a garland to adorne her hed,
Without suspect of ill or daungers hidden dred.
(VI.iii.23)

This is the point at which the Blatant Beast catches her “vnaware . . . thus
loosely wandring here and there” (24). Even without the last five words of
narrative commentary, which feature the third use of wander within seven
lines, now modified by the adverb “loosely,” Serena’s aimless movement,
led only by her fluctuating, wavelike pleasure, is clearly narrated as too
heedless for so pleasurable a place, a locus amoenus and implicitly an idyllically pastoral one to boot. Her occupying herself with her own adornment, a garland of flowers for her head, mindless of danger the while, is
as ominous a note as the distance beat of approaching danger heard in a
melodrama. The culling of flowers is a common figure of “proper choice.”33
Yet the “myldnesse of the gentle wether” is naturally alluring to her precisely because she is Serena, “fair, serene,” usually in reference to mild and
gentle weather and, tropically, to a condition of gladness, joy, tranquility. She is where she naturally belongs, allured by nature herself, here the
springlike weather. Her “lust,” which ranges in meaning from “pleasure,
to delight, to desire,” is hardly unnatural or wicked, and (pace Hamilton),
she is not seized and wounded simply by monstrous Lust, as Amoret was,
but by the vicious mouth of the Blatant Beast, a venomous attack from
without. The Beast’s venom soon spreads within, however, going beyond
the vicious social offense of gossip or slander that first wounds Serena, to
eat away at her self-respect—her self-worth, as we took to calling it in the
twentieth century, according to the OED.
Later in this same book, Melibee will spend “all the night in siluer
sleepe” and attend all day to whatever he pleases, to what he “listes,” that
is, “lustes” in a variant spelling ; carelessly, he will also lay his “limbes in
euery shade . . . And drinke of euery brooke” (ix.22–23). The vulnerability
of either figure, Serena or Melibee, a woman or a man, results from selfindulgent imprudence, once we accept an invitation to read allegorically
and, more exactly here, morally: prudence is a cardinal virtue. In Serena’s
instance, however, the failing is far less deliberated and less willful than
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in Melibee’s. 34 She appears to be young and is certainly “vnaware” and
inexperienced, as we have been told. Moreover, Serena’s plight implicates
Calepine’s inattentive thoughtlessness as much as her own. Calepine and
Calidore are discourteous in their self-centered knight-talk, and the result,
exceeding any offense, is the serious wounding of the vulnerable Serena,
Crying aloud in vaine, to shew her sad misfare
Vnto the Knights, and calling oft for ayde,
Who with the horrour of her haplesse care
Hastily starting vp, like men dismayd,
Ran after fast to reskue the distressed mayde.
(VI.iii.24)

The rhyming play on “mayde” in the last two of these lines mocks the
knights’ manhood, their humiliating failure to protect a vulnerable
woman, and the rhyme word “misfare” virtually becomes Serena’s motto
from this time forward. From a prefix meaning “badly, mistakenly, amiss”
and a noun (or verb) meaning “journey,” misfare is “The action or process of going wrong or astray; a mishap, misfortune, ill-fate.”35 Hamilton
glosses the phrase “haplesse care” in the same passage simply as “trouble,”
but “haplesse” more likely means “unfortunate,” a meaning that evokes the
word “fortune,” which, as we know, together with responsibility, is thematic in this book; besides “trouble,” “care” indicates “mental suffering,
sorrow, grief.”36 In passing, I note again that Serena is here a “mayde,” her
dalliance with Calepine notwithstanding. Indeed, the Beast’s intention is
to drag her into the woods and to “spoyl” her, that is, “to destroy, injure
bodily, ravish,” or otherwise “violate” her. 37 The instability of figurative
and physical dimensions in her plight is conspicuous. They are coextensive. The Beast’s malice endangers her whole being.
Having forced the Beast to drop his victim, Calidore pursues
him, disappearing from sight until canto ix, and the story of Calepine
and Serena, now together, now apart, becomes the Book’s major thread.
Calepine, on foot, with the badly wounded Serena on his horse—imagined in silhouette, the three an emblem of passion’s wound—seeks assistance and shelter from Turpine, who first denies these and then assaults
and seriously wounds the unmounted, disadvantaged knightly protector
of the wounded Serena.38 At this point, the Salvage Man, another figure of
natural compassion, appears, chases Turpine off, and takes the wounded
knight and lady to his forest dwelling in a “gloomy shade” (iv.13). Under
the kindly Salvage Man’s care, Calepine recovers, but the Salvage finds no
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herb able to heal Serena’s wound, “for it was inwardly vnsound” (iv.16).
The Beast’s bite is venomous, but again, as with Serena’s wandering and
wavering through the flowery fields, a persistent intimation of immorality, this time present in that single word “inwardly,” is becoming harder
to escape. Or is it just easier to hear a second time? Has the process of
reading itself been affected? Could the Beast’s poison be spreading? In the
opening episode of The Faerie Queene, it was the maple tree that was “seldom inward sound,” phrasing whose signal of corruption few readers miss
(I.i.9). In poetry that is incredibly self-conscious, the Beast’s bite is affecting the figuration of Serena and simultaneously our reading of it. This
development exceeds the impact of history on the triangle of Belphoebe,
Amoret, and Timias in Book IV because it comes from within the poem
itself. It now does so noticeably, moreover.
At this juncture, Calepine, wending “abrode . . . To take the ayre,
and heare the thrushes song”—whispers of pastoral again—encounters
a bear with a baby in his jaws, gives chase, and rescues the baby, but in
the course of doing so loses himself in the forest (iv.17).39 Unable to find
the knight, the Salvage conveys his loss to Serena, who for the first time
loses control, tearing her hair, rending her garments, beating her breast,
tormenting herself (v.4):
Vpon the ground her selfe she fiercely threw,
Regardlesse of her wounds, yet bleeding rife,
That with their bloud did all the flore imbrew,
As if her breast new launcht with murdrous knife,
Would streight dislodge the wretched wearie life.
There she long groueling, and deepe groning lay,
As if her vitall powers were at strife
With stronger death, and feared their decay,
Such were this Ladies pangs and dolorous assay.
(VI.v.5)40

Another, similar stanza follows as the Salvage tries to help her, “But day
and night did [she] vexe her carefull thought, / And euer more and more
her owne affliction wrought” (6). She is feeding on her own misery, much
as did Scudamour in Books III and IV, not to mention Redcrosse in Book
I. When any hope of Calepine’s return has faded, however, she arises (like
Una) and sets out for help, mounted on Calepine’s horse and accompanied by the Salvage, now in Calepine’s armor and on foot. They encounter
Arthur and Timias, who has also been bitten by the Blatant Beast. By now,
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we read, Serena’s “wounds corruption gan to breed; / And eke this Squire,
who likewise wounded was / Of that same Monster late, for lacke of heed,
/ Now gan to faint” (v.31). “Corruption” is now out in the open, not just
intimated by wandering or inward unsoundness, and it is directly Serena’s
but only Timias’s in “like” manner: a hair’s breadth of difference, but
nonetheless evident. Timias’s wound, moreover, is specifically the result
of a “lacke of heed,” together with entrapment, whereas Serena’s, which
heedlessness also occasions, is intimated to be more culpable. What is
progressively exposed to view in Serena’s story is the way meaning and its
consequences get attached to an event and indeed to a figure—the figure
of a woman, as it happens, and not without the narrator’s awareness,
arguably both sympathetic and realistic—truthful.
Serena, who has not spoken since her cry for help when the Beast
seized her and then her futile plea to Turpine to spare Calepine, intervenes when Arthur and Timias first find her with the kindly Salvage,
whom Timias tries to subdue. She calls on Arthur to separate the combatants, and he, significantly having first asked whether she is freely with
the Salvage, or not, for nearly three stanzas hears her sad story. That she is
herself the teller bears emphasis, as does her awareness of what has happened to her. Discerningly, she characterizes herself as a dame “Who both
in minde, the which most grieueth me, / And body haue receiu’d a mortall
wound,” and she characterizes her companion as “a saluage wight, of brutish kind” who has been bred among forest beasts, yet one in whom “It is
most straunge and wonderfull to fynd / So milde humanity, and perfect
mynd” (v.28–29).41 From this point forward, we recognize that Serena, no
merely passive object, appreciates what is going on. She seems more fully
human, particularly in her awareness of her mental suffering and in her
grateful wonder at the Salvage’s “straunge,” or unaccustomed, kindness.
Notably, however, she has been wounded in body as well as in mind.
Arthur commits Serena and Timias to the care of the holy old hermit, who treats their wounds, now festering “pruily,” “rankling inward”
with bouts of pain, and putrifying the “inner parts”—in short, quite
desperate (vi.5). The hermit’s “counsell to the minde” by means of artful words is well known: “For in your selfe, your onely helpe doth lie, /
To heale your selues, and must proceed alone / From your owne will, to
cure your maladie” (5–7). It would be hard to imagine a more emphatic
emphasis on the word self, which in this period is acquiring its modern
meaning as “that which in a person is really and intrinsically [s]he (in
contradistinction to what is adventitious).”42 Selfhood is associated with
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self-awareness and vice versa, as well as with responsibility and agency—
with “your owne will,” as the hermit puts it. He also counsels self-restraint
and avoidance of “things, that stirre vp fraile affection” (7). His discipline
is stern; “affection” indicates not simply passion (in the popular modern
sense) but anything that affects the sensible soul. Whether “fraile” applies
to all passion or only to its corrupting forms is open to interpretation.
The hermit is an elderly ascetic who would be at home in the House of
Holiness, were it not for its formal features, which are not merely formal.
This hermit, in contrast, has also had a long and active life of worldly experiences. What seems quite clear is that the sickened plight of Timias and
Serena has reached a need for desperate measures.
The hermit further explains that the Blatant Beast bites “both good
and bad, both most and least,” thereby injecting doubt back into the question of his patients’ responsibility for the extremity of their conditions
(12). Serena, like many a modern patient, comically wishes for a salve that
might magically cure her malady, instead of the harsh, therapeutic discipline the hermit prescribes, but then she joins Timias in accepting the hermit’s more detailed remedy:
Abstaine from pleasure, and restraine your will,
Subdue desire, and bridle loose delight,
Vse scanted diet, and forbeare your fill,
Shun secresie, and talke in open sight.
(VI.vi.14)

Thus fortified, Timias and Serena again set forth and promptly
see Mirabella and her two tormentors, whose story I defer until done
with Serena’s, treating only Serena’s response to Timias’s capture. Seeing
Timias clubbed to earth by Mirabella’s Giant Disdain, Serena flees “away
with all the speede she mought [might],” just as Una fled from the battle of Satyrane and Sans Loy in Book I (VI.vii.50, I.vi.90). Both women
flee anticipated capture with good reason, but, whereas Una next finds the
dwarf traveling toward her with Redcrosse’s abandoned armor, to which
she transfers her attention, Serena is not so fortunate. Serena flees at once
into and away from herself, “afeard”
Of villany to be to her inferd:
So fresh the image of her former dread,
Yet dwelling in her eye, to her appeard,
That euery foote did tremble, which did tread,
And euery body two, and two she foure did read.
(VI.viii.31)
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In the first line of the inset, the word “inferd” signals Serena’s fear of being
judged vicious, or depraved in character, a fear that results from the vivid
memory—indeed the image “Yet dwelling in her eye”—of her seizure
and near-spoliation by the Blatant Beast. 43 She is haunted, traumatized
in modern terms, by a flashback to that experience and by the inference
drawn from it, the inference of culpability and inner corruption that I
have traced. The hermit’s counsel, supposedly her cure, has only increased
her terror of regression or the mere inference of it by others. The sight of
Mirabella and the capture of Timias by Disdain and Scorn have triggered
the terrifying flashback.
Flying “Through hils and dales, through bushes and through breres
. . . till that at last she thought / Her selfe now past the perill of her feares,”
Serena dismounts and utters a complaint about Calepine’s disloyalty in
abandoning her in the forest, unaware that he has spent the intervening
cantos trying to find her (32).44 (Even Una, on the basis of abandonment,
entertained a passing contrast between the kind lion that protects her and
her unfaithful knight: I.iii.7.) Serena, now thinking herself safe and worn
out by travel and sorrow, falls asleep. This is when the savage cannibals,
who are not only sexual predators but conspicuously also Petrarchan sonneteers, hence eroticized makers of cultural meaning, discover her. Unlike
the artist Busirane, however, they are first and foremost—literally, as we
say—eaters of human flesh. By further translation, of course, the cannibals
turn out also to be Catholic idolators, exploitative colonizers, mercantilists, natives of the New World or of Ireland, and more. 45 Such extraordinarily pronounced tropic conversion, I would reemphasize, has a cost.
It becomes itself the cancelation of Serena’s identity as a womanly figure,
together, ironically, with the destruction of her serenity and, in short, of
Serena herself. By such tropic interpretation, her figure becomes as multiple as that of Duessa, the other figure of a woman in the poem who is
stripped (I.viii.45–50). But surely with a difference. Beneath her clothing,
Duessa is a monstrous cartoon of misshapen matter. Serena is undeniably
a woman. And a beautiful one, at that. In further contrast to Duessa, this
time as Mary Stuart in Book V, Serena is not essentially reduced just to her
name as a common noun in the poem. She has, instead, quite a story.
With the cannibals’ voyeuristic, wishful dismemberment of Serena’s
nakedness and their plan for her ritual sacrifice, to be followed by a
feast on her flesh, we are well beyond Busirane’s feigning. This time the
performance is more than a little too real. Given what Serena has been
through—especially “the image of her former dread / Yet dwelling in her
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eye” that has been so recently renewed, together with “the villany . . . to
her inferd”—it is surely tempting to suppose that the cannibals are her
fantasy, fueled by fear and guilt.46 They are this, but by no means only or
simply so. The text is clear on this matter: Serena wakes to a real nightmare, not simply from one:
The damsel wakes, then all attonce vpstart,
And round about her flocke, like many flies,
Whooping, and hallowing on euery part,
As if they would have rent the brazen skies.
Which when she sees with ghastly griefful eies,
Her heart does quake, and deadly pallid hew
Benumbes her cheekes: Then out aloud she cries,
Where none is nigh to heare, that will her rew.
(VI.viii.40)

This looks like, and is, isolation, desperation, and sheer terror. Evidently
there really are “paines in loue” and “punishments in hell,” together with
the “phantasies / In wauering wemens witt.” They can superimpose themselves on each other inextricably.47
Even as the savage priest lowers his sacrificial knife toward Serena’s
“brest,”—notably not, like Busirane’s Amoret, her breast and bowels—
Calepine arrives on the scene “by chaunce, more then by choyce” and
saves her (viii.46, 48: my emphases). Because it is night and she does not
speak—“So inward shame of her vncomely case / She did conceiue”—he
fails to recognize her (51). Three of the most elusive lines in the entire
poem then follow: “So all that night to him vnknowen she past. / But day,
that doth discouer bad and good, / Ensewing, made her knowen to him at
last” (51).48 The poet promises a continuation at another time, but never
gets to it. This is the last we see of Serena. Whether what is discovered
is good, bad, or both and what “knowen” means in the last line are left
hanging, apparently left up to readers in another strong instance of what
I termed disnarration in chapter 2.49 What we do know, however, is that
Serena can never again be serene—cheerful, tranquil, carefree as a day in
June.
Unlike Amoret near the end of Book III, moreover, Serena indubitably does not feel “her selfe . . . perfect hole” when she is finally rescued
(III.xii.38). A modern comment about forgiveness, which in Spenser’s
Book VI is a version of courtesy that is evident from its earliest cantos,
seems more appropriate at this moment than a sexual pun on “knowen,”
not to mention another on “case” in the same stanza. This comment
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resonates with what we know of Serena’s story to this point.50 It encompasses both fortune and agency: “Without being forgiven, released from
the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it
were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover;
we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the
sorcerer’s apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break [or, like
Busirane, to reverse?] the spell. . . . no one can forgive herself.”51 This challenge to interpretation, also resonating with challenges in Florimell’s flight
in Book III and more loudly with Amoret’s plight in Book IV, is an appropriate note on which to turn next to the story of Mirabella, whose sight
precipitates Serena’s headlong flight, unwittingly, as it turns out, into torment by the savages.
Mirabella’s story interlinks with Serena’s, as earlier noticed, and, like
hers, recurrently recalls the story of Amoret and the history of Ralegh’s
wife that informs it. Ralegh referred to his wife as Serena. 52 Another reason that the story of Mirabella occurs between Serena’s cure by the hermit
and her headlong flight from the sight of Timias’s capture by Mirabella’s
tormentors is that the figure of Mirabella, a representation of the conventional Cruel Beauty of the Middle Ages and the Tudor sonnet tradition,
also glances unmistakably at England’s Virgin Queen, who long refused
parliamentary requests that she marry and about whose love life cultural
fantasies proliferated.53 The opening stanzas of the eighth canto of Book
VI, which intervene between the initial report of Serena’s terrified flight
and Mirabella’s full tale, issue a warning to the queen. The first of these
starts by addressing “gentle Ladies, in whose soueraine powre / Loue hath
the glory of his kingdome left” and then cautions them,
Be well aware, how ye the same doe vse,
That pride doe not to tyranny you lift;
Least if men you of cruelty accuse,
He from you take that chiefedome, which ye doe abuse.”
(VI.viii.1)

Critical analyses of Elizabethan sonnet sequences have long accustomed
us to the subtleties of their political nuances, but there is little subtlety about the language of royalty in the present context: “soueraine
powere,” “tyranny,” and “chiefedome” require little effort of the readerly
imagination.54
Somewhat gentler, the next stanza recalls the advice in the proem
to Book IV that Cupid “chase imperious feare” from the queen’s “high
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spirit . . . And vse of awful Maiestie remoue,” sprinkling her heart with
drops of love and softening her “haughtie courage . . . That she may hearke
to loue, and reade this lesson often” (5). This stanza directly introduces
the full story of Mirabella by suggesting the fall from high to low estate
that Fortune’s wheel produces. It continues the address to court ladies,
urging the practice of kindness (natural goodness, generosity) that is
further thematic in Book VI and then the banishing of “cruelty and
hardnesse”
That all your other praises will deface,
And from you turne the loue of men to hate.
Ensample take of Mirabellaes case,
Who from the high degree of happy state,
Fell into wretched woes, which she repented late.
(VI.viii.2)

Aside from reference to the queen, Mirabella is another, profoundly
psychological study of womanly misery, as well as a kind of emblematic
road show—a “Ladie free,” who rides “an Asse / Led by a Carle and foole,
which by her side did passe” (VI.vii.27). Guided, or led, as is Mirabella, by
her Giant Disdain and with her Fool Scorn beside her, the sense in which
she is “free” is in question from the very start. The word “free,” reinforced
by the word “libertie,” occurs twice in the four stanzas depicting her here.
As Hamilton notes in his edition, “free” is a stock epithet for a lady of
noble birth, and he further suggests that the initial use of the word at this
point carries “the sense of being wilful,” a quality, I would add, that, if
pertinent, is hardly evident this soon (648n27.7). A beauty, “deckt with
wondrous giftes of natures grace,” Mirabella scorns and disdains scores of
languishing lovers, until eventually she is haled before Cupid as judge, and
this love god imposes a penance on her (vii.28). Until she saves as many
lovers as she has destroyed, she is to wander with the Fool and the Giant,
who also happens to be the sib of Orgoglio (Book I’s Giant Pride). As
this threesome travels, the Giant cruelly demeans Mirabella, and the Fool
occasionally whips her, along with her horse. She is also furnished with
a backpack for her repentance that has a torn bottom and with a leaky
bottle for her contrite tears. The figure of Mirabella, embodying futility
as well as misery, looks like yet another expression of despair. She is a far
cry from the earlier cartoons implicating the queen, such as Argante and
Slander, insofar as her story includes some appreciation of her unhappy
plight.
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When Timias, traveling with Serena, tries to rescue Mirabella from
the Giant and Fool, he is instead captured by them, as is the knight who
next tries to intervene. Mirabella’s tormentors lead Timias, bound like a
dog, and then threaten to yoke the two captured knights together as if they
were oxen. They degrade and dehumanize the men they control. Mirabella
herself, whose aggressive behavior they embody, is their prisoner, too, and,
seen this way, she is to be pitied. Everything about her signals hopeless
self-enclosure. Her name suggests not only beauty (bella) to be admired
but also, in view of her life-long behavior, a mirror: like Latin mira
and miror/-ari, which derive from miro, “to wonder,” these Latin roots
underlie the English word mirror, which sound alone would suggest as a
play on Mirabella’s name. If Mirabella’s Giant Pride is Orgoglio’s brother,
her sister is Lucifera, the joyless Queen of Pride’s House, who holds in
her hand “a mirrhour bright” and “in her selfe-lou’d semblance” takes
delight (I.iv.10). 55 The difference between these two queenly figures,
however, is Mirabella’s awareness of her guilt as well as her misery, evident in her confessing to Prince Arthur the damage to others her selfloving denial of true love has done and its painful consequences for herself
(viii.19–22).
Like Amoret in Book III, however, Mirabella pleads selfdestructively for the life of her own oppressors, her Giant Disdain and
Fool Scorn. Yet, having heard Mirabella’s pleas to spare her tormentors
and then having “wisely” attended to her own account of her plight,
Arthur suddenly and surprisingly offers her redemption:
Now Lady sith your fortunes thus dispose,
That if ye list haue liberty, ye may,
Vnto your selfe I freely leaue to chose,
Whether I shall you leaue, or from these villaines lose.
(VI.viii.25, 29)

Arthur clearly puts no stock in Mirabella’s hopeless understanding of
her present plight. But her reply to his offer is simply that “it may not
be” because she has to fulfill the penance enjoined by Cupid, which she
cannot fulfill, not least because of the bottomless bag of repentance and
the leaking bottle of contrition, which mock a religious doctrine of meritorious works—that is, self-help. This is the point, not earlier, at which
Mirabella’s freedom ironically becomes, by her own choice, its lack. The
repeated word “free” in her initial portrait only now becomes clearly ironic by virtue of retrospection, at once with respect to her will and to her
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Chaucerian “fredom and curtesye,” generosity and its social expression in
courtesy, forms of love and forgiveness.56
Mirabella has been self-loving, and Cupid has sentenced her to
herself. The disdain and scorn with which she hurt others have turned in
guilt and penance back upon herself. They lash out at any, such as Timias,
who would rescue her. They are still her masters and, indeed, have become
her gods. Led by them, she finally refuses her own right to redemption
when Arthur offers it to her. From one point of view, she is willful but,
from another, quite will-less and lacking not only in kindness but also in
faith. Mirabella and her tormentors keep moving, but they get nowhere.
Effectually, she is stuck in one place and condition, an effect that sheds
light on her initial depiction in so strikingly emblematic a form. Her
refusal of Arthur’s offer, his “good will,” as with unwitting irony she calls
it, immediately gives way in the same canto to the episode of Serena and
the cannibals (30). Whereas Serena is depicted essentially as a victim of
fortune, however, Mirabella is depicted as a victim at once by choice and
its lack. In this, she bears an odd resemblance to Acrasia, as Harry Berger
has glossed this witch’s name, which alludes at once to power and to powerlessness.57
Discussing the stories of Belphoebe and Amoret in chapter 2, I suggested that Spenser explored and improvised as he went along; at this point,
I would add that, as time passed, he re-envisioned his massive project with
respect to its figuration of women. The figuration of Serena and Mirabella,
an extensive transformation of Amoret and Belphoebe, extends not only
to their names but even to the prioritizing of their respective stories
within the poem, and it does so conclusively. Whereas poor Amoret just
keeps falling into lustful hands—Busirane’s, Lust’s, then Lust’s again (with
Timias’s help), then seemingly once more Scudamour’s—Serena’s story is
not primarily about lust but more complexly about pleasure, detraction,
agency, trauma, and the poetic and readerly generation of sociocultural and personal meaning. As for Belphoebe and Mirabella, whereas
Belphoebe’s figure suggests fixation, Mirabella’s more sympathetically and
starkly explores its sociocultural and personal sources, or mechanisms—
including choice and fortune, virtù and fortuna.
Yet simply to make contrasting exempla of the linked stories of
Serena and Mirabella, the one too free with her favors, the other too
stingy, would be, although not wrong, morally reductive. It would violate
the human contours, the emotional insight and complexity, of their figures and stories, that is, of their narrativized figuration. Like Una, Serena
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and Mirabella are offered real, salvific help by Arthur, not just the pity he
feels for Amoret in Book IV. Serena, in fact, gets the same help as Timias,
although their plights diverge once they leave the hermit, and the help
both women get in Book VI involves the human dignity of responsible
choice. In short, this book brings not only a return to romance after the
epic form that dominates Book V but also a profound conceptual shift in
the figuration of its major woman, Serena, with whom Mirabella is still
meaningfully twinned.
The interlinked episodes of Serena and Mirabella lead into the
pastoral cantos of Melibee and Pastorella, the old shepherd’s foster child
and a foundling, with whom Calidore, the nominal protagonist of Book
VI, falls in love. He first sees her “placed” on a hillock, “Environ’d with
a girland, goodly graced, / Of louely lasses,” a sight that anticipates his
later vision of the Graces (ix.8). Charmed both by Melibee’s way of life
and Pastorella’s beauty, Calidore dons the garb of a shepherd, and a pastoral courtship ensues. Little distinguishes Pastorella from many another
pastoral queen, and here she exists only in the narrator’s brief accounts
of Calidore’s courtship and her response to it. Essentially, she belongs to
Melibee’s idyllic situation, his place and condition, as her name signals.
When, in Calidore’s absence, brigands capture Melibee and “all his people,” including Pastorella, they effectually destroy the place of pastoral
(x.40). Pastorella’s situation becomes the brigands’ cave, where “darkenesse dred and daily night did houer / Through all the inner parts” and
where “continuall candlelight . . . delt / A doubtfull sense of things, not
so well seene, as felt” (x.42). In this situation, Pastorella exercises some
ingenuity, pretending to favor the brigand’s captain, who is attracted to
her, and feigning sickness to escape his attentions. In short, she lies, one
of the character effects discussed in chapter 3. The narrator also reports
that she suffers in mind and body but is constant in virtue and troth. By
and large, however, she remains a stock figure of romance. When Calidore
rescues her from the brigands and restores her to “joyous light,” he takes
her to a castle, which turns out to belong to the parents who lost her as
an infant (xi.50). He thus takes her home, her third and final situation.
Here, Pastorella’s mother recognizes her long-lost daughter by a birthmark in the shape of a rose on Pastorella’s breast (VI.xii.7). This birthmark
recalls and reembodies Belphoebe’s rose, which was formerly recalled in
the poet’s lyric sublation of Amoret’s “flowre” (IV.viii. 32–33). Yet, in all
Pastorella’s differing locations—pastoral fields, hellish cave, true origin—
she never speaks directly or otherwise exhibits much awareness or depth.
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If our sense of who she is changes, it does so mainly because her situation does. She remains largely a function of the plot and, for this reason,
usefully sets off the figures of Serena and Mirabella in this book, both of
whom are effectually psychological studies with multiple historical and
cultural dimensions.
To end a discussion of Spenser’s figures of women with Pastorella
is in one sense to end with a whimper. Yet Pastorella on the pastoral hillock prefigures the “countrey lasse” at the center of the vision on Mount
Acidale, and her joyous redemption from what is termed the “hell” of her
capture by the diabolical brigands also participates in the reaffirmation
of trouthe, fidelity and truth—her own, Colin’s, and Calidore’s—close
to the end of Book VI (x.25, 43). The language of this redemption, especially Calidore’s breaking open the “dores” and “locks” of the brigands’
cave, is laden with distant memories of the harrowing of hell, more insistently recalled in the debate between Duessa’s emissary Archimago with
Redcrosse and Una at the end of Book I, which I examined in chapter 1
(VI.xi.43, 50).58 Of course, in the final stanzas of canto xii, on the other
side of the Acidalian vision and this further reaffirmation of redemptive
trouthe, the Blatant Beast continues to rage and spread poison, a process
studied so acutely in the story of Serena’s figuration and, like it, never ending. At the end of Book I, we similarly realized that Archimago would
escape his prison. The difference involves tone and emphasis: a hopeful
promise at the close of the opening book but, at the close of the final book,
a bitter complaint. If Books IV to VI witness a massive refiguration, barring the Mutabilitie Cantos, which reflect on time and change, they also
witness the end of The Faerie Queene.
***
The major figures of women examined in this study—especially Una,
Belphoebe, and Britomart, but also Amoret, Florimell, Mirabella, and
Serena—depict the status of women with a greater sensitivity to their problems and experiences than is the sociocultural norm in the Elizabethan
period, even while staying largely within it. They push meaningfully
against it, although only so far. Una’s truth, her “trouthe,” finds fulfillment
only in Eden; Belphoebe’s early promise turns into haggish cartoons;
Britomart’s approach to selfhood is suppressed in the end; Amoret is
abandoned; Mirabella is arrested in misery; and Serena seems damaged
for good. Only Florimell enters wedlock, yet the culturally normative
happiness of her wedding day with her long-sought Marinell, which has
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been taken to symbolize the coming of spring, the return of Persephone
to earth, the fruitful conjunction of heaven and earth, and more, turns
out at best to be nostalgic, “taking vsurie of time forepast,” as the narrator remarks of it (V.iii.40: my emphasis). The term usury suggests a selfindulgent and dubiously ethical exploitation of what belongs to the past.
Nostalgia is what Pastorella’s happy ending offers as well, in this instance
for the homecoming that concludes Book I, yet there remains in her restoration a present memory of Una’s achievement and, with it, a still lingering reaffirmation of renewal as well. Spenser’s figuration of the women of
Faerie does not end in ways to content most modern readers, but the explorations of possibility in his figured narratives are still complex, impressive,
and promising. As one of my former graduate students, a committed feminist, memorably asked a harsher reader of Spenser’s poem, “Don’t you get
credit for trying?” Awareness is where still movement starts.
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lion, and the trio of Abessa, Corceca, and Kirkrapine. Walls cites Halpern for support, as well as Berger 2003, and so it goes.
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which, Hamilton implies, is elevated or ennobling, is ambiguous as well: is this
object himself or the serpent strangling him—or both? Una’s intervention seems
the right moment to redouble his force in God’s fight, not to stop fighting and
start praying.
53
Online OED, s.v., add, v., 1.b (accessed March 15, 2014).
54
Another pressure point comes with Walls’s identification of the Lion as
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deputy clerk, see Hadfield, 187, 192, and on Spenser as litigant, 202–6, 291–92.
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See Patricia Fumerton, “‘Secret’ Arts: Elizabethan Miniatures and
Sonnets,” in Representing the English Renaissance, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 93–133, esp. 93–106. Specifically on
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Early Modern English Lyric,” Studies in English Literature 44.1 (2004): 37–58, for
further light on Scudamour’s raptus of Amoret, including reference to Ralegh (43).
53
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Literary Renaissance 45.3 (2015): 351–76, interprets womanly silence as a strategic, open-ended eluding of patriarchal power and thereby an alternative to Sinfield’s reading. Oh’s alternative does not disqualify Sinfield’s positive criteria of
consciousness, as distinguished from its eventual lack.
10
I extend and modify Sinfield, Faultlines, 59. For another take on “character effects,” see William Dodd, “Character as Dynamic Identity: From Fictional
Interaction Script to Performance,” 62–79, in Shakespeare and Character: we
should take “character as an effect and not as an origin of speech”; such a “discourse biography” results in a social, moral, cultural identity (62–63). Such biography may be compatible with Dodd’s “mimesis,” but dubiously with agency. In
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“verecunda” in the discussion of metaphor in Cicero’s De Oratore (ed. G. P. Goold,
trans. E. W. Sutton, completed by H. Rackham, 2 vols. [London: Heinemann,
1942], 2:128; Bk. III.xli.165).
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chains issuing from his mouth.” The description is Jean Bodin’s in his Six Books of
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University Press, 2001), 82–105.
35
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“Spenser’s Poetics of ‘Transfixion’ in the Allegory of Chastity,” Studies in English
Literature 54.1 (2014): 41–58 at 42–48. Guenther’s discussion of Britomart and
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Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson
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of Scudamour’s embrace of Amoret (III.xii.45.1 [1590]) with the earlier embrace
of False Florimell by the witch’s son (III.viii.x.1).
45
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In the Limits of Eroticism in Post-Petrarchan Narrative: Conditional Pleasure from Spenser to Marvell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),
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But onely vented vp her vmbriere” (III.i.42). Britomart’s minimal exposure would
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52
Compare Jan Kott’s classic essay “Shakespeare’s Bitter Arcadia,” in
Shakespeare Our Contemporary, trans. Boleslaw Taborski, second ed., rev. (London: Methuen, 1967), 226–27.
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55–57, 130–34.
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win,” presumably an allusion to Hector’s killing the disguised Patroclus, which
gave the Trojans possession of Achilles’s armor (III.ii.25): notable is the implicit
fusion of Greek with Trojan, comparable to the joining of Saxon with Briton in
Britomart’s arming. See also Hamilton, ed. (2007), 306n25.6, 321n60.2. William
E. Bolton, “Anglo-Saxons in Faerie Land?: A Note on Some Unlikely Characters in Spenser’s Britain moniments,” Spenser Studies 23 (2008): 293–301, aims
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Tough Love: Amazon Encounters in the English Renaissance (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2000), 16–61: Schwarz perceptively discusses various ways of
interpreting Britomart’s arming.
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On Pubidius, see Harry Berger, Jr., Revisionary Play: Studies in the Spenserian Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 104. Hamilton,
ed. (2007), has further suggestions, 313n13, 630n29.3. Rather than finding comic
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is also a goddess of storm and lightning ( Jovian thunderbolts!) and as such could
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57
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possessing wondrous arts, who eventually overreaches. Accordingly, perhaps to
shield Britomart from such hubris, her Bladudian spear is rendered ineffectual in
her climactic battle with Artegall, and, as part of her more general disfiguration in
Book V, it goes missing in her battle with Radigund. Before these battles, it never
fails her—whether against Guyon, Marinell, or Paridell. In both the later exceptions, she continues to use a sword. John Lance Griffith locates in Britomart’s virtuous purpose the difference between her use of the spear and Bladud’s self-indulgent magic: “Britomart’s Spear and Merlin’s Magic Mirror: Magics Meaningful
and Meaningless in Faerie Queene Book III,” Medieval and Early Modern Studies
20 (2012): 73–91 at 81–83.
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Hamilton, ed. (2007), 307n30.2.
59
For example, The Romaunt of the Rose, in Geoffrey Chaucer: The Works
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1602 (London: Scolar, 1969), f. cxliii v.
60
On Sidney’s speaking picture in Spenser’s poetry, cf. Adam McKeown,
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(2005): 43–63 at 44–49.
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See Susanne Wofford, “Britomart’s Petrarchan Lament: Allegory and Narrative in The Faerie Queene, III, iv,” Comparative Literature 39 (1987): 28–57 at
39–44.
62
Although Sir Gawain and the Green Knight was never published in Spenser’s time and today exists in a single manuscript, the possibility remains of his
having seen a manuscript of it or having encountered a source or some other version of the castle trial. Be that as it may, intertextuality, which differs from source
study, though it might include sources, can work in both directions for a reader,
from former to later, or the reverse: e.g., see Anderson, Reading the Allegorical
Intertext, 15–16.
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James Nohrnberg remarks Britomart’s virginal “attraction toward cloistered interiors” but finds it “somewhat paradoxical that Britomart is also the penetrating agent” (532).
64
On this relation in Book I, see Claire McEachern, The Poetics of English Nationhood 1590–1612 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
chap. 2, and Harry Berger Jr.’s challenge to her view in “Sexual and Religious Politics in Book I of Spenser’s Faerie Queene,” English Literary Renaissance 34 (2004):
201–42. Berger favors an all-encompassing inwardness, McEachern a nearly total
outwardness.
65
Regarding Britomart’s faining, cf. Loomba and Sanchez, “Feminism and
the Burdens of History,” 41: “Desdemona’s desire for such a man” as Othello “and
her desire to be such a man, are inextricable.”
66
Quotation from Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, II.iv.138.
67
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity
(New York: Routledge, 1990), 128–49; and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 1–23. On performance, see
also Kathryn Schwarz, “Whose Body?” in Rethinking Feminism in Early Modern
Studies: Gender, Race, and Sexuality, ed. Ania Loomba and Melissa E. Sanchez
(London: Taylor & Francis, 2016), 213–28 at 216. On cross-gender identification, see Valerie Traub, Thinking Sex with the Early Moderns (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 24–25.
68
On transference and traversal, see chaps. 10–19 of Jacques Lacan, The Four
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, book XI of The Seminar of Jacques Lacan,
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981).
Compare Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “On Saracen Enjoyment: Some Fantasies of Race
in Late Medieval France and England,” Journal of Medieval & Early Modern Studies 31 (2001), 113–46 at 128, 132–33; also Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of
Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 30–45; and his “Revisioning ‘Lacanian’ Social
Criticism: The Law and Its Obscene Double,” The Journal for the Psychoanalysis of
Culture & Society 1 (1996): 15–25. Žižek translates cultural ideology to individual
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69
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succinctly, in Light and Death: Figuration in Spenser, Kepler Donne, Milton (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 160–62.
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dominantly differentiates Britomart from Amoret and Busirane. It also privileges a
narrower conception of erotic desire as genital and woman as Busirane’s Amoret—
whole only when wanting—than is historically justified. Compare Debora Kuller
Shuger’s argument that in the Renaissance “sexual desire is an inflection of erotic
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longing, not its origin or essence”: The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice,
and Subjectivity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 178, 180.
71
Flower and boar are two major, binary forms of symbolism in Book III: see
my Growth of a Personal Voice, 98–113.
72
Consider Stephens’s argument that Lust’s cave is a place where women find
a kind of community or intimacy denied them elsewhere (25–26, 41–42).
73
Although I admire Stephens’s work on Spenser’s gender-bending, I am
sometimes puzzled by her treating a figure such as Amoret—“Venus mayd” (and
“made”) for coupling with “Cupids man”—as if she had, and we could grasp, her
“consciousness,” her “thoughts” and her intentions (e.g., 28, 33, 37); cf. Faerie
Queene, III.xi.7, IV.x.54. Long before the Temple of Venus, Scudamour’s name
(Shield of Love), on which Cupid is emblazoned, identifies him as the relatively
simple figure “Cupids man.” See also note 96 below on characterological inference.
74
On the Venerean veil, see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 135–53.
75
Compare this stanza with Britomart’s revelation in III.ix.20–24, where she
doffs helmet and habergeon alike. In the present passage, the “firie light” suggests
heat lightning to Hamilton, ed. (2007); he, too, is reminded of Florimell’s cometlike hair (413n13.6–9).
76
See The Faerie Queene, IV.i.47–49: “I saw him [i.e., Britomart] haue your
Amoret at will”; Ate alleges heterosexual sex (49: my emphasis). Compare Slander’s
comparable reading of Amoret in IV.viii.28–29 (“conuersing”), 35 (“whores”);
and Jonathan Goldberg, Endlesse Worke: Spenser and the Structures of Discourse
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 59–60. On the reading of “their loues,” see Hamilton, ed. (2007), 413n16, who cites Camille Paglia,
Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson (New York:
Random House, 1991), on the homoeroticism of Britomart and Amoret (182);
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an intimate—though still highly problematical—friendship with Amoret” in the
passages at issue. On homoerotic and other “imprecise” or “unintelligible” terms
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Aemylia, was captured by Lust when she tried to elope with her squire of low
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Compare Elizabeth Fowler’s point that, in the marriage of Thames and
Medway (IV.xi), Medway, the bride, is there by her consent: Literary Character:
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The Human Figure in Early English Writing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2003), 202, cf. also 203–4. Aside from the retrospective raptus of Amoret
in IV.x, consent is the dominant ethical emphasis in Book IV. Melissa E. Sanchez
gives consent a more sinister, political cast in Book IV: Erotic Subjects: The Sexuality of Politics in Early Modern English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), e.g., 64, 71–75.
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homoerotic violence to heterosexual marriage” (163); cf. Kent R. Lehnhof ’s reading of Britomart’s armor as a bow to the poem’s homonormativity, which requires
that “her uncomfortable anatomical otherness” be “covered up” as fully as possible: “Incest and Empire in The Faerie Queene,” ELH 73 (2006): 215–43, here
236. I remain interested in the enabling possibilities of the encounter, insofar as
they can be sustained. They cannot be sustained indefinitely. For an alternative,
positive reading of the encounter, see Lisa Celovsky, “Early Modern Masculinities
and The Faerie Queene,” English Literary Renaissance 35 (2005): 210–47 at 222.
80
William Oram observes that Spenser’s figure of Lust combines male and
female genital imagery, proving a “demonic parallel to the bisexual Venus of canto
x”: “Elizabethan Fact and Spenserian Fiction,” Spenser Studies 4 (1983): 33–47
at 42. Stephens considers the figure of Lust “extravagantly male” (42); Goldberg observes that Lust, when first described, is “little more than a gaping mouth
dripping blood,” the embodiment of desire as a “devouring place” or “devouring
mouth” (58). As he describes it, this place is female. With a trunk-like nose and
long, wide ears to the waist, however, Lust is also elephantine (and Ollyphantine) and male. On the bisexuality of the cave beneath the mount in the Garden of
Adonis, see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 221–23; also Silberman, 47–48.
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Jean-François Lyotard, “The Dream-Work Does Not Think,” in his Discourse, Figure, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2011), 233–67; and Ricoeur, “Metaphorical Process,” 141–57.
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Lyotard, “The Dream-Work Does Not Think,” 244; cf. Lyotard, Discourse,
Figure, 15 (phantasm). Lyotard compares the matrix of narrative rhythm to “what
Propp called form” (244). On Propp, see Discourse, Figure, 145, 406–7n12,
425n26.
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Faerie Queene, III.ii.25, IV.iv.39, vi.12.
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Compare the related confusion/conflation of the roles of hunter and
hunted in the imagery of IV.x.55, as Scudamour leads Amoret from the Temple of
Venus, a passage I have treated in Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 150–51.
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Masked Ate’s description of Britomart’s shield in IV.i.48 is ironically pertinent: telling Scudamour that she does not know the name of the knight who now
possesses Amoret, namely armed Britomart, Ate continues, “but in his shield he
beares / (That well I wote) the heads of many broken spears.” If Britomart’s spear
and steeple need blunting, the Salvage Knight comparably needs bloodletting, as
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earlier suggested: excess, wildness, crudeness (rawness and roughness) are implicit
in his disguised figure, whose “mayle” gets “yriv’d” and whose “fingers [go] slacke,”
his sword thereupon falling (IV.vi.15, 21); sexual allusion is obvious. Like Britomart, Artegall is unmasked before an accord can be reached.
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Compare Amoretti LXVII, in The Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems of
Edmund Spenser, ed. William A. Oram, Einar Bjorvand, Ronald Bond, Thomas
H. Cain, Alexander Dunlop, and Richard Schell (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989): “till I . . . with her owne goodwill hir fyrmely tyde; / Strange
thing me seemd to see a beast so wyld, / so goodly wonne with her owne will
beguyld” (my emphasis). Context and genre make a difference, however.
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Joseph Anthony Mazzeo’s exposition of Machiavelli’s virtù remains useful: Renaissance and Revolution: Backgrounds in Seventeenth-Century Literature
(London: Methuen, 1969), 91–94.
88
On the traditional gendering of wrath, which relates to hate as masculine,
see Barbara H. Rosenwein, ed., Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the
Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), esp. 1–6, 233–47; Lester K. Little, “Anger in Monastic Curses,” ibid., 9–35; Gerd Althoff, “Ira Regis:
Prolegomena to a History of Royal Anger,” ibid., 59–74; and William V. Harris, Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
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On “fitt,” see chapter 2, 53–54.
90
On the difference between allegorical and allegory, adjective and noun, see
my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 5–7. Mihoko Suzuki observes that, “Britomart, though androgynous, is not self-contained to the point of narcissism”
because she seeks Artegall; in other words, she is not subject and object to herself:
Metamorphoses of Helen: Authority, Difference, and the Epic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 154. In connection with Sidney’s Arcadia, Schwarz,
Tough Love, 197, cites Marjorie Garber’s illuminating remarks about the use of the
term “androgyne” or “hermaphrodite,” but, I would add, without an orientation
to figural or mythic thinking, which is not reducible to abstract binaries: Garber
denies that a “third term” is properly a term or “a sex, certainly not an instantiated
‘blurred’ sex as signified by a term like ‘androgyne’ or ‘hermaphrodite.’ . . . The
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Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety (New York: Routledge, 1992), 11.
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Quitslund, Spenser’s Supreme Fiction: Platonic Natural Philosophy and “The
Faerie Queene” (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 230–35. See also
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See Leone Ebreo [Leo Hebraeus] Dialoghi d’Amore [1535] (Heidelberg:
Carl. Gebhardt, 1929), Dialogo Terzo, 1–154 at 87 v. to 88 r.; in French, Dialogues d’Amour, trans. Pontus de Tyard (1551), ed. T. Anthony Perry (Chapel Hill:
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University of North Carolina Press, 1974) 249, 260; in English, The Philosophy of
Love, trans. F. Friedeberg-Seeley and Jean H. Barnes (London: Soncino, 1937),
268–69, 302, 354–55, 371–72. Reprints and translations testify to the popularity of Leone’s dialogue. Taken whole, his views support Elliot R. Wolfson’s
explanation of the ultimately androcentric basis of kabbalistic hermaphroditism:
Language, Eros, Being: Kabbalistic Hermeneutics and Poetic Imagination (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2005), chap. 2; cf. chaps. 3–4. Leone’s assertion
that each male and female includes the other sex/gender illogically gives way to a
more conventional allegory of man as intellect and woman as body. Relevant to
Leone’s assertions is Shuger’s contention that, in the later seventeenth century,
eros is relocated from the eyes and “brain to regions below the waist” (179). My
“Artegall” in The Spenser Encyclopedia, 62–64 at 63, already notes that the principle of coupling in Spenser’s epic (and in its principal couple) involves four terms,
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Compare Laqueur on the so-called one-sex model, which is largely Galen’s:
“what we call sex and gender were . . . [in this model] explicitly bound up in a
circle of meanings from which escape . . . was impossible” (8, 128–29). Laqueur
acknowledges the existence of the Aristotelian two-sex model in the period, on
which see my Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 376–77n10. Traub’s view, although
not utopian, is somewhat more hopeful: Desire and Anxiety, 14–18. See also note
45 above in this chapter and Traub, Thinking Sex, e.g., 8, 18.
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Earlier, Scudamour has referred to the willingly disarmed Artegall as “a
Ladies thrall” (IV.vi.28). Both the facts that Scudamour is the speaker and that he
speaks at the anticlimax of the battle of Britomart and Artegall make a big difference. Scudamour, “Cupid’s man,” is not the most reliable of witnesses, a point his
story and Amoret’s bring home.
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Compare Ricoeur, “Metaphorical Process,” 151, on the split reference of
metaphor; also Wolfgang Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary
Anthropology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), xiv–xv:
Iser’s category of the fictive is not tied to “the old fiction/reality dichotomy.” Like
Ricoeur’s metaphor, the fictive “keeps in view what has been overstepped” but is
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William Morse, “’The Play’s the Thing: Shakespeare’s Critique of Character (and Harold Bloom),” in Harold Bloom’s Shakespeare, 109–23 at 118, 120.
Compare Lorna Hutson, “Law, Probability and Character in Shakespeare,” in
Fictions of Knowledge: Fact, Evidence, Doubt, ed. Yota Baatsaki, Subha Mukherji,
and Jan-Melissa Schramm (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 61–83.
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requires a boy actor to make a fictive woman speak “from within about the system
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of gender”: Yanchin and Slights, introduction to Shakespeare and Character, 1–18
at 9. Are there limits to inferential reading? What role has evidence, and who is
the judge?
97
Faerie Queene, V.vi.34, 37–38, vii.21–23.
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Faerie Queene, V.vii.8, 16, 19.
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For discussion, including Isis Church, see my essay in Essential Articles for
the Study of Edmund Spenser, at 458–60; and in A Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture, I:263–73. Also McKeown, 52; and David Lee
Miller, “Gender, Justice, and the Gods in The Faerie Queene, Book V,” in Reading
Renaissance Ethics, ed. Marshall Grossman (New York: Routledge, 2007), 19–37.
Katherine Eggert comments perceptively about sex and gender in the Temple of
Isis: Showing like a Queen: Female Authority and Literary Experiment in Spenser,
Shakespeare, and Milton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000),
40; more recently, Eggert offers an alchemical interpretation of Britomart’s vision
as a “coniunctio of equals” in the Temple: Disknowledge: Literature, Alchemy, and
the End of Humanism in Renaissance England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 187–90 at 188. Compare also Alice Miskimin, “Britomart’s
Crocodile and the Legends of Chastity,” JEGP 77 (1978): 17–36; and Kathryn
Walls, “Spenser and the ‘Medieval Past’: A Question of Definition,” in Spenser in
the Moment, ed. Paul J. Hecht and J. B. Lethbridge (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2015), 35–66 at 45–47.
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Quotation from William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England, as cited in Elizabeth Fowler, 107.
101
A foreign marriage increases the danger, but a domestic one also incurs it.
On Alençon, see The Spenser Encyclopedia, 14–15; Andrew Hadfield, Spenser: A
Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 101, 273.
102
Hamilton, ed. (2007), 558n30, suggests that the lioness is Britomart and
the tiger Radigund, insofar as the lion is a “royal beast.” I am less confident of
these identifications; cf. the blurring of Redcrosse and Sans Joy in Book I as a griffin with “pray” and “rightfull rauine” and a dragon desirous of these (I.v.8). In
the present battle, the lioness is female, and the tiger is not, but the combatants
cannot so neatly be distinguished. The lack of a stable distinction between them is
another instance of figural undoing and reversing: Mars and Venus wasting each
other, an internal and figural matter and not simply a dynastic or political one.
Compare Eggert, Showing like a Queen, 41: “Britomart’s task is evidently to subdue herself.” While Eggert reads Britomart and Radigund as “scarcely distinguishable,” she also reads tiger and lion as female, whereas I think it important that
Britomart’s Martian and Venerean components alike are hemorrhaging in this
battle; cf. Paglia, “Appollonian Androgyne,” 85; and Suzuki, 177–95. For final
complications of gender, cf. V.iv.39 (Lioness), V.vii.30 (Lioness, Lion, she), and
V.viii.49 (bitch, Tiger). Raging female at least momentarily morphs into male in
the last two passages. See also note 88 in this chapter.
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Britomart’s progress in Books III–V can variously be translated and theorized: e.g., her assumption of Busirane’s abuse of Amoret into theories of transference (10–11, 103–4 ) or of sadism, masochism, or both; her journey in Book V
into a process of sublimation or, again, of transference (see Anderson, “Nor Man
It Is,” Essential Articles, 460); and her fight with Radigund into masochism. In
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1965), Freud (very) controversially wrote, “The suppression of
women’s aggressiveness which is prescribed for them constitutionally [i.e., essentially] and imposed on them socially favours the development of powerful masochistic impulses, which succeed, as we know, in binding erotically the destructive
trends which have been diverted inwards” (155–16). Because my present concern
is with figuration, with metaphorical allegory as a way of thinking, and with significant form and tangible meaning, I want to minimize ahistorical, abstractive
translation, even while acknowledging its possibility within a different kind of
project.
104
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of Edmund Spenser. On the birth of Venus, see also Hesiod, Theogony, in Hesiod
and Theognis, trans. Dorothea Wender (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1973),
27–29. For the positive aspects of Britomart’s rescue of Artegall, see the parallels
to Una observed in my first chapter.
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On the Chaucerian persona in the fifth proem, see my Growth of a Personal Voice, 184–86, and, for additional contextualization, see my Words That
Matter, 172–73. Unlike Harry Berger, Jr., I do not find Spenser’s narrator consistent even in his masking. Like the figures of The Faerie Queene, its narrator evolves
and shifts. His own figure is contextualized: see Berger’s “Narrative as Rhetoric in
The Faerie Queene,” in Situated Utterances (New York: Fordham University Press,
2005), 173–217, and my “Chaucer’s and Spenser’s Reflexive Narrators,” in Reading the Allegorical Intertext, 27–41. My discussion of Malfont and Duessa in chapter 4 of the present volume is also relevant.
106
Artegall’s name suggests “art equal,” “art of equality,” or “equal [to] Arthur.”
Prince Arthur is identified in the poem as Artegall’s maternal half-brother (III.
iii.27). In Book III, his name is spelled “Arthogall” or “Arthegall,” emphasizing his
similarity to Arthur.
107
Metonymy is “referential, substitutive, coded, ideological,” as distinguished from metaphor, which is “deviant, constructive, creative—code-breaking”: Anderson, Translating Investments, 4.
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Shekhar Kapur, Elizabeth (1998). Reading Britomart throughout the
poem as an allegory of Elizabeth I, Julia M. Walker suggestively sees Mercilla as
the icon that replaces Britomart: Medusa’s Mirrors: Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton,
and the Metamorphosis of the Female Self (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware
Press, 1998), chap. 3, esp. 112–13. To my mind, replacement comes earlier and for
a larger complex of reasons.
103

Notes   181

4 Phantasies, Pains, and Punishments: A Still-Moving Coda
1
Quotations from Edmund Spenser: The Faerie Queene, ed. A. C. Hamilton,
text edited by Hiroshi Yamashita, Toshiyuki Suzuki, and Shohachi Fukuda, rev.
second ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2007), here III.xii.26. Notes are cited as Hamilton, ed. (2007), unless otherwise indicated.
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Paolucci, The Women in Dante’s “Divine Comedy” and Spenser’s “Faerie
Queene” (Dover, DE: Griffon House, 2005).
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English Renaissance (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Melissa E.
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Secret Sights (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 67–82 (portrait of
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English Writing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 193–214 (Medway
and Florimell).
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), IV.4.140–43; Ben Jonson, The Forrest,
in Works, ed. C. H. Herford and Percy and Evelyn Simpson, 11 vols. (Oxford:
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University Press, 1996), 116–21.
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For various approaches to Mutability and Nature (mine included), see
Celebrating Mutabilitie: Essays on Edmund Spenser’s Mutabilitie Cantos, ed. Jane
Grogan (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010). See also note 15
below in this chapter.
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